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Abstract 
Despite their use in every British general election of the twentieth and twentieth first century, 
the political poster remains largely unconsidered by the majority of historians working in the 
field of British politics. This thesis is the first study dedicated entirely to the posters role in 
British elections. Through five election case studies, the work contextualises the poster within 
the broader narratives of election culture. Unusually for studies of political communication, it 
is the type and content of the communication ± namely the poster ± that forms the central 
focus of each chapter. Each of which seeks to locate the production, content and display of 
posters parties produced for an election, within the broader landscape of that elections 
particular culture.  
Understandably given the structure of the thesis, chronologically long, but heavily focused on 
specific events, the conclusions are at times pertinent to a particular moment. By studying 
communication in this way, however, by locating posters in one election and understanding 
them as products of the culture that produced them, the research expands on and questions 
some of the key totems that define research into British political communication. Moreover, 
the thesis positions the poster not as an archaic dying form of communication; one replaced 
by those electronic media that have been of far greater interest to academics, namely 
television and more latterly online platIRUPV5DWKHUDVDUJXHGKHUHSDUWLHV¶XVHRIWKHSRVWHU 
has constantly been in a state of flux. Ultimately, posters are objects that are constantly being 
re-imagined for each new age.       
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I.0 Introduction 
 
 
 
Figure i.1 /$%285,61¶7:25.,1*, 1978, Conservative Party of Great Britain, CPA, 
POSTER 1978/9-01. 
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I.1 1979 and all that 
Election posters are ephemeral things. Political parties produce them in order to speak to a 
specific body of people, at a specific time. They have a short shelf life, and are easily 
IRUJRWWHQ 7KLV WKHQ PDNHV WKH IDPH RI WKH &RQVHUYDWLYH SDUW\¶V  /$%285 ,61¶7
WORKING. [Figure i.1] remarkable.1 While little has been written on how parties have used 
posters to communicate with the people, that image of a queue snaking towards an 
Unemployment Office remains the exception. Rather than add to the already extensive 
literature on the birth of the poster and its supposed impact, this thesis begins with an 
appraisal of that literature.  This study begins by questioning the hyperbole and myth that 
surrounds the poster. And in doing so it establishes the need for a study of political posters 
WKDWPRYHVEH\RQGWKHQDUURZFRQILQHVRIµDQGDOOWKDW¶ 
The product of a relationship between the Conservative Party and advertising firm Saatchi 
and Saatchi /$%285,61¶7:25.,1* was first unveiled in 1978. Some suggest that the 
combination of this poster coupled with the supposedly innovative Conservative campaign a 
year later changed electioneering. For Margaret Scammell the 1979 campaign represented, a 
µODQGPDUN LQ WKH XVH RI PDUNHWLQJ LQ %ULWLVK SROLWLFV¶ MXGJLQJ WKH µ/DERXU LVQ¶W ZRUNLQJ¶
VORJDQµWKHPRVWEULOOLDQWDQGPHPRUDEOHSLHFHRISROLWLFDODGYHUWLVLQJRIWKH7KDWFKHUHUD¶2  
$OLVRQ )HQGOH\ DJUHHG FODLPLQJ WKH VXFFHVV RI WKH SRVWHU µVLJQDOOHG D FKDQJH LQ SXEOLF
DWWLWXGHVWRSROLWLFDODGYHUWLVLQJ¶µ2QFHWKH7RULHVZHre in office, their advertisements turned 
the tables on Labour by treating them as if they were a failed government rather than an 
DFWLYHRSSRVLWLRQ¶3 Tim Bell ± the liaison between Saatchi and Margaret Thatcher ± wrote in 
 WKDW µ/DERXU LVQ¶W ZRUNLQJ¶ µZLOO SUREDEO\ JR GRZQ LQ KLVWRU\ DV RQH RI WKH PRVW
HIIHFWLYHSROLWLFDOSRVWHUVHYHUSURGXFHG¶4 Bell joined (or began) a chorus which testified to 
WKH ELOOERDUG¶V UROH LQ WKH &RQVHUYDWLYH YLFWRU\ 'DYLG %XWOHU DQG 'HQQLV .DYDQDJK FLWH
leading Conservatives who argued that the poster dissuaded James Callaghan from calling an 
                                         
1
 Unlike conventional works of art posters were not formally titled.  Throughout this work the posters referenced 
DUHUHIHUUHGWRE\WKHLUILUVWOLQH:KHUHWKLVµWLWOH¶DSSHDUVRQWKHRULJLQDOSRVWHULQXSSHUFDVHWKHFDSLWDOLVDWLRQ
is retained in the citation.  Where the text appears in lower case this is also reflected. This is a deliberate 
recognition of the conscious choice made by the produced in whether to use upper or lower case.   
2
 06FDPPHOOµ7KHRGGFRXSOHPDUNHWLQJDQG0DJJLH¶European Journal of Marketing (1996) 30:10, p. 120; 
M. Scammell, Designer Politics, How Elections Are Won (London, 1995) p. 87. 
3
 A. Fendley, Saatchi & Saatchi: The Inside Story (New York, 1996) p. 59. 
4
 7%HOOµ7KH&RQVHUYDWLYHV¶$GYHUWLVLQJ&DPSDLJQ¶LQ50:RUFHVWHUDQd M. Harrop (Eds.) Political 
Communications: The General Election Campaign of 1979 (London, 1982), p. 16. 
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early election in October 1978, one he might have narrowly won. He did not call the election, 
however, and the subsequent Winter of Discontent irrevocably undermined Labour support.5  
Undoubtedly, the 1979 Conservative campaign has become synonymous with a new style of 
electioneering, and /$%285 ,61¶7 :25.,1* the visual embodiment of that 
transformation. Moreover, WKH SRVWHU¶V IDPH KDV RQO\ LQFUHDVHG ZLWK WKH SDVVDJH RI WLPH
Countless artists and designers have adopted elements of the poster for use in their own work: 
WKHµLVQ¶WZRUNLQJ¶VORJDQDQGVQDNLQJOLQHRISHRSOHKDYHDSSHDUHGLQDYDULHW\RIGLIIHUHQW
contexts. A year after the Conservative victory the poster appeared in a Bill Caldwell cartoon, 
which depicted a queue VWRRGXQGHUWKHELOOERDUGDORQJVLGH WKHFDSWLRQ µ6R PXFK IRU7RU\
HOHFWLRQSURPLVHV¶6 ,Q6WHYH%HOOXVHGWKHTXHXHDQGµZRUNLQJ¶PRWLIV WRVXJJHVWWKH
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition provided sinecures for the privileged few, while 
unemployment remained high [Figure i.2]. The concept has been regularly recycled in varied 
formats.7  When in 1999, the advertising weekly Campaign YRWHG µ/DERXU LVQ¶W ZRUNLQJ¶ 
µSRVWHURIWKHFHQWXU\¶LWVSRVLWLRQLQSRVWerity seemed secure.8 As its designer Martyn Walsh 
VWDWHGWZR\HDUVODWHUWKHSRVWHUKDGEHFRPHWKHµEHQFKPDUN¶KDYLQJµLQIOXHQFHGDOOSROLWLFDO
DGYHUWLVLQJVLQFHDQGHIIHFWLYHQHVVLVPHDVXUHGDJDLQVWLW¶9  
Good design or good art, however, do not necessarily make good political communication. 
Admittedly, those who have used parts of /$%285,61¶7:25.,1* have done so in the 
belief that it will have some impact on the viewer. An important point in the study of the 
construction of political languages, this is considered in more detail below. However, the 
constant recycling of /$%285 ,61¶7 :25.,1* has increased not only the fame of the 
original poster, but also complicated any judgements of how that image spoke to the 
electorate at the very end of the 1970s. Critics no longer assess the image within the context 
of its production, but through eyes that have seen countless reproductions and read various 
heroic interpretations. As Walter Benjamin noted, reproduction of any image increases 
familiarity, and with such familiarity comes a failure to examine the image with a critical 
                                         
5
 D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1979 (Houndmills: 1999), p. 140.  
6
 British Cartoon Archive, University of Kent (BCA), 33%&DOGZHOOµ6RPXFKIRU7RU\HOHFWLRQSURPLVHV¶
(cartoon) Daily Star, 19 Feb 1980. 
7
 6HHIRUH[DPSOHµ&DSLWDOLVPLVQ¶WZRUNLQJ¶EDQQHUwww.swindonclimate.org.uk/20081206London [accessed 
26 July 2012]. 
8
 /&DPSEHOOµ7RULHV¶/DERXULVQ¶WZRUNLQJ¶MXGJHGWKHFHQWXU\¶VWRSSRVWHU¶Campaign, 15 October 1999. 
http://www.campaignlive.co.uk/news/35243/Tories--rsquoLabour-isn-rsquot-working-rsquo-judged-century-
rsquos-top-poster/?DCMP=ILC-SEARCH [accessed 26 July 2012]. 
9
 M. Walsh quoted in http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1222326.stm [accessed 26 July 2012]. 
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eye.10 Just because a poster remains in continued use, does not automatically mean that it had 
DQ\ JUHDW LPSDFW RQ WKH HOHFWLRQ IRU ZKLFK LW ZDV SURGXFHG )XUWKHUPRUH WKH SRVWHU¶V
association with Thatcher has only heightened its renown. As debate continues around how 
precisely society should interpret her premiership, so the fame of the poster only increases. 
Would commentators hold the poster in such high esteem if the Conservatives had produced 
it for another contest? One, for instance, WKDWGLGQRWOHDGWRµ7KDWFKHULVP¶DQGWKHHQGRIWKH
post-ZDUµFRQVHQVXV¶" 
Only by studying /$%285 ,61¶7 :25.,1* within the context of its production can we 
make any accurate declarations about its effectiveness as a form of political communication. 
To assess the extent to which a single poster was the first to achieve something, or marked a 
notable shift from what had come before, it needs locating within a broader history. Put 
simply, we require a PRUHWKRURXJKXQGHUVWDQGLQJRISDUWLHV¶XVHRISRVWHUV WKURXJKRXW WKH
twentieth century set within a historical and contextual prism.  
By interpreting /$%285,61¶7:25.,1* within the history of twentieth century posters, 
we can expose the myths that surrRXQG LW 2I %HOO¶V FODLP WKDW WKH SRVWHU ZRQ WKH 
election, it remains questionable whether a campaign has ever swung on a single event, let 
alone a single poster. Writing in 1932, Philip Cambray ± a former Conservative Director of 
Publicity ± stated that the brevity of such campaigns meant there was not enough time for 
posters to have any significant effect on voters.11 Twelve years later Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard 
BerelVRQDQG+D]HO*DXGHW¶VHVWDEOLVKHGWKDWWKHHIIHFWRIPHGLDZDVWRUHLQIRUFHDJHQHUDO 
consensus rather than change it. It was interpersonal communication, they argued, that was 
the driving force behind changing political choice. 12 More recent studies, which prove the 
power of media to reinforce existing views as opposed to creating new ones, have confirmed 
Lazarsfeld HW DO¶V ZRUN13 Ivor Crewe certainly disputed any causal link between LABOUR 
,61¶7:25.,1*and voter choice in 1979. PROOLQJGHPRQVWUDWHGWKDWµRQO\DVPDOOPLQRULW\
                                         
10
 W. Benjamin, The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction, (London: 2008 (first published 1935)) 
11
 G. Cambray, The Game of Politics: A study of the principles of British political strategy (London: 1932) p. 
177. 
12
 P. Lazarsfeld, B. Berelson and H. Gaudet, 7KH3HRSOH¶V&KRLFH(New York: 1944) pp. 88-9 and p. 150. 
13
 Discussed in D. Kavanagh, Election Campaigning: The New Marketing of Politics (Oxford: 1995) pp. 149-
152; See also B. McNair, An Introduction to Political Communication (London: 2011) pp. 33-34; Research into 
Party Election Broadcasts has shown to have the same effect, although their reinforcing impact is greater than 
posterV6HH,0F$OOLVWHUµ&DPSDLJQ$FWLYLWLHVDQG(OHFWRUDO2XWFRPHVLQ%ULWDLQDQG¶The Public 
Opinion Quarterly, (Winter: 1985) 49:4, pp. 496-497. 
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of the electorate noticed the Conservatives' posters more thaQ WKRVH RI /DERXU¶14 Winston 
Fletcher was more vociferous still: dismissing the Conservative Treasurer Lord 
7KRUQH\FURIW¶VYLHZWKDWWKHSRVWHUKDGµHIIHFWLYHO\ZRQWKHHOHFWLRQ IRUWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHV¶
DV µFODSWUDS¶15 There is, moreover, little or no evidence to support claims that the poster 
FDXVHG &DOODJKDQ WR GHOD\ JRLQJ WR WKH SROOV .HQQHWK 0RUJDQ¶V ELRJUDSK\ RI &DOODJKDQ
certainly does not mention it.16  
Although it is easy to dismiss claims that /$%285,61¶7:25.,1* won the election, it is 
harder to discount assertions that the poster was innovative. Rachel Grainger devoted an 
entire PhD to proving that the &RQVHUYDWLYHµSULQWDGYHUWLVHPHQWV¶RIZHUH µdifferent to 
WKDW RI DQ\ SUHYLRXV SROLWLFDO DGYHUWLVHPHQWV¶17 According to Grainger, Saatchi & Saatchi 
XVHG µFXWWLQJ HGJH DGYHUWLVLQJ WHFKQLTXHV¶ premised on simplicity, including bold short 
slogans and a single image on a white background, which supposedly left opponents with 
µYHU\ OLWWOH WR DUJXH DJDLQVW¶ 18  Yet, simplicity in poster design was neither new nor 
innovative in 1979. Throughout the twentieth century, campaign planners had sought to 
abbreviate their messages to voters.  
Many of the grander claims for /$%285,61¶7:25.,1* are a result of a lack of research 
into what had gone before. FendlH\¶V VXJJHVWLRQ WKDW WKH&RQVHUYDWLYHFDPSDLJQEHJDQ WKH
SOR\ RI DWWDFNLQJ RSSRVLWLRQV IRU EHLQJ µIDLOHG¶ JRYHUQPHQWV LV VLPSO\ ZURQJ $V &KDSWHU
Four reveals, nine years before, in 1970, Labour had produced a poster with the slogan 
µ<HVWHUGD\¶VPHQWKH\IDLOHGEHIRUH¶ 
It is only by giving little or no regard to the history of election posters, that /$%285,61¶7
WORKING. seems so innovative. Partly to redress such interpretative shortcomings this 
WKHVLV FKDUWV WKH SDUWLHV¶ XVH RI SRVWHUV DFURVV WKH WZHQtieth century. Such a long-view 
demonstrates that many conclusions regarding /$%285,61¶7:25.,1*. require revision.  
By examining posters, studying their production, content, and display within the confines and 
                                         
14
 ,&UHZHµ:K\WKH&RQVHUYDWLYHV:RQ¶LQ+53HQQLPDQ(GBritain at the Polls, 1979, A Study of the 
General Election (Washington, London: 1979) pp. 269-70. 
15
 )RU7KRUQH\FURIW¶VTXRWHDQG)OHWFKHU¶VUHVSRQVHVHH:)OHWFKHUPower of Persuasion (Oxford, 2008) p. 
150. 
16
 K. O. Morgan, Callaghan a Life (Oxford, 2007) pp. 638-646. 
17
 R. L. Grainger, ThH9LVXDO5KHWRULFRIWKH&RQVHUYDWLYH3DUW\¶V*HQHUDO(OHFWLRQ3RVWHUDQG3ULQW
Advertising: A Social Semiotic Analysis PhD Thesis (Manchester Metropolitan University, 2005) p. 1. 
18
 Ibid, pp. 183-184. 
11 
 
contexts of the election for which parties produced them, this thesis aims to increase our 
broader understanding of how BritDLQ¶VSROLWLFDOHOLWHVXVHGSRVWHUV to speak to the people. 
In addition to locating posters within a historical context, the thesis questions some of the 
theories that surround political communication. Even the foregoing brief consideration of 
/$%285,61¶7:25.,1*. has shown that there not only exists a problem of context and 
KLVWRULFDO SHUVSHFWLYH EXW DOVR RQH RI ODQJXDJH ,Q KHU XVH RI WKH WHUP µFXWWLQJ HGJH¶
Grainger implies that before 1979 election planners and poster designers had no awareness, 
or gave no thought, to the use of contemporary best practice in the deployment of pictorial 
propaganda. A.J Davies suggests the same: according to him, the Conservative party in 1979 
DGRSWHG µVKDUSHU 0DGLVRQ $YHQXH-VW\OH PHWKRGV¶ 19  The reality is quite different, as 
WKURXJKRXWWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\%ULWDLQ¶VWKUHHPDMRUSDUWLHVZHUHRIWHQHDJHUWRXVHWKHYHU\
best designers and advertising agencies. Existing scholarship defines parWLHV¶DGRSWLRQRIVR-
FDOOHGµFXWWLQJHGJH¶DQGµVKDUSHU¶DGYHUWLVLQJWHFKQLTXHVDVµSURIHVVLRQDOLVDWLRQ¶DFRQFHSW
discussed in more detail below. The term however contains some unhelpful assumptions. As 
Ralph Negrine has suggested, if contemporary communLFDWLRQLVµSURIHVVLRQDO¶E\GHILQLWLRQ
SUHYLRXV ZRUN PXVW EH µDPDWHXU¶20 As the thesis demonstrates, this was far from the case. 
Frequently, parties VRXJKWWREULQJZKDW LV EHVWGHVFULHGDV µFRQWHPSRUDU\ EHVWSUDFWLFH¶ WR
their posters. 
The development oI WKH µSURIHVVLRQDOLVDWLRQ¶ RU VRPHWLPHV µ$PHULFDQLVDWLRQ¶ PRGHO
highlights a systemic problem with the study of political communication, one that 
undermines the utility of most existing assessments of /$%285 ,61¶7 :25.,1*. A 
Whiggish inevitability pervades such analysis, implying that the newer the communication, 
the more effective it is. This is far from true. Not all posters produced before 1979 were 
inferior to /$%285,61¶7:25.,1*, just as not all produced since are superior. Posters 
are ephemeral products born of a specific set of circumstance. They are understood best 
within the context of the ideas and events that led to their production. As will become 
apparent, innovation was not the monopoly of Saatchi and Saatchi. 
                                         
19
 A.J. Davies, We, The Nation (London: 1995) p. 211. 
20
 51HJULQHµ7KH3URIHVVLRQDOLVDWLRQRI3ROLWLFDO&RPPXQLFDWLRQLQ(XURSH¶LQ51HJULQH30DQFLQL&
Holtz-Bacha and S. Papathanassopoulos (eds.) The Professionalisation of Political Communication: Changing 
Media, Changing Europe (Bristol: 2007) p. 34. 
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This examination of the existing work surrounding /$%285,61¶7:25.,1*. has revealed 
a lack of historical perspective and contextual consideration. The Saatchi and Saatchi design 
is claimed exceptional without proper analysis of what came before, and all posters produced 
since are judged against it. As shown in the literature review below, aside from one key text ± 
-DPHV7KRPSVRQ¶VDUWLFOHRQWKHHOHFWLRQSRVWHUVRI(GZDUGLDQ%ULWDLQ± there is a dearth of 
material dedicated to understanding pictorial election communication. This thesis is one 
attempt to correct that gap in the historiography of modern British politics. It does so through 
five case studies, each focussed on one or two closely connected elections and each charting 
the campaigns of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal parties. The justification for those 
case studies now follows. 
I.2 The case studies 
Each chapter analyses how and why parties produced the posters they did. The sweep of these 
case studies is necessarily broad. During the twentieth century, both politics and political 
communication went through rapid development. Votes for some women and all men of 21 
years or older in 1918, universal suffrage by 1929, and the lowering of the voting age in time 
for 1970 election transformed the electorate. Those able to participate in general elections did 
not just change in number or age or sex: over the course of the century, their values and 
demands also altered. Party allegiance grew stronger before 1939 and then after the early 
1950s weakened. The 1960s saw the rise of the permissive society. All these factors affected 
the way political elites and campaign organisers viewed the electorate and influenced how 
they spoke to the nation. The case studies have been selected so as to reflect on some of those 
changes. 
If only because the two elections held in 1910 were the last conducted under an exclusively 
masculine franchise, Chapter One focuses on them. However, the contests of 1910 are also 
worthy of consideration because contemporaries branded the January campaign µWKH SRVWHU
HOHFWLRQ¶ 21  This was due to the millions of posters WKDWZDOOSDSHUHGWKHVWUHHWVRI%ULWDLQ¶V
metropolitan areas. Moreover, other actors aside from parties involved themselves in this 
battle of the billboards. Posters sharing the linguistic codes of party examples but produced 
by preVVXUH JURXSV NQRZQ DV µOHDJXHV¶ also contested for thH YRWHUV¶ DWWHQWLRQ. Given the 
centrality of posters to the two campaigns, coupled with the opportunity to explore pictorial 
                                         
21
 µ7KH3RVWHU(OHFWLRQ¶Pall Mall Gazette, February 1910, p. 211. 
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politics before the onset of universal democracy, 1910 makes an interesting place to begin the 
study.  
Chapter Two examines the impact that universal suffrage ± following the 1918 
Representation of the Peoples Act and 1928 Representation of the People (Equal Franchise) 
Act ± made on the SDUWLHV¶SRVWHU campaigns. The chapter examines the posters of the 1929 
election the first under universal suffrage, which perhaps not surprisingly featured a unique 
QXPEHURILPDJHVRI\RXQJZRPHQ%XWLWZDVDOVRDQHOHFWLRQZKHUHWKHSDUWLHV¶UHVSHFWLYH
leaders featured heavily in poster designs, most famously in WKH &RQVHUYDWLYH¶V FDPSDLJQ
µ6DIHW\)LUVW¶GHYLVHGE\DGYHUWLVLQJDJHQF\%HQVRQ¶V8VLQJDGYHUWLVLQJH[SHUWV who were 
fuelled by new understandLQJV RI µPDVV SHUVXDVLRQ¶ GHYHORSHG from the techniques of war 
propaganda, helped µVHOO¶WKHSDUW\ ± playing to wants and preoccupations of the voter. This, 
however, FRXOGEHDWRGGVZLWKDEHOLHIWKDWWKHQHZHOHFWRUDWHPXVWEHµHGXFDWHG¶DVWRWKH
LVVXHVWKH\µVKRXOG¶EHFRQVLGHULQJZKHQYRWLQJ    
Education was noWVRPXFKRQWKHSDUWLHV¶PLQGVGXULQJWKHDQGFDPSDLJQV WKH
subject of Chapter Three. During those elections, Labour and the Conservatives primarily 
aimed to simply get already convinced voters to the polls rather than persuade wavering 
voters of the merits of their respective programmes. This was a time of confident parties, 
reflected in high memberships and huge election turnouts: the 83.9% achieved in 1950 was 
WKH KLJKHVW RI WKH GHPRFUDWLF HUD 6FKRODUV EHOLHYH WKLV GHVLUH WR µJHW WKH YRWH RXW¶ PHDQW
parties rarely mentioned their rivals, even to attack them, which the posters in the Chapter 
demonstrate was not universally true.22 Posters emphasised a new politics centred on the 
domestic, rather than the workplace and while posters had often previously associated women 
with the home, they now located men there too. The 1950 election also saw the Liberals 
mount a personality-driven poster campaign, one the parties had abandoned after 1929, and 
which paradoxically anticipated the character of later elections.   
The cultural changes that occurred during the two decades following 1951 significantly 
affected the way parties perceived and spoke to the electorate. 23  Conservatives began 
DSSHDOLQJWRLQGLYLGXDOV¶HFRQRPLFVHOI-interest and aspirations, most notably with the 1959 
µ/LIH¶V%HWWHU¶FDPSDLJQ,QUHVSRQVH/DERXUFDPHXSZLWKµ/HW¶V*R:LWK/DERXU¶LQWLPH
                                         
22
 J. Lawrence, Electing Our Masters: The Hustings in British Politics from Hogarth to Blair (Oxford: 2009) pp. 
146-147. ; D. Butler, British General Elections Since 1945 (Oxford: 1989) pp. 2-3. 
23
 J.K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society (London: 1958) second edition.  
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for the 1964 election. Posters remained central to the communication of these messages 
despite the rise in television ownership, if only because the parties were not allowed to 
purchase small screen advertising. Chapter Four assesses these changes by concentrating on 
the 1970 election, the first in which 18 year olds could vote. One consequence was a rebirth 
of attack posters as parties competed for voters whose support was increasingly seen as up for 
JUDEVWKHPRVWLQIDPRXVRIZKLFKZDV/DERXU¶V<(67(5'$<¶60(1.  
&KDSWHU)LYHH[DPLQHVWKHSRVWHUVRIWKHHOHFWLRQRQHLQZKLFKµ1HZ¶/DERXURXWOLQHG
D µQHZ SROLWLFV¶ DQG DGRSWHG D VXSSRVHGO\ novel communications strategy. 24 And yet this 
election saw posters ± by the end of the century a venerable means of campaigning ± be more 
important than ever before. 25 Posters helped mark /DERXU¶V µQHZQHVV¶ The most famous 
µSRVWHU¶RIWKHSHULRG, the Conservatives Tony Blair with µ'HPRQ(\HV¶ that featured Claire 
6KRUW¶V DWWDFN RQ WKH µGDUN IRUFHV¶ EHKLQG 7RQ\ %ODLU exemplified how posters no longer 
simply communicated a message but had become the message. Her words were a veiled 
reference to Labour communication strategists Peter Mandelson and Alistair Campbell. No 
longer was the process of producing communication and the actual communication separate 
entities. Moreover, WKHUHSRUWLQJRIWKHµDemon Eyes SRVWHU¶WKDWKDGLQIDFWPDLQO\DSSHDUHG
as a newspaper advert, showed the new fluidity of political pictorial communication. 
 
I.3 What is a Poster? 
 
Contrarily, &DUOR $UWXUR 4XLQWDYDOOH GHFODUHG ZKDW D SRVWHU ZDV QRW (GRXDUG 0DQHW¶V Les 
Chats GLG QRW DFFRUGLQJ WKH ,WDOLDQ DUW KLVWRULDQ µGHPRQVWUDWH WKH Qew rapport between 
LPDJH DQG ZRUG WKDW RQH PLJKW FDOO GHILQLQJ D SRVWHU¶ 26  µ5DSSRUW¶ ZDV 4XLQWDYDOOH¶V
expression for the inter-dependence between image and text, the relationship which creates a 
whole thought. If we were to remove the image then the overall message is lost. LABOUR 
STANDS FOR ALL WHO WORK, drawn by *HUDOG 6SHQFHU 3U\VH IRU /DERXU¶V 
FDPSDLJQSURYLGHVDXVHIXOGHPRQVWUDWLRQRIWKLVYLHZ$WULSW\FKGHVLJQWKHSRVWHU¶VPLGGOH
                                         
24
 For those associations see J. Lees-Marshment, Political Marketing and British Political Parties (Manchester: 
2008) 2nd edition pp. 181-203. ; D. Wring, The Politics of Marketing the Labour Party (Basingstoke: 2005) p. 
175. 
25
 Lawrence, Electing our Masters, p. 179. 
26
 &$UWXUR4XLQWDYDOOHµ7KH'HYHORSPHQWRI3RVWHU$UW¶LQ0*DOORHGThe Poster in History (London, 
1975) p. 217. 
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section carries the slogan above the image of female workers joined in celebration.27 The left 
panel pictures female workers [Figure i.3] in what appears to be a manual trade, while the 
right hand poster would have depicted of male clerks. The middle section, with its slogan, is 
required to understand the outer images; without it, their meaning is unclear [Figure i.4].  
µ5DSSRUW¶ZDVOHVVLPSRUWDQWIRUHarold Hutchinson, who described the poster as µHVVHQWLDOO\
a large announcement, usually with a pictorial element, usually printed on paper and usually 
displayed on a wall or billboard to the general public. Its purpose is to draw attention to 
ZKDWHYHUDQDGYHUWLVHULVWU\LQJWRSURPRWHDQGWRLPSUHVVVRPHPHVVDJHRQWKHSDVVHUE\¶28 
For Hutchinson the poster is a large printed message, which spoke to people in the street. 
How posters went about doing this was less important to Hutchinson than it was to 
4XLQWDYDOOH EXW KLV LQFRUSRUDWLRQ RI WKH WHUP µXVXDOO\¶ LQ IURQW RI µSLFWRULDO¶ GRHV UDLVH D
crucial point. Not all election posters had pictures. James Thompson and Jon Lawrence 
highlight the importance of text-only examples in local Edwardian electioneering. 29  One 
1DWLRQDO 8QLRQ UHSRUW RI  HYHQ VSRNH RI µFDUWRRQV¶ ZLWK SLFWXUHV DQG µSRVWHUV¶
(without).30 The WHUPµELOO¶ZDVDOVRTXLWHFRPPRQ Moreover, when in the second half of the 
twentieth century producing pictorial posters became increasingly cheaper, a single slogan 
would appeared on nationally produced posters as Figure i.5 from 1955 shows. This thesis 
WKHUHIRUHFRQVLGHUVWKDWµSRVWHUV¶PLJKWFRQWDLQSLFWXUHV or words or a combination of them 
both.  
:KHQFRQVLGHULQJZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVD¶SRVWHU¶VL]H LV LPSRUWDQW:ULWLQJ LQ WKHSRVWHU
designer John Hassall recorded three standard single sheet poster measurements used in the 
UK. Double Crown measured ´E\´P[P, Double Demy PHDVXUHG´E\
´ P [ P) and finally there was Double Royal which measured ´ E\ ´
(1.01m x 0.63m).31 $OO WKUHH W\SHV ZHUH DYDLODEOH LQ µEURDGVLGH¶ ODQGVFDSH RU µXSULJKW¶
(portrait). By combining the Double Crown size in multiples of four, Edwardian commercial 
advertisers and political parties could mount larger posters: the biggest was the 32 sheet 
                                         
27
 The author was unable to get an image of the poster of male clerks. That Labour intended three posters to be 
GLVSOD\HGWRJHWKHULVVKRZQLQµ7KH'DZQDQGWKH'D\LV&RPLQJ¶Labour magazine (May, 1929). The photo 
HGLWLQJLQILJXUHLLVWKHDXWKRU¶VRZQ 
28
 H. F. Hutchinson, The Poster an illustrated history from 1860 (London: 1968) p. 9. 
29
 Lawrence, Electing our Masters, p. -7KRPSVRQµ³3LFWRULDOOLHV´"SRVWHUVDQGSROLWLFVLQ%ULWDLQ-
¶Past and Present (November, 2007) 197, p. 108. 
30
 Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive (hereafter CPA): NUA  2/2/4, Report of the National 
Union of Conservative and Constitutional Associations 44th Annual Conference, 1910, p. 53. 
31
 7DEOHDGDSWHGIURP-+DVVDOOµ3RVWHUV¶LQ75XVVHOO(GAdvertising and Publicity (London: 1911) p. 
133. 
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GRXEOHFURZQZKLFKZDV´GHHSE\´ZLGHP[PP32 Over the course of 
the twentieth century, billboards have become ever larger. By 2010, JC Decaux ± the 
company responsible for over 10,000 advertising sites ± suggested three possible landscape 
billboard sizes, the smallest of which was a 32 sheet double crown, the largest being a 
gigantic 96 double crown sheets, measuring 3.04m high x 12.19mm wide.33 +XWFKLQVRQ¶V
µODUJH¶FRXOGWKHQEHYHU\ODUJHLQGHHG 
 
After the 1970 election defining what a poster is becomes more problematic. During the 
campaign Labour conducted one of the first ever posteUµODXQFKes¶LQFUHDVLQJO\SRSXODUZLWK
parties who understandably wanted journalists to take note of their efforts and bring them to 
the attention of their readers and viewers.34 But sometimes a poster was launched without 
ever being pasted on a billboard: during the 2010 election a cash-strapped Labour party held 
many launches but had no billboard sites. 35  The launch therefore qualifies +XWFKLQVRQ¶V
belief in the need for walls and billboards; as Chapter Five argues, the poster launch event 
has become as important as the poster itself.  
 
By the end of the century there had been a shift, from something that is easily definable as a 
poster to something better classiILHG DV µSRVWHU OLNH¶ &KDSWHU )ive shows how the 
&RQVHUYDWLYH µ'HPRQ (\HV¶ LPDJH ZDV UHSRUWHG as a poster, but actually was principally a 
newspaper advert. With the development in online campaigning, parties are increasingly 
releasing posters online. During the 2010 election campaign the Conservatives combined 
µWUDGLWLRQDO¶ELOOERDUGVLQPDUJLQDOVHats, poster launches, and digital releases.36 The latter of 
these looked like posters and called posters, but were they actually posters? If we return 
EULHIO\WR4XLQWDYDOOH¶VLGHDRIµUDSSRUW¶WKHQLQDVHQVHWKH\ZHUH7KHPHVVDJHRIWKHPXFK
parodied ConVHUYDWLYHSRVWHUµ:HFDQ¶WJRRQOLNHWKLV¶>)LJXUHL@ZRXOGQRWKDYHEHHQWKH
VDPH LI WKH ZRUGV RU 'DYLG &DPHURQ¶V IDFH ZHUH DEVHQW 7KH SRVWHU¶V LQWHQGHG VLQFHULW\
would have been lost without the seriousness, but relaxed attitude of the future Prime 
                                         
32
 Ibid, pp. 133-134. 
33
 J C Decaux, Large Format Production Guide, http://www.jcdecaux.co.uk/products/billboards/ [accessed on 
31 August 2010]. 
34
 B. Franklin, Packaging Politics (London: 2004) p. 129. 
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 &%XUJHVVµµ7KLV(OHFWLRQZLOOEH:RQE\3HRSOHQRW3RVWHUV¶«$GYHUWLVLQJDQGWKH*HQHUDO(OHFWLRQ¶
in D. Wring, R. Mortimer, S. Atkinson (Eds.) Political Communication in Britain (London: 2011), p 193.   
36
 For an account of the poster campaigns during the 2010 general election see D. Kavanagh and P. Cowley, The 
British General Election of 2010 (London, 2010) pp. 143-%XUJHVVµµ7KLV(OHFWLRQZLOOEH:RQE\3HRSOH
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Minister.  Moreover, while the poster was displayed on billboards, it also appeared online. 
While this latter example may not have fitted in with the principle of being a printed medium, 
that the political class, press, and public were calling this digital communication a poster, 
suggests that what constitutes a political poster has gone through a process of redefinition. 
This thesis accepts such developments.     
 
I.4 The purpose of political posters  
At the most simplistic level, parties put up posters to persuade people to vote for them.37 This 
reason, however, does not explain the complexity of why political parties have mounted such 
large and expensive billboard campaigns over the course of the twentieth century.  Research 
of contemporary French and Belgium politics identified eight different reasons why parties 
displayed posters: Informing voters about the electoral programme, making a candidate 
known, showing campaign strength to voters, showing campaign strength to the opposition, 
mobilising activists, mobilising regular voters, convincing undecided voters, and convincing 
leaning voters.38 During elections in twentieth century Britain, all these factors were at some 
point important. And as a dynamic form of communication, the reasons why parties used 
posters changed continually.  
The other important practical consideration why posters have remained such a vibrant form 
of campaigning is the continued ban on paid for advertising on broadcast media. It remains 
illegal for any political or religious bodies to purchase broadcast advertising or for 
advertising to have a political or religious end. Access to broadcasting is not entirely 
restricted, and during election periods come in the form of Party Election Broadcasts. All 
parties contesting 110 or more of the seats up for election are eligible for a broadcast, and 
setting the parameters for the allocation of PEBs is in 2014 the duty of the regulator Ofcom.39  
This limitation on broadcasting has meant that parties have continually turned to posters in 
order to make mass public appeals. 
                                         
37
 S. Seidman, Posters, Propaganda and Persuasion (New York: 2008) pp. 125-162. 
38
 ''XPLWUHVFXµ7KHLPSRUWDQFHRIEHLQJSUHVHQW(OHFWLRQSRVWHUVDVVLJQDOVRIHOHFWRUDOVWUHQJWKHYLGHQFH
IURP)UDQFHDQG%HOJLXP¶, Party Politics,  (Nov, 2012) 18: 6, p. 947; For a similar argument on the use of 
posters see J. S. Trent and R. V. Friedenberg, Political Campaign Communications, Principles and Practices. 
(Maryland: 2008), p. 358 
39
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Having become synonymous with elections, posters play a symbolic role. Such is the link 
between elections and posters that fictional depictions of politics use posters to create an 
image of politics with which the audience can quickly identify. 40  The importance of 
symbolism cannot be overstated. Posters indicate to the public that an election is coming, 
often over a year in advance. Activists like to see posters from their own party because they 
believe them to be central to the process of electioneering, even without any definable 
practical purpose. A Conservative Party report of 1911 reflected on the posters role in 
symbolic representation, stating that the only reason for Conservatives to invest in billboard 
propaganda was because the other side did.41 
Posters fill a space between parties and people, and in doing so fulfil a role in parties claim to 
represent. In order to represent political parties are forced, as Michael Saward states, to make 
claims about themselves and the represented. This act in turn forces parties to portray the 
represented, and in making those portrayals, parties (or any person who seeks to represent) 
PXVWDGMXVWWKHPVHOYHVWRµVRPHVHOHFWLYHYHUVLRQ¶RIWKDWSHUVRQµDQDFWLYLW\WKDWJRHVWRWKH
very heart of poOLWLFDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶42 $VSDUWLHVXVHSRVWHUVWREXLOGWKHLUµFRQVWLWXHQFLHVRI
VXSSRUW¶WKHUHSUHVHQWHGDV/DZUHQFH%ODFNSXWVLWWKH\SURYLGHGDQLQVLJKWLQWRKRZWKH\
saw the voter.43 By unpicking how parties used these visual and verbal languages to speak to 
the represented, the thesis provides new understandings of the relationship between and high 
and low. 
I.5 How the poster has been analysed 
Despite its importance, scholars have largely chosen to ignore the poster. There are many 
reasons for this. Political historians favour text-based evidence and are often uncomfortable 
analysing the visual. While political scientists are more willing to study images, they have 
focussed on new developments in visual communication such as television in the 1960s and 
more recently the internet and social media, rather than the venerable taken-for-granted 
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 For instance see Episode 1, Series 3, The Thick of It, BBC, 24 October, 2009. 
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poster.44 While some art historians have analysed election imagery, as a group they tend to 
focus on the admittedly often more aesthetically pleasing posters produced by Communist 
regimes, rather than their sometimes humdrum democratic equivalents.45  
Pictorial evidence in general, is remarkably absent from most studies of modern political 
history. This is somewhat surprising, given sights increasing importance to communication 
over the course of the twentieth century.46 Admittedly, the relationship between politics and 
vision has always been uneasy, with Western tradition placing greater weight on writing and 
the spoken word.47 Moreover, critics have long railed against the apparent shallowness of the 
image. Plato argued WKDW DUWLVWV ZHUH µD ORQJ ZD\ UHPRYHG IURP WUXWK¶ DQG WKHLU ZRUN
LQFDSDEOHRISHQHWUDWLQJµEHQHDWKWKHVXSHUILFLDODSSHDUDQFHRIDQ\WKLQJ¶48 As images are not 
reality but representations of it, they have long been regarded as potential sites for untruth.49 
The painter Rene Magritte frequently commented on the gap between truth and image; as the 
art historian Ernst Gombrich put it, Magritte ZDV QRW µFRS\LQJ UHDOLW\ EXW UDWKHU FUHDWLQJ D
QHZUHDOLW\¶50  There is a final problem as images are, as Victoria Bonnell points out, usually 
polyvalent.51  
Despite these concerns (or because of them), there has been a growing call for historians to 
utilise visual sources. As early as 1976 Raphael Samuel hoped images woXOG µLQIRUP QHZ
modes of HQTXLU\¶ WKRXJK few historians have seemingly taken up the challenge.52 When 
historians have used visual sources, the result Stephen Connolly believes has been 
µXQUHIOHFWLYH¶ DQG WRR RIWHQ WKH\ KDYH QRW EHHQ VWXGLHG LQ WKHLU RZQ ULght, but merely to 
affirm arguments reached by other evidence.53 Despite such concerns, work on vision and 
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politics has led to a number of breakthroughs. Most notably, in establishing the importance of 
sight to eighteenth and nineteenth political discourse.54 Connolly admits that the work of 
James Epstein has demonstrated how eighteenth century political communication was 
constructed through a variety of mediums.55 Epstein is just one of a number of historians who 
have used visual sources and other non-textual material to study what could be termed the 
µOLYHGH[SHULHQFH¶RIHLJKWHHQWKDQGQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\SROLWLFV56 Such innovation is just one 
part of a much broader shift within political history. For James Vernon, Patrick Joyce, and 
Gareth Stedman Jones this KDV FRPH XQGHU WKH JXLVH RI WKH µOLQJXLVWLF WXUQ¶57 At times 
controversial, they have redefined political history through investigation of new forms of 
evidence ± including visual sources ± in order to study politics through its language. 58 If the 
study of visual evidence can radically alter our conception of pre-democratic Britain, then it 
also has the potential to reinvigorate our understanding of the modern and contemporary 
periods. 
Change has come about through pressure from other forms of history which, according to 
6WHYHQ)LHOGLQJKDVUHVXOWHGLQWKHVWXG\RISROLWLFDOSDVWVWXUQLQJLWVHOIµWRZDUGVWKHµSHRSOH¶
DQGLQFUHDVLQJO\WRWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQRILGHQWLWLHVDQGPHDQLQJV¶59. This approach has yielded 
significant results across a broad spectrum, most notably in the field of class-identity and 
party allegiance, but also the relationship between politics and society, highlighting the gap 
between those who sought to rule and those who would be ruled.60 
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VHHDOVR)2¶*RUPDQµ7KH3DLQH%XUQLQJVRI-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Present (November, 2006) 193:1, pp. 111-53RROHµ7KH0DUFKWR3HWHUORR3ROLWLFVDQG)HVWLYLW\LQ/DWH
*HRUJLDQ(QJODQG¶Past and Present (August: 2006) 192:1, pp. 109-153.  
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 G. Steadman Jones, Languages of Class (Cambridge: 1983); P. Joyce, Visions of the People, Industrial 
England and the question of class 1848-1914 (Cambridge: 1991). 
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 For criticism of their findings see J. Lawrence, Speaking for the people: Party, language and popular politics 
in England, 1867-1914 (Cambridge: 1997), pp. 58-0LFKDHO%HQWOH\KDVEHHQVWURQJO\FULWLFDORI9HUQRQ¶V
ZRUNVHH0%HQWOH\µ9LFWRULDQSROLWLFVDQGWKHOLQJXLVWLFWXUQ¶The Historical Journal (1999) 42, pp. 883-902. 
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 6)LHOGLQJµ5HYLHZ$UWLFOH/RRNLQJIRUWKHµ1HZ3ROLWLFDO+LVWRU\¶Journal of Contemporary History 
(2007) 42:3, p. 516.  
60
 For the relationship between people and party see Lawrence, Speaking for the people; '7DQQHUµClass 
voting and radical politics: the Liberal and Labour parties, 1910-¶LQ-/DZUHQFHDQG07D\ORUHGV
Party State and Society: Electoral Behaviour since 1820 (Aldershot: 1997) pp. 106-120. For the role of politics 
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7KH ZRUNRI -R\FH DQG 9HUQRQ RQ SHRSOH¶V UHODWLRQVhip with formal and informal political 
structures at the local level, demonstrate how innovative studies of communication can 
LQIRUPXQGHUVWDQGLQJ+RZHYHUDOWKRXJKWKH\VRXJKWWRPRYHDZD\IURP(37KRPSVRQ¶V
more reductive view of identity, their work UHPDLQV URRWHG LQ WKH µKLVWRU\ IURP EHORZ¶
tradition, one that is necessarily largely uninterested in high politics and indeed sees national 
SROLWLFLDQVDV WKUHDWHQLQJ ORFDO µGHPRFUDWLF¶ IRUPVRIH[SUHVVLRQ61 Such is the emphasis on 
local organisation it has become the main explanation for the rise of national party structures, 
especially Labour, in the pre- and inter-war years.62 
This focus on localised forms of communication has tended to marginalise the importance of 
the central national party voice. More recently, however, Phillip Williamson and Bill 
6FKZDU] KDYH VKRZQ WKH VLJQLILFDQFH RI %DOGZLQ¶V QDWLRQDO UKHWRULF LQ WKH building of his 
public persona and the µHGXFDWLRQ¶RI WKHQHZO\ HQIUDQFKLVHG PDVVHV LQ LQWHU-war Britain.63 
Meanwhile, Laura Beers has VKRZQ KRZ 7UDQVSRUW +RXVH¶V FRPPXQLFDWLRQ FRQWULEXWHG WR
/DERXU¶VJURZWKEHIRUHWKHYLFWRU\RI64 Beers is one of the few historians to offer any 
sustained thinking on the use of posters. Even so, like 5RVV0F.LEELQVKHFODLPV/DERXU¶V
1910 posters haGµTXDOLW\¶EXWIDLOVWRDUWLFXODWHZKDWWKDWDFWXDOO\PHDQV65 Highlighting the 
limited nature of many political KLVWRULDQV¶ DQDO\VLV RI SRVWHUV in his assessment of the 
/LEHUDO3DUW\¶VSRVWHUV1HDO%OHZHWWDSSOLHVWKHVDPHZRUGEXWDJDLQOHDYHVWKe reader 
wondering what exactly it signifies.66  
Reference to nationally produced posters does suggest political historians appreciated they 
played an important role in campaigning, even if most are not able to specify precisely what 
                                                                                                                              
in society see L. Black, Redefining British Politics : Culture, Consumerism and Participation 1954-1970 
(Hampshire: 2010). 
61
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it was.67 James Thompson has done the most to develop a coherent analysis of the efficacy of 
posters, in a wide-ranging study of Edwardian pictorial propaganda. 68  Thompson has 
demonstrated the centrality of pictorial propaganda to Edwardian politics and has shown the 
benefit of locating visual language within the myriad voices that constructed political 
communication. His work naturally leads to questions of how parties continued to use posters 
after 1914 and how in turn those images help construct post-reform political communication, 
one of the most significant aims of this thesis. 
While political historians like Beers and Thompson have demonstrated the importance of 
locating posters in their context, many art historians are apt to ignore it. By refusing to 
acknowledge the political posters purpose ± communication ± and instead concentrating on 
the aesthetic, their work result in few conclusions about how posters actually functioned.69 
By exclusively focusing on the image contained in the poster, art historians reveal nothing 
about why the posters were created and so why such images were produced, a failing 
common to the innumerable studies of war posters.70 This absence also undermines Susan 
6RQWDJ¶V DQDO\sis of posters, which suggested a binary separation between commercial and 
political examples; the former she deemed cultivated private desires, while the latter 
promoted a sense of obligation. The briefest glance at the images included in this thesis show 
that her distinction is by no means universally true. Nor is Sontag correct that posters were a 
mirror for the public to look upon themselves: many political posters aspired to change how 
people thought. 71 
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For scholars of political communication, an interest in the post-war rise of so called  
µSURIHVVLRQDOLVDWLRQ¶ a term used to capWXUH WKH PDLQVWUHDP SDUWLHV¶ JURZLQJ XVH RI
commercial techniques and advertising expertise) has led to a reaction against the study of 
posters.72 $V 'HQQLV .DYDQDJK VXJJHVWV µRQH LQGLFDWRU RI WKH DFFHSWDQFH RI SURIHVVLRQDO
communications is that no major British party would now dream of entering an election 
FDPSDLJQZLWKRXWDFRPPXQLFDWLRQVVWUDWHJ\DQGDGYLFHIURPSURIHVVLRQDOV¶73 Within these 
constraints, campaigning of the past is naturally viewed as unstructured and amateur.74  
However, Dominic Wring and Richard Cockett have shown that political marketing before 
1945 was more complex and advanced than those who study post-war politics are prepared to 
admit.75 As this thesis demonstrates, throughout the twentieth century, the production of 
election posters was often informed by external expertise in some form. Undoubtedly, in the 
latter half of the century this dependence increased but it did not come from nowhere.  
This IRFXV RQ WKH µQHZ¶ PHDQV WKDW SROLWLFDO FRPPXQLFDWLRQ VWXGLHV IRFXV RQ PRUH UHFHQW
types of communication. A rapidly growing body of literature dedicated to internet 
campaigning is testament to this fact.76 Yet, as the authors of the 2010 Nuffield study state, 
SDUWLHV¶XVHRI WKH LQWHUQHW LQ WKHHOHFWLRQZDVKDUGO\ UHYROXWLRQDU\:KLOHRQOLQH platforms 
are becoming increasingly important, they deliver a relatively traditional type of message.77 
Tellingly the greatest expense during the 2010 campaign was not web advertising, but direct 
mail, something that is, like the poster, usually overlooked.78  Before interest in internet 
FDPSDLJQLQJ LW ZDV WHOHYLVLRQ¶V UROH LQ SROLWLFDO FRPPXQLFDWLRQ WKDW GRPLQDWHG UHVHDUFK
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)ROORZLQJ WKH SXEOLFDWLRQ RI -D\ %OXPOHU¶V DQG 'HQLV 0F4XDLO¶V FODVVLF VWXG\ LQ 
academics have constantly questioned, reassessed, and revised the function and impact of 
broadcasting politics to the people.79  
While research into the role and impact of television and the internet on political 
communication is substantial and growing, the same is not true of posters. One reason for this 
is a prevailing view that the medium is a redundant outdated form of campaigning.80 Indeed, 
during the early 1990s academics had begun to point to the posters waning influence.81 And 
while Martin Harrop and Margaret Scammell showed that in 1997 there had been a shift 
away from newspaper advertising back to posters, the medium was by that point viewed as 
communication from an earlier time.82 Whatever the merits of such conclusions, they reflect 
the problem that ± µ/DERXULVQ¶WZRUNLQJ¶ aside ± those working in political communications 
simply regard posters as of little interest.  
Building on those few who have taken posters seriously, this thesis aims to map out a 
nuanced and coherent explanation of the development of the political poster during the 
twentieth century, integrating an understanding of text and context. The poster continues to 
be an important part of any campaign and it is surprising that it has not yet been the subject of 
a serious academic study. Consequently, this thesis can do little more than scratch the surface, 
but in doing so, it aims to encourage others to look at posters in greater depth.  
I.6 Method  
$VLQGLFDWHGDWWKHVWDUWRIWKLV,QWURGXFWLRQPXFKZULWWHQDERXWWKHµLFRQLF¶/$%285,61¶7
WORKING. poster lacks historical perspective. It has further established that, apart from the 
6DDWFKLEURWKHUV¶PRVWIDPRXVSURGXFWPRVWVFKRODUV LQWHUHVWHG LQFRQWHPSRUDU\SROLWLFVRU
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modern political history have rarely turned their attention to posters. Historians tend only to 
take written forms of evidence seriously, while scholars of more recent political 
communication appear to view the poster as old-fashioned and unworthy of serious 
consideration. This thesis will hope to demonstrate that such outlooks are in need of revision.  
An awareness of context is critical to any interpretation of posters, something appreciated by 
both James Thompson and Pearl James.83 In order to achieve this, the five case studies break 
down each campaign to reveal the conception, production, and dissemination of posters. Each 
case study shares the same structure, beginning with an investigation of how parties 
organised themselves to produce posters. The middle section examines the posters 
themselves, deconstructing their images in order to understand how exactly they 
communicated their intended messages. The final section examines how parties displayed 
their posters, and therefore the changing way in which voters physically experienced the 
billboard.   
This method builds on well-established foundations. As early as 1949 the political scientist 
DQGFRPPXQLFDWLRQVVSHFLDOLVW+DUROG/DVZHOOEURNHGRZQWKHµDFW¶RIFRPPXQLFDWLRQ LQWR
five steps, Who, Says What, In Which Channel, To Whom, With What Effect.84 For the 
SXUSRVH RI WKLV VWXG\ µ,Q :KLFK &KDQQHO¶ ZLOO DOZD\V EH SRVWHUV µ7R ZKRP¶ LV EURDGO\
considered as those who could vote, but does account for the reality that although posters 
were essentially viewable by all, they were a sophisticated form of communication, using as 
discussed below specific codes to speak to specifiFJURXSV7KLVOHDYHVXVWKHQZLWKµ:KR¶"
µ6D\V:KDW¶"WRµ:KDW(IIHFW¶":HQHHGWRXQGHUVWDQGZKDWWKHLPDJHWKHRULVW6XVDQ%XFN-
0RUVV FDOOHG DQ µREMHFW
V SUHKLVWRU\¶ DQG µDIWHUKLVWRU\¶85 Cara Finnegan was more precise 
still, arguing that if one or all oI DQ LPDJH¶V µSURGXFWLRQ¶ µFRPSRVLWLRQ¶ µUHSURGXFWLRQ¶
µFLUFXODWLRQ¶DQG µUHFHSWLRQ¶ LVDQDO\VHG LW LVSRVVLEOH WRDQVZHU µSDUWLFXODUTXHVWLRQVDERXW
WKHUROHVLPDJHVSOD\LQSXEOLFFXOWXUH¶86  
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)LQQHJDQ¶V PHWKRG LV XVHIXO WR D SRLQW EXW PRUH LV QHHGHG. ,Q WKLV WKHVLV µSURGXFWLRQ¶ LV
understood not just for individual posters but also at the level of entire campaigns at the 
national level. Undoubtedly, some posters were incredibly influential, remaining longer in the 
public conscientious than others. The thesis, however, is concerned with how the posters 
interacted with each other, with other texts and with the electorate. Consideration is needed of 
who worked on campaigns and made the decisions. Why parties employed certain artists and 
how they worked with them, and whether this had an impact on the final product. For the first 
four case studies archival material can tell us the organisational practicalities of why parties 
acted in the manner they did.87 With the fifth case study, that of 1997, a closed Conservative 
DUFKLYHDQGDµ1HZ¶/DERXU3DUW\UHOuctant to retain documents has meant a reliance on the 
posters and evidence gained from contemporary newspapers and other published accounts. 
 
7KHVHFRQGSRLQWRQ)LQQHJDQ¶VPRGHOLVFRPSRVLWLRQDQGZHQHHG to build on her approach. 
We need to know not only how the image is composed, but also of what, and more crucially 
why. Posters are an amalgam of various symbols, each taken from a variety of locations and 
like all texts constructed from existing sources. Julia Kristeva called this process 
µLQWHUWH[WXDOLW\¶ 88  7KLV µPRVDLF RI TXRWDWLRQV¶ ZDV HYLGHQW LQ SRVWHUV DV GHVLJQHUV PDGH
extensive use of existing symbols to create their product. Gerard Genette summed up 
µLQWHUWH[WXDOLW\¶ DV µTXRWLQJ ZLWK RU ZLWKRXW quotation marks) plagiarism, allusion, and the 
SHUFHSWLRQ E\ WKH UHDGHU RI WKH UHODWLRQVKLS RI RQH ZRUN WR DQRWKHU¶89 By determining the 
origins of slogans and symbols designers used, we can better understand how posters 
communicated with the electorate and thereby begin to bridge the gap of understanding just 
how that electorate interpreted that communication.  
Posters were not simply images, but very often mixtures of words and pictures. The nature of 
this relationship is contested. For Roland Barthes, image and word act as one in a single 
document. They work in unity and present a coherent whole. The image fixed in place using 
the written word. 90 IQUHFHQW\HDUV%DUWKHV¶DQDO\VLVKDVFRPHXQGHUVFUXWLQ\, not least with 
the suggestion it is only possible to understand the relationship between image and text by 
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studying them independently of one another.91 W.J.T Mitchell adopts a position somewhere 
beyond, rather than between, Barthes and his critics. Mitchell stated that the relationship 
between text and image is entirely dependent on the subject and the difference or similarity 
between image and text does not matter. What is important, according the Mitchell, is what 
GLIIHUHQFHGRWKHµGLIIHUHQFHVDQGVLPLODULWLHVPDNH¶92 
0LWFKHOO¶V DSSURDFK to the interpretation of media IROORZLQJ WKH µSLFWRULDO WXUQ¶ DUH
particularly useful because he accepts that communication is increasingly formed via 
mixtures of codes and symbols. In the age of the digital revolution, this is becoming ever 
more the case. As stated above historians have previously shied away from visual evidence, 
preferring instead the safety of the written word that confines their disciplinary boundaries. 
What Mitchell has in effect called for is a de-disciplining of the gap between the verbal and 
the visual.93 What this offers for the study of posters is an insight into the world of mixed 
communication. Barthes and Mitchell do not agree on the relationship between image and 
text. Writing on the work of William Blake Mitchell argued there could be a complete 
collapse in the difference between the written and verbal forms.94 Despite these differences 
Mitchell and Barthes are useful in that both theories maintain the acceptance, that at a posters 
inception the intention is that image and word would function in unity. Designers intended 
that a single poster constructed from image and word would deliver a cohesive idea, 
embodying what Quintavalle called µUDSSRUW¶7KHUHIRUHDVDVWDUWLQJSRLQW WRXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
posters, it is important to treat image and text as functioning towards the same goal, even if at 
times, they did not always succeed. 
Having negotiated the relationship between text and image, the thesis unpicks the posters to 
try and source their content. This enables us to see from what languages designers drew, and 
understand better the nature of political language in particular elections. During each election, 
certain factors remained constant in poster production. Parties (and their designers) wanted to 
say something and believed that voters would understand the communications they produced. 
They made decisions about what they wanted to say ± and how best to say it ± by drawing on 
their interpretations of the contemporary political culture. Indeed this is one of the factors 
Steven Fielding stated as definLQJ µFXOWXUH¶, DV LW HPEUDFHG µQRW MXVW ZKDW SHRSOH GLG EXW
                                         
91
 G. Kress and T. van Leeuwen, Reading Images The Grammar of Visual Design (London, 1999) p. 17. 
92
 Mitchell, Picture Theory, p.91 
93
 Mitchell, Picture Theory, p.83-107 
94
 Ibid, p. 146-147 
28 
 
what they imagined they were doing and what impact they believed their actions would 
KDYH¶95 ,QUHODWLRQWRWKHSURGXFWLRQRISLFWXUHVDQGRWKHUµKLVWRULFDODUWHIDFWV¶ WKHKLVWRULDQ
Michael BaxanGDOOFRQFHSWXDOLVHGWKLVDVµDPDQDGGUHVVLQJDSUREOHPRIZKLFKKLVSURGXFW
is a finished and concrete solution. To understand it we try to reconstruct both the specific 
problem it was designed to solve and the circumstances out of which he was addressing LW¶96 
The process of producing posters was constituted by the parties addressing the problem of 
how to speak to the voter, and how they went about solving it. This involved using words, 
symbols, and codes that the communicator thought the viewer would understand. In his work 
RQ 5HQDLVVDQFH SDLQWLQJ %D[DQGDOO VSRNH RI DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V µFRJQLWLYH VW\OH¶97 7KLV µVW\OH¶
ZDVWKHYLHZHU¶VH[SHULHQFHXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGHGXFDWLRQ WKDWZKLFKWKH\EURXJKWWR bear 
on the image. Moreover, %D[DQGDOODUJXHGWKDWWKHµFRJQLWLYHVW\OH¶GLIIHUHd from generation 
to generation; it was the cultural norms RIHDFKJHQHUDWLRQ WKDWGHWHUPLQHG WKLV µVW\OH¶ DQG
this he described DV µWKH SHULRG H\H¶98 Obviously when poster and voter met, a number of 
complex negotiations occurred, aQGHQYLVLRQLQJLQGLYLGXDOYRWHUV¶H[SHULHQFHRIWKDWPRPHQW
is difficult, if not impossible, given the nature of the source material available. However, by 
locating and interpreting the language of posters in the context of the period we can at least 
begin to resolve how voters experienced election billboards.   
By picking posters apart, by studying the visual and verbal symbols, appreciating how the 
parties envisioned voters also becomes clearer. The poster hails people, the very act of 
attraction ± of hailing ± Louis Althusser called interpellation, and this, he stated, made 
subjects of people.99 By studying how posters communicated, we can better understand how 
far they actually subjugated people. While political historians acknowledge that voters were 
capable of multiple identities, there is little understanding of how parties engaged or indeed 
envisioned this group as an audience. Michael Saward highlighted the importance of 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHµDHVWKHWLF¶RIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHHYRFDWLRQRIWKHµUHSUHVHQWHG¶100 Thus, 
the poster can demonstrate just what the parties thought about those they sought to rule.  
By unpicking the images posters used, and seeking to understand how they constructed a 
picture of the electorate, we are moving towards understanding the impact of posters, but 
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SUREDEO\ QRW WKH µHIIHFW¶ RI ZKLFK /DVZHOO VSRNH (VWDEOLVKLQJ ZKHWKHU SRVWHUV KDG
significant electoral impact is at best problematic. Steven Seidman asserted that they could be 
effective. A possibly sensible conclusion, but he provided no conclusive evidence to back up 
his claim.101 What limited studies have been conducted suggest that if posters do anything to 
achieve electoral success it is, like other forms of advertising,  to reaffirm existing beliefs 
rather that changing minds, but to a much lesser extent than broadcasting.102 Separating out 
one particular type of political communication to understand its specific impact is extremely 
problematic, as those who have tried to assess the impact of party election broadcasts have 
discovered.103 Where evidence is available, the thesis does articulate where individual posters 
or campaigns appeared to have an impact. This, however, is rare. Political communications 
does not exist in a vacuum, and separating posters from the maelstrom of other 
communication to which voters were subject is impossible.  
By examining how a party organised itself to produce posters, by unpicking and 
contextualising the images within them, by recreating the period eye, and then by seeing what 
that meant for politicDOHOLWHV¶YLVLRQRIWKHSHRSOHZHFDQPRYHWRZDUGVDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI
WKLV QHJOHFWHG DVSHFW RI %ULWDLQ¶V SROLWLFDO FXOWXUH The study here is of a developing 
relationship of reciprocity. The thesis suggests that actors (be they politicians or poster 
designers) reacted to the existing perceived culture, and produce communication based on 
that reaction. This in turns helped to inform and indeed change the existing culture. This 
occurred with the production of /$%285,61¶7:25.,1*. The Conservatives, and Saatchi 
and Saatchi saw that sections of electorate were concerned about unemployment. They 
devised a campaign that spoke to that concern using codes or symbols taken directly from the 
culture of unemployment, in this case the job centre and the queue. On its release, the poster 
became part of the political culture as designers continued to recycle the poster¶s constituent 
parts to construct their own message.  
Each case study ends by examining how the parties displayed their posters. Just as the design 
of posters changed, so the physical appearance of posters also changed. Images certainly 
became larger; change in the physical nature of posters having come as result of legislation 
and technological development. The large posters sites of more recent times, displaying as 
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they do single images have replaced the densely packed billboards of Edwardian Britain. In 
the latter part of the century, the rise in car ownership has meant that the time individual 
electors have to ponder over bills has decreased.  Furthermore, fly posting, poster launches 
and the rise of internet posters all provide different opportunities for interaction between 
poster and viewer. 
Problems associated with understanding posters do not simply begin an end with the source 
itself. Gaining insight into the political and electoral culture of the periods that the thesis 
covers is made more problematic by long thin nature of the study. For the first elections 
under scrutiny, archival research has formed a significant part of the basis for the evaluation. 
Any archival research has its limitations. Research is often constrained by the cataloguing 
and accessibility of papers. During the period of mass cataloguing of party archives during 
the 1980s and 1990s, it was little anticipated that researchers would one day want to know 
how and why parties produced the posters they did. It remains a sad but true statement that 
much of the information regarding the whereabouts of documents in archive remains in 
archivists heads. The problem with archival research is also historical. Minutes detailing 
decisions made in committee are often sparse, although at least it has been possible to trace 
top level decision making regarding posters. Finding detailed correspondence about the 
nature of posters has been more problematic. Where it exists it has, hopefully, be located.   
Archival research has not been the only source of evidence used in this thesis. The vast span 
of history covered in the thesis, has inevitably meant that the type of evidence utilised over 
the course of time period covered has changed. The rise in advertising trade press in the latter 
half of the twentieth century, most notably with the introduction of Campaign, has provided a 
much greater scope of evidence for understanding how posters were produced and functioned. 
The thesis has exploited Campaign alongside articles on political posters included in the 
mainstream press. Such coverage has filled some of the gaps left by conventional archives, 
which become much less rich for the later decades of the century.  
Newspapers, however, do not always a complete solution to the deficiencies of archives. 
Often posters that newspapers mention no longer survive, or more commonly, those 
mentioned in the newspaper appear slightly differently when compared to surviving examples. 
Moreover, the evidence of newspapers is tainted by the fact posters suffer from being entities 
of which many people have an opinion. Just as with some of the historians cited above, 
opinion formers will cast views of posters with little or no analysis as to why they hold such 
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an opinion. The reason for this is as much to do with the people to whom newspapers have 
turned to reach their views, namely members of the advertising industry. Within this world 
esteem is often based on creativity. As the proceeding chapters make clear those who work in 
advertising are reluctant to listen to any evidence of what makes a good advert beyond their 
own opinion. It is an industry reluctant to engage in any quantative or qualitative testing of 
their work, and it was notable when questioned by the author how he knew what a good 
DGYHUW ORRNHG OLNHD UHVSRQGHQW IURPDKLJK UDQNLQJDGYHUWLVLQJ ILUPVLPSO\ UHSOLHG µ, MXVW
NQRZ¶104 The consequence of this is that the use of this source must always be tempered with 
the realisation that any opinions cited come with provisions. 
Although those working within the advertising industry have it seems ignored any structured 
analysis of the effect of their posters, this study has not. In the later elections cited in this 
study, the use of polling and particularly in 1997 focus group testing has offered new insights 
LQWRSRVWHUVDQGWKHLUXVH3ROOVWDNHQRIWHQTXHVWLRQHGSHRSOH¶VUHFDOORISRVWHUVDQGZKHWKHU
they agreed with the statement. Such evidence undoubtedly adds an extra dimension to our 
understanding of how posters functioned, but as with any evidence it also brings new 
questions. The ability to recall a poster or remember seeing one, does not reveal the actual 
effect of the poster, only that it was memorable.105 Focus group testing ± to which Maurice 
Saatchi riled in 1997 ± potentially has the ability to fill this missing qualitative detail. This 
thesis does use such information where it is available, but this is often second hand, through 
newspaper reporting. Labour, in the run up to and during the 1997 campaign conducted 
hundreds of focus group tests. Quite what happened to these results is unknown, however. 
They do not exist in the Labour party archive, and while the author has made attempts to 
interview or discuss the findings of these groups with individuals involved, this is so far to no 
avail.      
The final problem of evidence related to the study of election posters is the posters 
themselves. Large numbers do survive, the Labour and Conservative Party archives contain 
large collections of examples produced by the respective parties over the course of the 
twentieth century. In addition, the London School of Economics, the Hoover Institute in 
Stanford ± particularly good for Liberal posters otherwise missing from the various British 
Liberal archives ± and Oldham and Wigan Museums also hold significant collections. The 
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availability of such a resource is a combination of good curatorial decision-making and happy 
coincidence. 106  However, despite the hundreds of posters that do survive, some do not. 
Newspapers report their release, but it has not been possible to trace an original copy. A 
further problem with researching posters is that actually getting to see them can be difficult. 
The superb cataloguing and digitising of the Conservative Party collection remains a rarity. 
The posters size, difficulty of handling and staff time in supervising research, can lead to 
reluctance on the part of some museums and galleries to allow access to the researcher. While 
the thesis has made its conclusions based on those posters it could access, it acknowledges 
that some posters the author was unable to view and this remains a limitation.  
Of those that do survive there is also the problem of selection. As stated above, this thesis is a 
study of posters produced by central parties at a national level. By understanding how posters 
functioned towards constructing a relationship between the national party and voter it seeks 
to inject into the debates on the relationship between the two groups. By focussing on only 
one source of evidence others are naturally ignored, namely the huge numbers of posters 
produced throughout the century at a local level. The author recognises this as a problem, but 
highlights the want to understand how posters functioned between national parties and voters 
rather than local organisations. 
Posters are a complex source of evidence. It is perhaps little wonder that the majority of 
political communication scholars from whatever discipline prefer to study communication 
with a strong oral and written content. The written or spoken word is a muscular thing upon 
which to grasp. Contextualising and interpreting any communication within the framework of 
its production is difficult enough. To do so with an image is harder still. The conclusions of 
this thesis may be challenging and are certainly open to discussion. But in placing the poster 
± an object which is after all closely associated with elections ± at its centre this work aims to 
open the ground for new scholarship into this, one of the most evocative and visceral forms 
of political communication.107  
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1.0 The General Elections of 1910 
 
 
Figure 1.1 TAX THE LOAFER ± NOT THE LOAF, 1910, Budget League, PHM. 
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 µ7KDW WKH DFWLRQ RI WKH +RXVH RI /RUGV LQ UHIXsing to pass into law the financial 
provision made by this House for the Service of the year is a breach of the Constitution 
DQGDXVXUSDWLRQRIWKHULJKWVRIWKH&RPPRQV¶1  
So spoke H.H. Asquith on the 2nd December 1909, after the Peers refused to pass Chancellor 
'DYLG /OR\G *HRUJH¶V µ3HRSOH¶V %XGJHW¶ 7KH 8SSHU +RXVH¶V LQWUDQVLJHQFH OHG WKH 3ULPH
Minister to dissolve parliament, and polling took place from the 15th January to the 10th 
February 1910. Although the Liberals retained power, their 274 seats was only two more than 
the National Union of Conservative and Constitutional Associations (hereafter known as the 
&RQVHUYDWLYHV$VTXLWK UHTXLUHG WKH VXSSRUWRI /DERXU¶V03VDQG WKH VHDWVRI -RKQ
5HGPRQG¶V ,ULVK 1DWLRQDOLVWV WR SDVV WKH EXGJHW &RQVWitutional wrangling continued 
throughout the year. Stalemate between the two Houses over an act designed to remove the 
LordV¶ULJKWWRYHWRIXWXUHEXGJHWV IRUFHG$VTXLWKWRFDOOWKH\HDU¶VVHFRQGHOHFWLRQ Polling 
took place between the 3rd and 19th December and the result again was tight. The electorate 
returned the Liberals to power with 272 MPs, and support was once again required from the 
Irish Nationalists and Labour; the Conservatives finished with 271.      
The two contests of 1910 were the last elections premised under a Victorian style of politics. 
7KH /LEHUDO¶V 3DUOLDPHQW $FW SDVVHG LQ  LUUHYRFDEO\ GLPLQLVKHG WKH SRZHU RI WKH
Lords.2 And although unknown at the time, the Liberals would never again win the largest 
number of seats. Moreover, 1910 would be the last election conducted under an all-male 
franchise. These constitutional adjustments changed the aesthetics of electioneering. As Jon 
Lawrence has shown, reform in 1918 and an end to the masculine preserve of Westminster 
electioneering, made campaigning a much less rumbustious affair.3 
Developments after 1910, therefore, make the elections worthy of study in order to see how 
change affected posters. The election is of additional interest to the poster historian because 
of the sheer number oI H[DPSOHV GHSOR\HG  3LFWRULDO SURSDJDQGD ZDOOSDSHUHG %ULWDLQ¶V
streets. Such was the coverage the Pall Mall Gazette declared the January contest to be the 
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µ3RVWHU (OHFWLRQ¶. 4  The Conservative Party produced 1,147,900 word only posters and 
983,615 pictoriDO H[DPSOHV RU µFDUWRRQV¶ 6XUYLYLQJ GDWD IRU WKH /LEHUDO 3XEOLFDWLRQV
Department is less illuminating but it seems the party produced 662,000 posters (both 
pictorial and non-pictorial examples) for the January election.  In London alone, posters 
covered two million square feet of wall.5  
Production of pictorial propaganda was not limited to parties. Edwardian pressure groups, 
known as leagues, played a prominent role in both campaigns, and although not officially 
linked to parties, the two advocated the same policies and often shared the same leadership. 
Liberal Cabinet minister Winston Churchill chaired the Budget League, founded in June 1909, 
LQ VXSSRUW RI /OR\G *HRUJH¶V EXGJHW6 The number of leagues had increased following the 
1883 Corrupt and Official Practices Act because unlike parties they were unencumbered by 
DQ\ OHJDO UHVWULFWLRQ RQ FDQGLGDWHV¶ H[SHQVHV 7  The leagues spent heavily on propaganda 
during the campaigns, and the millions of posters they produced were explicit as to which 
party they were allied.8 The same artists worked for pressure group and party, and as a result, 
both organisations shared a visual language.9  
Arguments proposed by parties in their posters were few, and pictorial propaganda reflected 
the broader themes of the election. µ3HHUVYVWKH3HRSOH¶was a campaign message and ethos 
that pervaded both the posters of the Liberal party proper, and those leagues aligned to it. The 
phrase encompassed more than a battle based on the relative constitutional positions of the 
upper and lower classes, as some historians have suggested. 10  In posters and speeches, 
Liberals yoked upper house reform with an attack on the economics of protectionism. At a 
VSHHFKDW:DOZRUWKGXULQJWKHILUVWFDPSDLJQ/OR\G*HRUJHFODLPHGWKH/RUGV¶VWDQFHZDV
thHµVSLULWRIUHDFWLRQ¶WDNLQJµ\RXEDFNVL[W\\HDUVWRWKHGD\VRIWKH&RUQ/DZV¶11 Liberal 
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posters suggested a widespread conspiracy ± the word used by the Chancellor at Walworth ± 
of the rich and powerful, against the poor.  As for the other parties, LaERXU¶VVWDQFHEURDGO\
mirrored that of the Liberals. The Conservatives meanwhile, responding to the /LEHUDO¶V two-
fold attack ± on their patrician supporters in Upper House and preference for economic 
protectionism ± caste themselves as defenders of the peRSOH3RVWHUVFODLPHG/OR\G*HRUJH¶V
policy of free trade had already raised prices, cost jobs, and denied the working man his 
pleasure of drink and tobacco. According to the Conservatives, WKH VR FDOOHG µ3HRSOH¶V
%XGJHW¶ZRXOGRQO\Hxacerbate the problem further.  
The messages may have been simple, but the posters produced were far from singular. Each 
party adopted a very different method of production, each in turn resulting in very different 
ways of making the same argument. Relying on the specialist Liberal Publication Department, 
the Liberals seemed to have thought most coherently about the best way of producing 
literature. Superficially at least, it seemed a better method than that adopted by the 
Conservatives publications committee. This, formed from MPs, disbanded at the call of the 
election. There was, however, a similarity between the Liberals and the Conservatives in that 
they placed implicit trust in the highly paid artists they used to produced their posters. This 
was in stark contrast to Labour ZKRGLVFXVVHGSRVWHUGHVLJQDWWKHKLJKHVW OHYHO WKHSDUW\¶V
National Executive Committee, and dictated to their artists exactly what they wanted.      
Across the parties and across the billboards there were consistencies in the language of visual 
politics. Where people were depicted they were mainly men, and working-class. However, 
the way in which posters depicted this group varied from party to party and from poster to 
poster. Both contemporary commentators and historians have been critical of Conservative 
GHSLFWLRQV RI ZRUNLQJ FODVV PHQ FLWLQJ WKH SDUW\¶V SRRU RUJDQLVDWLRQ DV WKH UHDVRQ 12 
Certainly, the figures in some posters were weak and feeble. But Conservative posters also 
defined working-man masculinity by the pub and the pipe; the implication being that the 
interfering Liberals sought to erode these sacred pastimes. Moreover, the working-class 
PDQ¶VULJKWWRDGRPHVWLFOLIHIUHHIURP/LEHUDODWWDFNZDVDUHFXUULQJWKHPH-RQ/DZUHQFH
has argued that the Conservative language shifted from the pub to the home in later 1900s. 13 
The posters demonstrate, however, that there was no complete break from one to the other 
but instead a gradual shift as the two appeals overlapped.  
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Just as the Conservatives were inconsistent in their depiction of working men, so too were the 
Liberals. While some Liberal posters did show working-class men defined by their moral 
fortitude, other billboards depicted the same as a victim of circumstance. The Liberals 
struggled with a contradiction that proposed that while workers must shake off their own 
shackles in order to free themselves from the tyranny of the Tory Lords, the only way to 
achieve this was by accepting Liberal help. The Labour Party were more consistent in their 
depiction of the working man, with posters premised on the argument that labour had to seize 
politically what was rightfully theirs.  
Some of the inconsistencies in depicting the working man can be explained by the way 
parties dealt with the artists they employed. The Conservative and Liberal habit of trusting 
their artists, meant that the bias and ideas of those artists emerged from the image. Another 
explanation relates to the rich tradition of cartooning in political posters.14 The very nature of 
cartoons (establishing as they did a comparison between one extreme and another) meant that 
while some posters that visualised WKH µ3HHUV YV WKH 3HRSOH¶ GLG SRUWUD\ XSULJKW ZRUNLQJ-
class men, it was common to adopt the language of the oppressor and oppressed. This 
naturally led to passive depictions of the voters.  
Just as the depiction of working men changed from poster to poster, so too did the 
vernaculars from which artists plagiarised. A complex visual language occurred, central to 
which was metonymy ± the replacement of the name of a thing with an image ± that liberated 
µWKHDUWLVW IURP WKHQHHG WRGHVFULEH¶ 15 Certainly commercial advertising provided some of 
these visual symbols and frameworks.16 But poster artists adopted symbols and motifs from a 
variety of sources pictorial political propaganda, cartoons or high art. Where consistency did 
occur was in the politics of attack, as all parties assailed the opposition. While the Liberals 
and Labour aimed their wrath at the Lords, the Conservatives concentrated on leading Liberal 
politicians.  
The packed Edwardian billboards brought these varied languages and styles together. The 
YLHZHUV¶ H\H ZDQGHUHG IURP FDUWRRQ WR OHWWHUSUHVV SRVWHU WR FRPPHUFLDO DGYHUW WR JHQUH
painting. Raymond Williams spoke of WKUHH W\SHV RI µIORZ¶ LQ WHOHYLVLRQ. Whether it be 
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between SURJUDPPHV WKH IORZ RI WKH µVXFFHVVLRQ RI LWHPV¶ ZLWKLQ HDFK SURJUDPPH DQG
ILQDOO\ WKH YHU\ GHWDLOHG µIORZ¶ EHWZHHQ ZRUG DQG LPDJH17 Although writing on a different 
medium Williams ideas help elucidate thinking on the Edwardian poster. There is the flow of 
the production process from commissioning to billboard, a process that dictated what the 
YLHZHUVDZ7KHUHDUHYLHZHUV¶H\HVZKLFKIORZHGRYHUWKHSDFNHG(GZDUGLDQELOOERDUGDQG
encountered a wide variety of different style of electoral and commercial posters, each 
demanding to be understood. Finally, there is the flow of image and word in the individual 
poster. Understanding how all these processes relate is crucial if we are to come close to 
understanding the poster cultures of 1910.  
This chapter expands upon these subjects in three parts; it begins with an examination of why 
and how each party produced their posters. The second section is an examination of how 
posters constructed their message, analysing the many ways pictorial propaganda 
extemporised the relatively few arguments of the 1910 election, and exploring this means for 
our understanding of political communication. The final section reconstructs how nationally 
and locally produced posters contested the battle of the streets.  
1.1 Producing posters in 1910 
Posters were products of complex internal and external relationships, which ultimately 
shaped the visual language of Edwardian politics. But making posters could be a fraught 
business. Parties producing billboard communication had to contend not just with their own, 
sometimes Byzantine, internal politics, but negotiate with external actors, such as artists, 
advertising agencies, and printers. Each party used a different method to achieve the ultimate 
aim of putting a poster on a billboard. Liberal OHDGHUV WUXVWHG WKH SDUW\¶V 3XEOLFDWLRQ
Department to take responsibility for commissioning posters. The Conservative Party relied 
on experienced poster designers, often paying commercial prices and leaving much of the 
work in the hands of professionals. Notably the leagues worked in a similar fashion. In 
FRQWUDVW/DERXU¶VVHQLRURIILFLDOVGHVLJQHGSLFWRULDOSURSDJDQGDE\FRPPLWWHH 
With the formation of the Liberal Publication Department (L.P.D) in 1886, the party had 
established an effective way of producing posters well before 1910. The Department had 
HPHUJHG IROORZLQJ LWV &KLHI $JHQW )UDQFLV 6FKQDGKRUVW¶V FRPSODLQWV DERXW WKH TXDOLW\ RI
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Liberal publications. 18  After a shaky start, by 1896 the annual report highlighted the 
'HSDUWPHQW¶VFRQWLQXLQJ µLQYDOXDEOHZRUNRISROLWLFDOHGXFDWLRQ¶ QRWLQJ WKDW LWKDGEHFRPH
ODUJHO\ µVHOI VXSSRUWLQJ¶19  The latter statement was a reference to the L.P.D¶V DELOLW\ WR 
cover the cost of producing literature by selling it to local Liberal associations. From the 
outset, the Liberal Central Association, the Liberal Federation and the Whips office jointly 
administered the L.P.D, but the three groups appeared not to LQWHUIHUHZLWKWKH'HSDUWPHQW¶V
work, too much. Such independence offered the L.P.D a freedom from the exacting hand of 
WKHSDUW\DQG D UHODWLYHO\ µSURIHVVLRQDO¶ZD\RI ZRUNLQJ 20 Such professionalism increased 
with the appointment of Charles Geake as head of the L.P.D in 1895. At this point Liberal 
propaganda began to outstrip its rivals.21 .H\WR*HDNH¶V LPSURYement was a greater ability 
to cope during election campaigns and improved financial viability.22   
While historians have criticised Liberal organisation during the period, the L.P.D had proved 
itself in the huge Liberal victory of 1906. As a result, the party in 1910 had significant 
confidence in the body.23  It was certainly safe in the competent managerial hands of Geake. 
More specifically, the party was also attempting, or at least thinking about, two things that in 
later years of the twentieth century election planners would see as key to success. The first 
was a recognition that campaigning was something that could happen between as well as 
during elections. However, in stating such an aim in July 1909, a little over six months before 
the General Election, one might question how effective it was at this. The second 
consideration was the want to speak in a unified voice.24 Recognition of the single party voice, 
and the effort to construct a language of liberalism recognisable to the public as such, does 
show a relatively advanced view of electioneering on the part of the Liberals and their 
Publication Department.    
Organisationally speaking, the Conservatives appeared to lag behind their Liberal rivals. 
Their publication committee was twenty-five strong and made up of sitting Members of 
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Parliament. Subsequently, when the Liberals called the January election the membership left 
for their constituencies, passing responsibility for poster design to Central Office. For some 
VFKRODUV WKLV ZDV HYLGHQFH RI µSRRU RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶ DV WKH GLVSHUVLRQ RI WKH 3XEOLFDWLRQ
Committee at election time had the potential to undermine whatever continuity of 
communication that might have existed. 25  As, however, the party produced many of its 
SRVWHUGHVLJQVEHIRUH3DUOLDPHQW¶VGLVVolution it cannot explain the reasons for the supposed 
failure of some Conservative posters ± a subject explored in more detail below. 
In comparison with its larger rivals, Labour adopted a far more bureaucratic model. Poster 
production was a process consisting of submission, discussion, and resubmission. From its 
formation in 1900 the party had viewed posters as a useful tool for self-promotion, a belief 
that continued to 1910. 26  This is not to say that the two larger parties viewed posters with 
any less LPSRUWDQFH%XW/DERXU¶VUHYHUHQFHIor pictorial propaganda meant it was the SDUW\¶V
most senior body, the National Executive Committee (N.E.C), which discussed and made the 
final decision on what to produce. 27  When in October 1909, the N.E.C assigned poster 
production to a newly formed sub-committee, it was not to pass responsibility to more lowly 
PHPEHUV RI WKH SDUW\ 7KH QHZ ERG\¶V PHPEHUVKLS LQFOXGHG the then leader Arthur 
Henderson, former leader Keir Hardie, and other such luminaries as Philip Snowden, G.H. 
Stuart, and E.R. Pease while James Ramsay MacDonald sat in Chair. 28  Even after the 
establishment of the new specialist sub-committee the N.E.C did not entirely absent itself 
from poster production, as the more senior body continued to make the final decisions.29  
7KH 1(&¶V UHOXFWDQFH WR KDQG UHVSRQVLELOLW\ GRZQ OD\ LQ SDUW ZLWK WKH VKHHU H[SHQVH RI
producing billboard imagery. Parties with the largest incomes could afford to pay those 
commercial artists who came with the greatest reputation, and in theory could be trusted to 
produce effective work. The two largest parties used well-established figures, either from the 
world of illustration or cartooning. Cartoonist and book illustrator Charles Crombie charged 
the Budget League £26.5.0 for the poster Sympathy (around £2090 at current value). John 
Hassall ± IUHTXHQWO\ WKH &RQVHUYDWLYH¶V DQG WKHLU DVVRFLDWHG OHDJXHV GHVLJQHU RI FKRLFH ± 
typically charged £25.0.0 per design, but did offer reduced rates for bulk orders. 30   By 
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comparison, Labour did, or would, not spend such sums. In 1909 the party agreed a 
maximum fee of £5-5-0 for each design, which was an increase on the previous maximum of 
£3-3s-0d.31  
1.1.1 The Relationship between Party and Artist 
Labours meagre fees reflected the artists they used. The party often pursued suitable 
draughtsmen and designs from within the ranks of the wider socialist movement. Adverts for 
poster designs were placed in the Fabian News, and the party benefited from offers of help 
from activists. 32 Before 1910, Ramsay MacDonald received regular designs, accepting for 
instance F.H. Rose¶V D future Labour Representation Committee (LRC) candidate for 
Stockton and sometime cartoonist for Dispatch) LGHDVIRUµFRZDQGWKHUDLOZD\¶DQGµ/DERXU
DW WKH JDWH¶ >ILJXUH ].33  Designs came from all parts of the labour movement, and the 
routes by which they arrived were convoluted. F.G. Burgess, who wrote to MacDonald in 
 KHDUGRI /DERXU¶V QHHG IRU SRVWHUV IURP * - :DUGOH HGLWRURI WKH Railway Review 
and in 1903 the prospective L.R.C candidate for Stockport). 34  
In the appointment of Gerald Spencer Pryse ± whose artist style is discussed in section 2.2 ± 
MacDonald continued a Labour tradition of using artists whose sensibility was artistic rather 
than mercantile. 35 Pryse, who from WRZDV/DERXU¶VPRVWSUROLILFDQGFHOHEUDWHG
SRVWHUGHVLJQHUFDPH IURPZLWKLQ WKHSDUW\¶VZLGHUQHWZRUN$)DELDQVRFLDOLVWZDU hero, 
and respected artist, who produced commercial advertising and cartoons for Punch, Pryse 
came to the attention of MacDonald in 1909 after Beatrice and Sidney Webb employed him 
to help popularise their 1909 minority report.36 Towards the end of the nineteenth century the 
ODERXU PRYHPHQW KDG FRQVWUXFWHG LWV YLVXDO ODQJXDJH RQ WKH µVSLULWXDO VRFLDOLVP¶ RI DUWLVWV
Walter Crane and William Morris.37 &UDQH¶V VW\OH LI QRW KLV DFWXDO GHVLJQV ZHUH VHHQ RQ
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membership cards and banners.38 Just as the socialist principles of Morris and Crane guided 
their work, so it was the same for Pryse.  His appointment demonstrates that although the 
poster election may have been an Edwardian phenomenon, both organisationally and 
stylistically, Labour looked back to a Victorian tradition. 
Labour leaders had a resolute vision of how they wanted their posters to appear. Often artists 
were not there to come up with their own ideas, but deliver the ideas of party leaders who 
would constantly demand revision.39 Leaders even designed entire posters. In June 1904, 
Ramsay MacDonald anticipated that the arrival of the SS Tweeddale in Durban carrying 
ChiQHVH LQGHQWXUHG ODERXUHUV¶ ZRXOG KDYH UDPLILFDWLRQV IRU GRPHVWLF SROLWLFV +LV OHWWHU WR
the printers G.S. Christie, detailed exactly the image he wanted. 
We want an 8th cartoon upon Chinese Labour The idea we should like to have 
expressed is as follows: Let us have the opening of a South African mine, with a 
QRWLFHZHOOGLVSOD\HG³/DERXUZDQWHG2QO\&KLQDPHQQHHGDSSO\´3XWDVWUHDPRI
Chinese going down and a small group of English miners standing unemployed at 
the top. Across the top of the bill in bolGOHWWHUV³$IWHUWKH:DU´DQGRQRQHRIWKH
WRSFRUQHUVSUHIHUDEO\WKDWWRWKHOHIW³VSHQW/LYHVVDFULILFHG´
$WWKHERWWRPSXW³&KRUXVRI(QJOLVK0LQHUV³7LPHZHKDG/DERXU0HPEHUV´40  
Figure 1.3 VKRZVKRZFORVH0DF'RQDOG¶V EULHI ZDV WR WKH ILQDOGHVLJQ'HVSLWH WKHSDUW\¶V
need to solicit expertise to produce pictorial propaganda, it was possible to design their own 
images. The larger parties did not practice such micro- management, and it was not without 
difficulties.  Before arriving at Figure 1.3 ± itself a specimen ± the L.R.C demanded a number 
of alterations.41  The party criticised the standard of drawing, the quality of the colours and 
the inability of Christies to deliver work on time. So fraught was relationship between the 
L.R.C and printers that the party eventually used another company, indeed, Christies did not 
produce Figure 1.3, which was instead executed by another Nottingham firm Blacks.42 When 
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producing the posters used in the 1910 election Labour continued with the practice of closely 
scrutinising a design and then sending it back to the artist for changes. A N.E.C minute from 
the 8th -XO\  VWDWHG µ$ GHVLJQ IRU D QHZ SLFWXUH SRVWHU ZDV DOVR SUHVHQWHG DQG WKH
Secretary was instructed to consult with the artist with a view to the embodiment of certain 
VXJJHVWLRQVWKDWKDGEHHQPDGH¶43  In all the N.E.C discussed the design and production of 
posters in ten meetings between 1907 and 1910, in only three of did the committee instruct 
the Secretary to have the posters produced.44 
7KH EHQHILW RI /DERXU¶V PRGHO ZDV WKDW DOWKRXJK LW WRRN WLPH WKH ILQDO SURGXFW ZDV ZKDW
party the wanted. John Hassall, a leading poster designer of the day, argued that only direct 
contact between customer and artist could deliver exactly what was wanted.45 Most famous 
for his Jolly Fisherman in the poster Skegness is so bracing, Hassall produced a number of 
posters for the Conservative party and the Conservative supporting Budget Protest League 
during the 1910 campaign (see below). Some posters produced for the Conservative party 
were a result of this close relationship, suggesting similarities with the way Labour worked. 46 
But in comparison with the 1(&¶V OHQJWK\ FRPPLWWHH PDGH GHFLVLRQV +DVVDOO DQG WKH
Conservatives turned posters around much more quickly. Hassall after visiting party 
headquarters on the 16th November 1910 despatched a poster the following day.  47 This was 
not unremarkable, given in a single week Hassall could produce over eight completed posters. 
On occasion, the Conservatives would also use an advertising agency to commission and 
produce posters. The process involved approaching an agency who would go to a number of 
artists to have designs produced, the agency would then return to the customer who would 
select their preferred example.48 Hassall was not an advocate of conducting work through an 
agency. Obviously, returns meant no payment. However, he also argued that the process 
diminished the final product, as without direct contact the client would not get exactly what 
they wanted. Moreover, dealing with the artist directly, according to Hassall, saved 
µXQQHFHVVDU\H[SHQGLWXUH¶49  
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Whether judged by the resources expanded on them, both human and economic, it was clear 
that by 1910 the poster was a key type of communication available to parties. 50 The way each 
approached the production of those posters demonstrates something of their attitudes to the 
medium and, indeed, communication more widely. Each party had to tackle a specific 
problem: although they recognised the usefulness of posters to project their message, they 
were unable physically produce the final product themselves. This context of production is 
important as we move into an examination of the actual images. Political languages are 
constructed from a variety of sources. If we are to understand how posters took from and 
contributed to this wider language, it is necessary to consider just how much, or how little, 
parties were still involved with the process of production. There was clearly a difference 
between a communication actually being yours, or you simply putting your name to it.  
1.2 The posters of 1910 
Of the posters used in the 1910 election, many bore a strong visual relationship to cartooning, 
as many of the artists parties commissioned to produce posters came from the ranks of 
cartoonists who readily transferred the traditions of their craft to the billboard.  51  The 
:HVWPLQVWHU*D]]HWWH¶VFrancis Carruthers Gould worked prolifically for the Liberals. While 
in 1908, the Conservatives commissioned -editor of the Pall Mall magazine and cartoonist- 
George Ronald Halkett to produce cartoon and poster designs.52 With its traditions of visual 
argument, cartooning had significant potential for use in the combative world of electoral 
campaigning. As with many cartoons, posters often showed the cause of a problem, effect it 
had, and the solution to solve it. In the Conservative poster HOW LONG CAN YOU 
COMPETE AGAINST THIS? [Figure 1.4] the problem was the low pay of Japanese cotton 
workers. The artist intended that the viewer ZRXOG VXEOLPLQDOO\ UHSO\ µQRW ORQJ¶ WR WKH
question posed in the posters title, and thereby come to a conclusion that the problem was 
IHZHU MREV GXH WR RYHUVHDV FRPSHWLWLRQ DQG WKHUHIRUH WKH RQO\ VROXWLRQ RU µ\RXU UHPHG\¶
must be tariff reform. 
Given the symbiosis between cartoons and political posters, it is unsurprising that scholars 
have criticised the academic and one-WLPH /LEHUDO FDQGLGDWH *UDKDP :DOODV¶ 
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suggestion that the use of large political posters represented the conquering of the political by 
the commercial.53 For Wallas such developments were sinister, representing he argued, a shift 
from an appeal to the intellect with one to the automatic sub-conscious. 54 As such, according 
to Wallas, the large-scale political poster represented a very DWWDFN RQ WKH SHRSOH¶V
relationship with the process of British politics. 
Political cartoons and commercial imagery are inherently different, the former presenting the 
YLHZHUZLWKDQDUJXPHQWWKHODWWHUVHOOLQJDOLIHVW\OHRUµH[SHFWDWLRQ¶DV-RKQ%HUJHUput it.55 
While Wallas undoubtedly overestimated just how much absorption there was of commercial 
techniques into Edwardian political communication, we should not dismiss his views too 
readily. The Edwardian artist was a dilettante (something Wallas recognised) and as such 
visual codes of the period transmuted from one form of communication to another.56 John 
Hassall famously produced the 1908 railway poster Skegness is so Bracing, and regularly 
undertook commissions for Kodak. He was also a prolific cartoonist, and this genre provided 
the inspiration for both his political and commercial work, writing in 1911 that the best 
SRVWHUVZHUHDVµVSDULQJRIZRUGVDVDJRRGSROLWLFDOFDUWRRQ LWVDFWLRQQRW LWVH[SODQDWRU\
ZRUGLQJIRUWKHPRVWSDUWWHOOVWKHVWRU\¶.57 Nor was Hassall the only artist who negotiated a 
career across visual formats. Bernard Partridge, designer of at least two Budget League 
posters, became chief cartoonist at Punch in 1910, but also worked in a commercial capacity 
for Lever Brothers and Selfridges.58  
Just as cartoons provided the images and symbols for posters so too did advertising.  
Politicians were not beyond selling themselves in the most mercantile fashion. In 1900 the 
voters of Oldham were urged to vote for the Liberals Emmott and Runciman simply because 
µ\RXOLNHWKHP¶>)igure 1.5]. In addition to this direct act of selling, designers also regularly 
plagiarised existing commercial adverts. The Conservatives poster TARIFF REFORM 
TOUCHES THE SPOT took directly from adverts for Homocea lumbago cream, indeed, the 
poster even included an apology to the manufacturer. 59 The benefits of such technique were 
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obvious. Artists knew they were deploying a visual language which the viewer would 
recognise. Wallas understood the importance of familiarity to Edwardian campaigning, 
DUJXLQJ WKDW LI DQ\WKLQJ µLV WR VWLPXODWH XV WRZDUG LPSXOVH RU DFWLRQ LV WKDW LW VKRXOG EH
recognisable ± that it should be like itself when we met it before, or like something else 
ZKLFKZHKDYHPHWEHIRUH¶60 The famous Pears soap advert was another from which artists 
readily plagiarised.61 6XFKZDVWKHFDVHZLWKWKH)UHH7UDGH8QLRQ¶VWILL IT BURST TOO? 
[Figure 1.6]. Here the artist took the advert ± again the images included an apology ± and re-
imagined it, with Austen Chamberlain drawn as the young boy contemplating the fragility of 
past and present ideas, which were represented as the bubbles.  
As with many posters the image of Chamberlain involved the viewer to unpick a framework 
of codes and symbols. Those who looked at the poster were expected to understand the 
source material (the Pears soap advert), recognise that the figure was a caricature of 
Chamberlain, and have some knowledge of his past ideas. Furthermore, the inclusion of the 
picture frame added an extra dimension, perhaps referencing the original source material; in 
WKLV FDVH -RKQ (YHUHWW 0LOODLV¶ FDQYDV Bubbles, a painting that continued to drive the 
imagination of poster designers well into the inter-war period.  
The reference to Bubbles showed that, alongside cartooning and commercial advertising, the 
language of fine art also held a place in the visual politics of the 1910 billboard and further 
demonstrates how designers drew from a varied range of different image types. Of all the 
SDUWLHV LWZDV/DERXU¶VSRVWers which were most noted for their artistic quality. The Times 
EHOLHYHGWKDW WKHZRUNRI*HUDOG6SHQFHU3U\VHHVSHFLDOO\KDGµH[FHSWLRQDOPHULWDVDUWLVWLF
SURGXFWLRQV¶62 Art was FHUWDLQO\ WKH SDUW\¶V LQWHQWLRQ 7KH DQQXDO UHSRUW KLJKOLJKWHG the 
µV\PEROLF and DUWLVWLF¶YDOXHRI3U\VH¶VZRUN which was untypical of the Edwardian period.63  
³)25:$5'7+('$<,6%5($.,1*´ for instance, formed the centre of a triptych. The 
optimism of the centre panel counteracted the dystopian plight of the urban and agricultural 
workers in the outer flanks ³:25./(66´and ³/$1'/(66´[Figure 1.7], respectively. As 
with any characteristic poster, Pryse contextualised his pictures with words, but the intensity 
of the message relied on his artistic talent.  
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Pryse used symbols common to political posters, but did so in a more deft way than seen in 
other examples. His use of the sun, for instance, is noteworthy. This was a symbol as old as 
figurative art itself, which was revered by ancient peoples as both a source of life and 
destrXFWLYHIRUFH-0:7XUQHUGHVFULEHGLWDVµ*RG¶64 It was particularly apt for the visual 
culture of electoral politics, speaking of rebirth, new life, and brighter futures. The mannered 
form seen in Figure 1.5, was typical of election posters. Not for Pryse though, his figures 
bask in the brightness and warmth of an unseen luminary, his poster a confident message of 
/DERXU¶VSURPLVHWRLOOXPLQDWHWKHGDUNQHVVRIERth the urban and rural poor.    
$OWKRXJK3U\VH¶VHIIRUWVZHUHXQGRXEWHGO\JRRGDUWWKHTXHVtion remains whether they were 
good political propaganda?  Certainly, those employed in the advertising industry often 
questioned the utility of such painterly techniques for billboards. On the one hand, the 
advertising manager of the Financial Times Howard Bridgewater hailed posters depicting 
landscape scenes, such as those produced by Norman Wilkinson for the London and North 
:HVWHUQ 5DLOZD\ DV D W\SH WKDW µWHQG WR UDLVH WKH SXEOLF LGHDO¶65 But such views were not 
universal. The American advertising executive Truman Armstrong DeWeese believed that 
µ6XFFHVVIXOSRVWHUFRS\PXVWGRVRPHWKLQJPRUHWKDQUHVSRQGWRWKHDUWVHQVHRUFXOWLYDWHG
taste of those who have a highly developed art instinct. It must show the uses of a product in 
its regular lines and vitDOHOHPHQWRI WKHVHOOLQJDUJXPHQW¶66 Hassall was also critical of the 
overly elaborate image.67 Such concerns reflected the need for a poster to deliver its message 
quickly. However, as DeWeese argued, it also hinted towards the fact that technical experts 
EHOLHYHG D SRVWHU¶V DXGLHQFH PLJKW QRW SRVVHVV WKH FXOWLYDWHG FDSDFLWLHV WR PRYH EH\RQG
anything but the most simply expressed messages.     
Despite these technical debates about the merits of fine art over more simple forms in 
advertising, Labour was not the only party to publish posters that conformed to a classic 
FDQRQ 7% .HQQLQJWRQ¶V ³)5(( 75$'(´ [Figure 1.8] was one of the most widely 
commented upon posters of the 1910 campaign. The painting, depicting a family destitute as 
a result of Liberal policy, was described by Peter Clarke as the pièce de resistance of the 
8QLRQLVWFDPSDLJQZKLOH)UDQN7UHQWPDQQKDVGHFODUHGLWµWKHPRVWVXFFHVVIXOSRVWHURIWKH
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SHULRG¶68 7KH ODWWHU IXUWKHU KLJKOLJKWHG µWKDW QR SLFWXUH FRXOG SRVVLEO\ KDYH EHHQ IXUWKHU
removed from the single splash of bright colour that dominated successful commercial 
DGYHUWLVHPHQWVOLNHWKRVHIRU&ROHPDQ¶V0XVWDUG¶69  
Rather than demonstrate that political communication and commercial advertising were poles 
DSDUW .HQQLQJWRQ¶V YLVLRQ RI WKH destitute family demonstrated just how varied political 
advertising could be. From the cartoon, to the commercial advert, to fine art, posters drew 
from each and at times amalgamated them together. Just as Chamberlain and his bubbles was 
surrounded by a two-dimensional frame, so too were the Free Trade family. The inclusion of 
the framing device was an attempt to present the argument in some way as to be 
understandable to the viewer. Chamberlain staring at his bubbles could never have claimed to 
be anything other than a mocking parody, yet the frame drew on themes with which the artist 
KRSHGWKHYLHZHUZRXOGEHIDPLOLDU.HQQLQJWRQ¶VLQFOXVLRQRIWKHIUDPHDSSHDUHGDQDWWHPSW
to elevate the political argument from the abstract theorising and politicising of Westminster. 
The frame made the political personal, but also made the image refined and worthy of 
contemplation, as if in a galley.70 Kennigton wanted above all to humanise politics and for 
the viewer to consider it in those terms. And whether this humanising of politics came in the 
form of slamming the opposition, or picturing the electorate, whether the source material 
were cartoons, attempts at selling, or from a tradition of fine art, all posters attempted to 
make the distant impersonal politics of Westminster relevant at some level to the viewer. It is 
to how exactly this human form of politics appeared on posters that we now turn.  
1.2.1  Peopling Posters 
3HHUVYV3HRSOHPD\KDYHEHHQWKHYHUEDOVORJDQRIWKH/LEHUDOFDPSDLJQEXWWKRVHµSHRSOH¶
that apSHDUHG LQ SRVWHUV ZHUH PDOH DQG ZRUNLQJ FODVV (YHQ 3U\VH¶V HJDOLWDULDQ evocation 
[Figure 1.7] showed a male manual worker leading the group out of the dark. The activity of 
3U\VH¶VILJXUHZDVLQVWDUNFRQWUDVWWRGHSLFWLRQVRIZRUNLQJ-class men in some Conservative 
posters, which critics argued were rather pathetic figures. A 1911 Unionist Organisation 
&RPPLWWHH5HSRUW  ODLGRXW WKHFRPSODLQWV LQ VWDUNGHWDLOKLJKOLJKWLQJ WKDW µLQ VRPHRI WKH
pictorial posters that are issued, it has been stated that a certain amount of offence has been 
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given to workmen by their always being depicted in corduroys and generally assuming a 
URXJKDSSHDUDQFHDQGLQPRVWFDVHVFDULFDWXULQJWKHZRUNLQJPDQ¶71 And certainly, in some 
Conservative imagery, the working man appeared helpless against pernicious assault on his 
life. Yet, there was more to the image of Conservative working-men than passivity. Tory 
posters defined working-class masculinity in terms of the pipe, the pub, and the home. Such 
complaints suggested that Liberal and Labour posters projected a more progressive image of 
the working classes, and at times, they did. But across the posters of all parties, such was the 
construction of political imagery it was too easy to revert to a visual language of victim hood.  
It was clear that frequently, whether working for Conservative party or associated leagues, 
artists struggled to portray the working classes positively. A Westminster Gazette journalist 
FRPPHQWHGWKDWWKHILJXUH LQRQHSDUWLFXODUSRVWHU ORRNHGPRUHOLNHDµYLFWLPRI IUHHGULQN¶
than free trade [Figure 1.9].72 6LPLODUO\FULWLFDORI WKHSDUW\¶V OLWHUDWXUHZDVWKHHGLWRURI WKH
Conservative supporting Observer, James Louis Garvin, who in a memorandum to party 
OHDGHU $UWKXU%DOIRXU VWDWHG WKDW µWKH%ULWLVK ZRUNPHQ must appear in all our pictures as a 
fine fellow, not the debased and uncouth and grotesque person that he seems in some of our 
SLFWXUHV¶73  
There were several reasons for the often-pitiful portrayals of the working classes on 
Conservative billboards. Undoubtedly, the party often placed too much trust in the artist. 
Uncritical party officials waived through designs without due consideration and as a result, 
the bias was evident. Such was the case of Ralph Cleaver; it was his ,7¶6WORK WE WANT 
[Figure 1.9] of which the Gazette journalist was so scathing. Cleaver also produced LESS 
BEER-LESS BACCY LESS EMPLOYMENT for the Budget Protest League.74 In both posters, 
the artist drew supplicant figures with out stretched hands and open palms. The importance of 
hand signals in personal communication had been long recognised by social commentators, 
WKH RSHQ SDOP JHVWXUH LQ &OHDYHU¶V LPDJHV ZDV DQ HPRWLRQDO GHVSHUDWH FDOO IRU KHOS IURP
men who spoke the truth, and had nothing to hide.75 But the result of drawing these hand 
gestures led naturally to the image of a pitiable figure. 
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Blaming artists, however, does not account for all the reasons why Conservatives portrayals 
of the working class were often so negative. Certainly many within the party had a poor view 
of the voter. Garvin told Balfour that mind of the masses is for the most part inconceivably 
crude; that you cannot be sure of their understanding any word more than two syllables 
ORQJ¶76 Indeed, members of all parties had little faith in electorate. The Liberal candidate 
Wallas spoke of the simple-PLQGHG YRWHU µLQWHOOHFWXDOLVLQJ¶ ZK\ KH VXSSRUWHG D SDUWLFXDO
candidate but effectively being duped by a photograph.77   
The Conservatives struggled in part to find a visual language that could both appeal to 
working class and depict them. In part, this problem occurred because of the way political 
imagery was constructed. The binary separation between oppressor and oppressed naturally 
lead to one seeming weak and under attack from an opposing force.  
The vigorous nature of the attack on socialism did nothing, moreover, to help depictions of 
working-class men in Conservative posters. Edward Huskinson 7KH6RFLDOLVW¶V/LWWOH*DPH
[Figure 1.10] demonstrated the contrast between this strength of one language compared with 
the weakness of another.  With the heavy labelling, and use of the Phrygian or cap of liberty 
the 6RFLDOLVW¶V/LWWOH*DPH left viewers in no doubt that those purporting left wing ideology 
could not be trusted. The cap alone, with connotations of the French revolution, and historic 
use in early nineteenth century cartoons, was a symbol of foreignness. 78  But Huskinson 
further emphasised the otherness of the socialists by drawing them with a swarthy 
complexion, and dressing them in clothes mort apt for 1910 Monmartre than the working-
class areas of Britain. The strength of this anti-socialist imagery contrasted strongly with the 
SDVVLYLW\RI+XVNLQVRQ¶V7UDGH8QLRQLVWZKRLQKLVJDUWHUVDQGIODWFDSDSSHDUVDGLPZLWWHG
character, distracted by one socialist espousing his creed while another picks his pocket  of 
union funds. 79  The strength of anti-socialist visual rhetoric was further evident in the 
numerous depictions of socialism as monster-like. Figure 1.11 showed socialism as a devil-
monkey strangling Britannia, whose depiction did at least free the artist from showing a 
working-class man being physically attacked.  
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Although attacking socialism could lead to passive depictions of the working class, this was 
not the only image of the worker revealed in Conservative posters. Matched with this 
vigorous anti-socialist rhetoric was a language that positioned the party as defender of the 
working mans right to smoke and drink; a separate campaign focussed on his right to a 
private domestic life. As such, the posters of 1910 form a bridge between the sensibilities of 
the masculine working-class drinker familiar to Conservative propaganda at the start of the 
century and the centrality of the home more common towards the outbreak of war.80  
The link between drinking and smoking had been common since the nineteenth century, not 
least because of the availability of free clay pipes in pubs.81 The Conservative posters of 1910 
maintained such tradition. In UNFAIR PREFERECNE >)LJXUH@WKHZRUNPDQ¶VULJKW WR
enjoy the solid British beverages of whisky, beer and tobacco were compared unfavourably 
with the plutocratic foreign vices of rich Liberals. The poster visually reinforced its verbal 
message about taxation, by comparing the working man at the bar, with the clubbable 
prosperity of those being waited on and sipping champagne.  
The Unionists mixed this appeal to the drinking man with a visual demonstration of how 
/LEHUDO IUHH WUDGH SROLF\ DWWDFNHG KLV GRPHVWLF LG\OO  .HQQLQJWRQ¶V ³)5(( 75$'(´ was 
certainly not the only poster to outline this threat. Although the date of the Imperial Tariff 
&RPPLWWHH¶V BRITISH WORKMEN CHOOSE FOR YOURSELF [Figure 1.13] is unknown, 
OLNH.HQQLQJWRQ¶VLPDJHLWSLFWXUHGWKH/LEHUDOGDQJHUWRIDPLO\OLIH7KHLPDJHGULSSHGZLWK
verbal and visual symbolism. The much larger loaf on the table in the left hand image than 
that seen on the right, visualised the lower spending power under free trade. The canary in the 
left hand image suggests the man might be a miner, while the cat in front of the roaring fire 
sugJHVWVZDUPWKDQGFRPIRUW,QDGGLWLRQWKHSRVWHUYLVXDOO\TXRWHV3VDOPDVWKHPDQ¶V
µFXS UXQQHWK RYHU¶ &RPPHQW RQ WKH LPSDFW IUHH WUDGH ZDV KDYLQJ RQ WKH GULQNLQJ PDQ¶V
pastime was included too, as the Red Lion pub, visible through the window is closed and up 
for auction.         
Just as the Liberals sought to split aristocrat and worker with their rhetoric of People vs. 
Peers, one poster used the language of the home to yoke the two classes back together. The 
Unionist supporting Budget Protest League¶V (1*/,6+0$1¶6 +20( [Figure 1.14] 
depicted the future under land taxes as proposed in the budget. According to the image, the 
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UHVXOW ZRXOG QRW MXVW PHDQ DULVWRFUDWV OHDYLQJ WKHLU KRPHV DQG WKH FROODSVH RI %ULWDLQ¶V
ancestral piles, but the Peers faithful retainers would be homeless also. The rotting gatehouse 
symbolised how taxing the rich ultimately affected the whole of society; while aiming at one 
WKLQJ/OR\G*HRUJH¶VEXGJHWZRXOGLQHYLWDEO\DGYHUVHO\DIIHFWDQRWKHU82  
On occasion Conservative posters mirrored wider political culture. Just as heckling was a 
common feature of the Edwardian political meeting, so some Conservative billboards 
depicted working-men speaking truth to power. 83  In a rare defence of the Lords, one 
Conservative poster showed a man WHOOLQJ03VWKDWLWLILWZDVQ¶WIRUWKH3HHUVKHZRXOd have 
been ignored [Figure 1.15]. Artists readily deployed languages familiar to viewers from the 
PDVVSODWIRUPDVWKHLPDJHRIWKHPHHWLQJFURVVHGRQWRWKHELOOERDUG,Q$%:KLWH¶V7DULII
Reform League WANTED-A CHANGE [Figure 1.16] a man rejects the claims of a Liberal 
canvasser.84 White demonstrated the plight of the working class man and his wife through 
their dishevelled, decidedly grubby appearance. Nevertheless, WKH SRVWHU¶V SURWDJRQLVW¶V
classic oratorical stance showed him to be completely at one with the economic arguments, 
well able to make his point clearly. It was if White had copied an Edwardian public speaking 
manual. One such teaching aide KLJKOLJKWHGWKHQHHGWRWKHNHHSWKHµIRUHKHDG Ln general is 
elevated, the brows are slightly drawn down and knit together they indicate, like the 
downward gesture with opening fist, force and authority, with the conception of an ability to 
master H[HUFLVHGXSRQWKDWWRZKLFKDWWHQWLRQLVGLUHFWHG¶85    
There was less variation in Liberal posters compared to the seemingly ever-changing image 
of the working class man on Conservative billboards. The existence of the Publication 
Department was one reason, the centralised structure less prone to generating communication 
that spoke at cross-purposes.  But in addition, the Liberals simple central campaign message 
of µPeers verses the People¶, provided the party with a concept easy to visualise; it was a 
language that lent itself to comparing upright, conscientious, and honourable workers, with 
VWRRSLQJ VXSHUFLOLRXV SHHUV  7KH %XGJHW /HDJXHV¶ )LJXUH  LV DQ H[DPSOH RI WKLV W\SH
Other posters showed Liberal MPs and working-men protesting together against the Lords.86  
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Unlike their Conservative rivals, Liberal SRVWHUV UHIOHFWHGWKHSDUW\¶VSRVLWLRQRISRZHUDQG
could therefore highlight actions they had taken to LPSURYHGSHRSOH¶V OLYHVA CROWN OF 
COMFORT [Figure 1.17] depicted two elderly people sat in the flower garden of a cottage 
under the sun rays emanating from a 5s piece, representative of the old age pension. The 
positive message had some impact on one Times journalist who thought it might be more 
µZRXOGEHPRUHWHOOLQJWKDQDQ\RIWKHRWKHUV¶SURGXFHG87 Quite why he thought the impact 
would be greater than other images was unclear, but the poster did stand in stark contrast to 
WKHYLWULRORIRWKHUH[DPSOHV/LNH6SHQFHU3U\VH¶VZRUNIRU/DERXUWKHLPDJHSURYLGHGDUD\
of hope in an otherwise confrontational visual landscape. Moreover, the poster further 
demonstrated the persistence of the sun as a symbol of benefice in Edwardian political 
imagery.  
While many Liberal depictions of the male working-class man were positive as shown in 
Figures 1.1 and 1.l7, there were exceptions to the rule. When Murray Urquhart drew a 
Swiftian scene in which miniature peers bind a giant figure with the bonds of amongst other 
WKLQJVµPRQRSRO\¶µIHXGDOLVP¶DQGµYHVWHGLQWHUHVW¶DQGGHPDQGHGWKDWworking men µ:$.(
83 927( /,%(5$/ $1' )5(( <2856(/9(6 21&( )25 $//¶ [Figure 1.18], he left 
YLHZHUV ZLWK WKH FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW WKH IDXOW OD\ ZLWK WKH YHU\ VDPH µZRUNLQJ PHQ¶ ZKR KDG
allowed themselves to be shackled in the first place. According to Urquhart the apathy of the 
ZRUNLQJ FODVV IDFLOLWDWHG WKH /RUGV¶ SRZHU. Budget League posters too, in aiming to 
demonstrate the plight of the older man, debased the very same to a position of servitude 
unable to escape the drudgery of life. In ³7+(/,%(5$/6*$9(0(%5($'<282))(5
ME A STONE.´>)LJXUH] the dress of the bearded pensioner and the brick wielding tariff 
reformer he faces initially appear similar. The sack coat, striped trousers, and waistcoat seem 
hardly far removed from his opponent. Detail though enabled the viewer to distinguish 
between the two; the frock coat top hat, red waistcoat, leather gloves, spats and gold watch 
chain, all add and air of entitlement otherwise lacking in the older figure. A 1907 American 
JXLGHWRWDLORULQJVWDWHGWKDW LWZDVµWKHEHWWHUFODVVRIEXVLQHVVPHQ¶ZKRZRUHIURFNFRDWV
while the sack coat was a more egalitarian garment.88  The stance too helped distinguish 
between the men, helping the viewer distinguish between elite and subject. The high-handed 
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DSSURDFKZLWKµ7KURZQ-EDFN¶KHDGµVOLJKWO\-VQHHULQJFRXQWHQDQFH¶µWKURZQEDFN¶ERG\DUH
all signs of the arrogant or self-important orator.89 
Given Labours organic attachment to the working-class, it was after all a party of and for 
them, their posters showed the workers in a wholly positive light.  Working-class men were 
generally depicted as upright and proud, but there was difference in the progressive message 
of some posters compared to the adversarial rhetoric of others. In VOTE FOR THE LABOUR 
PARTY THE HOPE OF THE WORKER  [Figure 1.20] a miner stands opposite a Peer 
separated by lines from the Robert Burns 1795 $0DQ¶V$0DQBurns was popular amongst 
the educated working class, Jonathan Rose states that among the 1906 intake of Labour MPs, 
the poet was the fifth favourite author.90 Educated socialists might have understood the quote, 
Labour activists almost certainly so. Such imagery fitted well with the moderation of James 
Ramsay MacDonald and his belief in progress through parliamentary democracy. However, 
just as Labour was a party in conflict over reformism versus revolution, so too was their 
pictorial propaganda.91  7KH SDUW\¶V SRVWHUV ZHQW IURP SURJUHVVLYH VWULGHV HYLGHQW LQ WKH
work of Pryse) to action that was more forthright. LABOUR CLEARS THE WAY showed 
working-class men battering their way into the House of Lords [Figure 1.21]. Here, the 
unknown artist resolutely positioned Labour as a party for the industrial (and unionised) male 
worker. The image showed the necessity and validity of labour representation in Parliament, 
by drawing a seamless transition from Westminster to smoking factory chimneys. This 
overtly aggressive form of Labour politics could also be seen in THE OSBORNE 
JUDGEMENT [Figure 1.22]7KHSXJLOLVWVRIµ/DERXU¶DQGWKHRJUHRIµFDSLWDOLVP¶EDWWOH LQ
WKHER[LQJULQJDQGWKHSRVWHU¶VLPDJHU\DQGODEHOOLQJOHDYHWKHYLHZHULQOLWtle doubt that this 
was a party premised on the rhetoric of masculine trade unionism. Labour may have been 
confident in depicting the working-class, but it had not yet decided quite how forthright it 
should be in its appeal. 
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1.2.2 Personal Attack 
Late Victorian and Edwardian electioneering was an adversarial affair and the politics of 
attack transferred easily to the billboard. Conservative posters levelled their guns at Asquith 
and Lloyd George; Hassall in particular showed the Chancellor to be a bungling figure, a 
man-child who could not see the consequences of his economic policy.92 There was a clear 
HIIRUWWRLQIDQWLOLVH/OR\G*HRUJHDQGWKHUHE\XQGHUPLQHWKHVWDWHVPDQ¶VDXWKRULW\,Q CAN 
IT BE DONE [Figure 1.23] Hassall drew Lloyd George sat on his budget staring intently at 
WKH SX]]OH SRQGHULQJ LI µFDSLWDO¶ FRXOG EH UHPRYHG ZLWKRXW XSVHWWLQJ µODERXU¶ ,W ZDV D
caricature infantilising the man, who sat chin in hands, elbows resting on the knees, slightly 
in-turned toes, and almost on the floor, just aV D FKLOG PLJKW GR ,I +DVVDOO¶V GHSLFWLRQ RI
Lloyd George was childish, Edward Huskinson depiction of Asquith demonstrated just how 
YLFLRXVSRVWHUVFRXOGEH7KHFDUWRRQLVWGUHZWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHUFOXWFKLQJDµ5DGLFDOFKHDS
ORDI¶ ZLWK WKH VLPSOH TXestion where is it? [Figure 1.24] Overtly Huskinson accused the 
Prime Minister of being a liar, or at least failing to deliver on his promises. And implicitly 
$VTXLWK¶V WXUQHG LQ WRHV DSSDUHQWO\ VZD\LQJ ILJXUH DQG SDUWLDOO\ IOXVKHG FKHHNV VXJJHVW
someone mildly inebriated. This vision of drunk perhaps went where verbal attacks could not 
go; although not discussed publicly, Asquith was a confirmed alcoholic; his detractors 
QLFNQDPLQJKLPµVTXLII¶93  
Liberal and Budget League propaganda attacked members of the House of Lords with a 
similar ferociousness. As Lloyd George made regular reference in his speeches to the idle 
Lords, so the posters showed the upper house to be indolent. Peers appeared unwilling to 
remove their hands from their pockets in order to help.94  It was the perceived vice of greed, 
however, upon which opposition billboards focussed their most virulent attacks. In THE 
GLUTTON!  [Figure 1.25] the expertly drawn piggy eyes and red face of the milk stealer 
convey the image of a figure that was full but still demanded more. Labour produced a more 
biting example still [Figure 1.26].  The figures existing wealth was evident with the large 
cigar and rings, his avarice shown by the pulling of the gold and deeds towards his person. 
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7KH VORJDQ µ:KDW ,¶YH JRW ,¶OO KROG DQG ZKDW ,¶YH JRW ,¶P DIWHU¶ OHIW WKH YLHZHU XQGHU QR
GRXEW DV WR WKH SRVWHU¶V LQWHQW $ VWUDQG RI DQWL-semitism runs through the image. Just as 
'LFNHQV UHSRUWHG WKDW )DJLQ¶V H\HV JOLVWHQHG DW WKH VLJKW RI D MHZHOOHG ZDWFK WKH 3HHUV¶
gleaming rings spoke of the symbolic association between Jewish people and jewels.95 
In depicting the Lords the artists did not have to ask much of the viewer, the uniform of the 
upper house was distinctive. Categorising the other malevolent forces that were central to the 
pictorial propaganda of 1910 was more complex, and the image required a greater level of 
µUHDGLQJ¶ RQ WKH YLHZHU¶V SDUW 6XFK ZHUH WKH FRGHV RI (GZDUGLDQ GUHVV VRPH JDUPHQWV
crossed class divisions.  Whilst the bowler hat could represent a businessman it also appeared 
on the heads of working men.96 The complex nature of the imagery reflected the past (and 
future) history of the bowler, supposedly invented by the Earl of Leicester to protect his 
JDPHNHHSHUV¶ KHDGV ZKLOH RXW-riding.97 And it quickly became the headwear of choice for 
many regardless of class.98  In 1910 its social symbolism was entirely dependent on whose 
head it sat. Intriguingly, of the surviving posters from 1910, the bowler wearing working- 
class man only appears in Unionist or their associated leagues poster not in those of the 
Liberal or Labour parties, this may be a coincidence but is interesting nonetheless.  
Depictions of top hats always represented elites but exactly who that elite was depended on 
the party commissioning the poster, for instance the top hat appears on the heads of the 
Unionist tariff reformers of Figure 1.19 and the Liberal free trader in Figure 1.16. In both 
SRVWHUV WKH WRS KDW LV D V\PERO XVHG WR GHSLFW DQ µRWKHU¶ ZKR VRXJKW WR IXUWKHU WKHLU RZQ
position at the expense of those below them. In 1910 the top hat was a garment well suited to 
this cause. Although previously worn by all gentlemen whatever their profession, the top hat 
was mostly limited to those in the political sphere; fashionable men from other professions 
might have sported a homburg or a bowler.99  
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1.3 Displaying posters in 1910 
The pictorial rhetoric of 1910 did not just advance party opinion. Parties were using posters 
to conduct a political battle. Posters rebutted, opposed, and corrected those of their rivals, one 
image declaiming another.100 The images themselves may have been simple, the way parties 
used them certainly was not.  For instance in December 1909, The Times wrote of the Budget 
/HDJXH¶V µ7KH :RUNHU¶V %XUGHQ DV WKH 7RULHV ZRXOG PDNH LW¶ [Figure 1.27@ WKDW LW ZDV µD
reply to a poster issued in support of tariff reform. It shows the working man bending beneath 
the tariff reform Budget, which it claims will put a tax on food, clothes, materials, and 
OLYLQJ¶101 Exactly to which poster the Budget League were responding is more complicated. 
It could either have been HURRAH FOR TARIFF REFORM AND MORE WORK [Figure 
1.28] which showed a workman stamping on the Lloyd George budget or 7+(32250$1¶6
BURDEN [Figure 1.29], which showed him carrying it.  Either way the similarities between 
the two demonstrate how visual vernaculars crossed the political divide, and make sense of 
just how posters fought a nuanced visual argument of the street. 
By tracing the call and response of these posters, we can better understand the construction of 
political communication beyond its initial production and release. As communication was 
built through the adversarial interaction between political actors, it rippled out beyond the 
initial poster, gradually affecting all manner of electoral politics. Such was the case, when 
Chairman of the Budget League, Winston Churchill authorised the cartoonist Charles 
Crombie to produce a poster called Sympathy, which attacked the Peers. 102  Apparently, 
Churchill approved the design while staying at his ancestral home and immediately after the 
SRVWHU¶VSXEOLFDWLRQWKHDaily Sketch published a rebuttal cartoon, Blenheim.103  Highlighting 
the hypocrisy of criticising the House Lords while at the same time living like one, Blenheim 
depicted Churchill recumbent, sipping brandy, smoking a pipe while two footmen held up 
Sympathy for his approval. This sophisticated communication required the viewer to 
understand who Churchill was, his background, and his role not only in the Liberal party but 
± as the original Sympathy poster was for the Budget League ± also in wider Liberal 
organisations.  
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Within a week Blenheim ZDV UHSURGXFHG DV D SRVWHU WDNLQJ WKH LPDJH RI &KXUFKLOO¶V
duplicity to the streets. While the originator of the Blenheim poster is unknown, they did 
write to the Manchester Billposting company ± ZKRSRVWHGWKHELOOVRIWKH%XGJHW/HDJXH¶V± 
enquiring where Sympathy was due to be stuck, in order that the two posters could appear 
next to one another. 104 An incensed Churchill accused the Manchester Billposting of posting 
the offending poster.105 Churchill even wrote to the publisher of Blenheim, David Allen and 
Sons, angry about how the poster depicted him; he got his apology, but the company did 
point out that the image was no worse than others produced during the campaign. 106 
Knowledge of the poster travelled far beyond its site of publication, with the Conservative 
candidate for Burnley, Gerald Arbuthnot, holding up the Sympathy poster at a meeting and 
after relating the circumstance of it productioQFRPSODLQHGWKHZKROHWKLQJZDVµPRQVWURXV
KXPEXJ¶107   
The Sympathy-Blenheim affair demonstrated the ability of pictorial rhetoric to reference not 
just contemporary political debate but also contemporary pictorial propaganda. Moreover it 
suggested the potential of the viewer to understand a political contest waged across a variety 
of mediums. Posters were clearly not static entities, but woven into the fabric of an ever 
changing Edwardian political discourse.  
1.3.1 The poster in its environment 
As we shall see, parties thought hard about the display of posters, not least because of the 
potential costs involved. Parties required the services of a billposting company whom they 
paid to rent the space and pay for posting. This relationship could be difficult. During 1909 
and 1910 billposting firms raised their prices in anticipation of an election.108 And while 
billposters boasted of voluntary code of censorship, there were problems of over-posting.109 
Using the space of buildings owned by party supporters provided opportunity to display 
posters free of charge. 110   /RFDO VXSSRUWHUV¶ ZLQGRZV DOVR SURYLGHG XVHIXO DQG IUHH
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opportunity for parties to display bills. 111 Election law prohibited supporters charging or 
parties paying for window displays, a breach potentially rendering the election void. 112 
Private posting extended beyond windows. Fly posting matched the legitimate use of private 
window and wall space, with teams of party activists indiscriminately posting bills over those 
of their rivals in the dead of night.113  
Whether fly-posted or on rented hoardings, political posters had to fight not only with each 
RWKHUEXWDOVRZLWKFRPPHUFLDO DGYHUWLVLQJ IRU WKHSXEOLF¶VDWWHQWLRQ(GZDUGLDQELOOERDUGV
were packed environments, and ensuring posters stood out from the crowd was a skill, as 
Figure 1.30 from Manchester demonstrates.  
Only professional illustrators Hassall argued, possessed this talent and indeed this was one of 
the reasons why his prices were so high. 114  A few politicians grasped the problem of 
congestion. In 1900DF'RQDOGLQIRUPHGWKHSULQWHU*6&KULVWLHWKDWµ5RXQGHDFK>SRVWHU@
I also want a good clear margin so that they will stand up separate and distinct on the 
hoardings. I also want the colouring very pronounced so that they will strike the eye of the 
passer-by. 115  While the mock frame around ³)5(( 75$'(´ alluded to fine art, it also 
provided a useful buffer to other posters. Beyond good design, there were other means of 
getting posters noticed. Parties could occupy a whole billboard only with their images and 
WKHUHE\UHPRYLQJWKHQHFHVVLW\RIKDYLQJWRFRPSHWHZLWKFRPSHWLWRUV.QRZQDVDµVWDQGDUG
VKRZ¶RQH%XGJHW/HDJXHHPSOR\HHFHUWDLQO\WKRXJKWWKHPµPRUHDWWUDFWLYH¶116 Figure 1.31 
shows a typical standard show in support of the Unionist MP, William Houghton-Gastrell.  
In addition to this belief that there was benefit to displaying posters, which were supportive 
RI HDFK RWKHU¶V SRsition together, campaigners also gave some consideration to the 
arrangement of the posters on the billboard. Charles Geake advanced the theory that massing 
many small posters together delivered the best results.117 The Times concurred, arguing that 
large political posters attempting to compete with commercial counterparts were ineffective. 
It was only possible, the paper argued, to make one single point rather than a whole variety 
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them.118 Such views were not universal, however. Writing of commercial advertising the 
American DeWeese, echoing Hassall, wrote that the best adverts were those that reduced the 
product to a single strong idea.119 2QH&RQVHUYDWLYHDJHQWDJUHHGµLI WKHELJSRVWHUZDVQRW
HIIHFWLYH¶ KH ZURWH LQ  µRXU KRDUGLQJV DQG SXEOLF YHKLFOHV ZRXOG VRRQ FHDVH WR EH
FRYHUHG ZLWK DQQRXQFHPHQWV DQG DSSHDOV¶120 The Manchester Guardian concurred, stating 
that largest posters had the greatest appeal.121 Those involved in the creation of political 
SRVWHUVDSSUHFLDWHG WKDW WKHYLHZHUV¶H\HV URYHG RYHU WKHSDFNHGELOOERDUGVEXW WKH\FRXOG
not agree about to harness that visual energy. Hassall and DeWeese thought it best to arrest 
the eye on larger images. Geake disagreed believing as long people viewed pro-Liberal 
images this was enough.  
As we have seen the commissioning process of the two larger parties resulted in posters from 
a variety of artists each which dramatically different styles.  As an artist Hassall wanted 
people only to see his posters. As commissioner Geake was happy to let people see other 
images so long as they supported his party; it mattered little if the bills were not entirely in 
visual synchronicity with one another. Posters from a fine art tradition sat next to cartoon 
illustration, and images of the working-man speaking truth to power, sat next to images of the 
working-man being downtrodden.  Artists were little interested in the other posters being 
designed for the campaign and how their own work functioned alongside them. The only 
important fact to them was making their own design stand out.  If Geake and contemporaries 
considered the effect of the commissioning process at all, resulting as it was in a myriad of 
visual styles and highly complex billboards, they did not act to mitigate against it. At some 
OHYHO WKH\ WUXVWHG WKH FRQWHPSRUDU\ YLHZHU¶V DELOLW\ WR UHDG HDFK SRVWHU and move easily 
between them.  
1.4 Conclusion 
The manner in which parties sought to commission posters and the control they had over the 
artists that conducted the work, meant that visual languages were disparate. They referenced 
a myriad of visual sources with which the viewer may or may not have been familiar. Such 
were these differences, those contemporary commentators who complained of the woeful 
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depiction of the working class man in Conservative posters, compared to his up-right Liberal 
counterpart, were far too generalised. Across all posters, there was a diverse portrayal of this 
figure. In fact, aside from Labour, the two larger parties struggled to find a language of the 
working class man, and even the socialists varied between an image of the striver and the 
fighter. The Conservatives were as comfortable in appealing to the drinker and smoker, as the 
Liberals were in attacking the Lords, but beyond this the edges are blurred. 
Given this myriad of language and inconsistency of style, concluding what exactly the 1910 
posters tell use about the election more broadly is problematic. Certainly, posters represented 
an attacking form of politics. Vitriol was rife; this was not the politics of bland statements but 
rather of unrepentant aggression. Nor was the politics of the billboard a type of 
communication in and of itself. Not only did posters refer to other examples, they took a 
language of politics familiar to voters from other print forms and the platform and transposed 
it for the street. Posters were very much interwoven into the communication of the election, 
and as such continued a Victorian public and active form of politics. But they also 
represented the change that was occurring to politics during the period. While the Edwardian 
poster did not represent the complete pacification of public politics, it undoubtedly was part 
of a move towards it. Posters may have taken the language of the mass meeting or shown 
men speaking truth to power and even encouraged such action, but picturing something and 
being it are not the same. Posters required no exploit on the part of the viewer except to read, 
and unlike the hustings or the mass platform, posters were a political communication that 
denied the populous the opportunity to answer back. While large pictorial posters may have 
reflected and pictured Victorian and Edwardian political traditions, their very nature marked 
the end of a vigorous active election type. It is perhaps for this reason, that as a medium their 
use continued after World War One when electioneering became less public, and less 
participatory. It is to that period that we now turn.    
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2.0 The General Election of 1929  
 
 
Figure 2.1 SAFETY FIRST!, National Union of Conservative and Unionist Association, 
CPA, POSTER 1929-09. 
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The 1929 election was the first held under universal suffrage. 7KH &RQVHUYDWLYH¶V 38.1 per 
cent share of the vote produced 260 seats. This was twenty-seven fewer than their nearest 
rival Labour, whose 37.1 percent vote share resulted in 287 MPs. The result was a minority 
JRYHUQPHQWZLWK/DERXU¶V OHDGHU -DPHV5DPVD\0DF'RQDOG EHFRPLQJ3ULPH0LQLVWHU IRU
the second time. The Liberal Party under David Lloyd George held the balance of power, but 
despite winning 23.6 per cent of the vote and fifty-nine seats, the Liberals remained a 
diminishing electorate force.  
 
To some extent, the passing of the Equal FranchiVH$FWD\HDUHDUOLHUKDGVHW WKHHOHFWLRQ¶V
tone. The Act added 6 ½ million new women voters to the register, a quarter of whom were 
under the age of twenty-five. Despite passing the Act, many members of parliament, 
especially many Conservatives, were wary of these new voters. Conservative members had 
aired their concerns in 1928 during debates on the bill; George Balfour suggested that women 
had made no call for the move, while Reginald Applin submitted that women given true 
electoral equality must take oQ µgrave responsibilities, which would perhaps be too great a 
EXUGHQIRUZRPHQ¶1 Sir George Cockerill was not in principle opposed to women voting, but 
riled against a franchise in which the majority would now be female. 2 During the 1927 
Conservative conference, one delegate moved that the age should be twenty-five for women, 
while Lord Cecil argued that this should be the age of eligibility for both men and women.3  
 
&HFLO¶V VXJJHVWLRQ SRLQWHG WRZDUGV WKH RWKHU IDFWRU WKDW GRPLQDWHG &RQVHUYDWLYH WKLQNLQJ 
aside from gender, that of class. The passing of the 1918 Representation of the People Act, 
which had not only enfranchised the majority of women aged 30 and over but also all 
remaining men 21 and over (and even some at 19), concerned Conservatives. A core of the 
party believed that the Act had opened up the franchise to working-class voters who would in 
turn vote Labour.4 Trade Union growth in the years leading up to the war had contributed to 
such concerns, as tKHXQLRQV¶ULJLGRUJDQLVDWLRQDQGOLQNVWR/abour led many Conservatives 
to the assume WKDWXQLRQPHPEHUV¶YRWHUVZHUHDOUHDG\ORVW5  
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Amongst politicians of all creeds there was a more general concern that universal suffrage 
gave the vote to a dangerous, unthinking, and uneducated mass.6 One Conservative agent 
ZULWLQJLQFODLPHGWKDWYRWHUVKDGµWKLFNVNXOOVILOOHGPRUHRUOHVVZLWKSULPLWLYHDQG
VOXJJLVK EUDLQV¶ 7  :KHQ 6WDQOH\ %DOGZLQ¶V &RQVHUYDWLYH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ SDVVHG WKH HTXDO
franchise act, the Prime Minister had declared: µWREXLOGXS that broken work half the human 
UDFHZDVQRWHQRXJK,WPXVWEHWKHPHQDQGZRPHQWRJHWKHU¶ 8 Privately, though, Baldwin 
thought that the War had pushed Britain into democracy long before the country was ready.  9  
 
A general belief existed amongst all parties that the new electorate were essentially irrational, 
DQGWKHUHIRUHQHHGHGWREHµHGXFDWHG¶LQWKHSURSHUZD\WREHKDYHDWWKHSROOV 
Parties had little interest in those who would weigh up the merits of all arguments and vote 
accordingly. Rather they sought to ensure that the electorate understood why they had no 
choice but to vote for their party. Factions within Labour constantly debated whether the 
SDUW\¶VDLPVKRXOGEHWRFUHDWHVRFLDOLVWVRU to merely sell the material benefits of socialism.10 
µ(GXFDWLRQ¶ZDVDOVR LPSRUWDQW WRWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHV'DYLG -DUYLV KDV KLJKOLJKWHGKRZ WKH
SDUW\XVHGOHDIOHWVDQGSURSDJDQGDWRµHGXFDWH¶QHZIHPDOHYoters in their responsibilities.11  
 
As Stuart Ball has stated, however, WKH V ZDV IRU µHGXFDWLRQ¶ what the 1920s was for 
propaganda. 12  Parties undoubtedly worried about irrational behaviour stimulated by 
propaganda, Labour MP for West Ham Thomas Grove claimed that those people aged 
between twenty-one and twenty-IRXU ZHUH MXVW WKH µVRUW RI ILVK WR EH FDXJKW E\ the best 
HOHFWLRQHHULQJDJHQWVDWHYHU\*HQHUDO(OHFWLRQ¶13  However, As Steve Seidman underlines 
propaganda has two definitions: oQHLVWKHµGLVWULEXWLRQRISURPRWLRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQ¶, and the 
other is µWKHVSUHDGRIPLVOHDGLQJLQIRUPDWLRQ¶14 In 1929, politicians held both definitions in 
their head simultaneously. While they thought it acceptable to adopt new techniques of 
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persuasion in order to secure their own victories, in the hands of the opposition, such tactics 
were thought anti-democratic. This was because, as Oliver Thomson states, a tendency had 
arisen, µIRU SURSDJDQGD WR EH WKRXJKWRI DV D WHFKQLTXH XVHG E\ WKH RWKHU VLGH UDWKHU WKDQ
what it is ± the range of skills used by all sides, consciously or subconsciously, to put across 
their own point of YLHZ¶15 In the hands of the opposition, propaganda presented a threat to 
democracy itself while \RXU RZQ SDUW\¶V LQIRUPDWLRQ ZDV LQHYLWDEO\ FRUUHFW Instinctively, 
Baldwin feared propaganda to be a permissive force, believing it had destroyed the individual 
DQGFUHDWHGWKHµPDVV-PLQG¶16 Yet in a Conservative Central Office report produced shortly 
before the 1929 election, Baldwin admitted that SURSDJDQGD ZDV µQRZ UHFRJQLVHG DV WKH
ZRUOG¶V PRVW SRWHQW ZHDSRQ¶ D UHIHUHQFH WR ERWK WKH EHQHILFLDO SRVVibilities of mass 
persuasion as well as its dangers in the wrong hands.17  
 
Interest in propaganda grew following studies of its use during WW1. Academics such as 
Harold Laswell demonstrated how Governments used propaganda during the conflict while 
advertising executives such as Edward Bernays articulated how such techniques might 
transfer to peace, democracy, and commerce.18 Writing in 1928, the public relations expert 
Bernays even attempted to rationalise the use of  propaganda  in democratic education, as the 
lattHUZDVQRWGHILQHG E\ µDFDGHPLFHGXFDWLRQ¶ EXW WKURXJK µWKHGUDPDWL]DWLRQRI LPSRUWant 
issues politicians could focus the public mind on crucial points of policy and regiment a vast, 
heterogeneous mass of voters to clear understanding and intelligent issue¶19  
 
Criticisms of propaganda stemmed from the same complaints Graham Wallas had made 
before the war, namely that it spoke to impulse and not reason. Labour MP Arthur 
3RQVRQE\¶VFalsehood in War-Time dissected the various lies propagated by Britain in 
order to maintain public support for the war. Ponsoby concluded that propaganda had a 
coercive nature and swayed opinion without structured argument.20 Aside from an appeal to 
the irrational there were, however, a number of techniques used in wartime propaganda 
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highly suited to the field of British campaigning. Writing in 1937 about the use of 
propaganda in the rise of fascist states, Amber Blanco White highlighted that the creation of 
an enemy or common danger allowed SURSDJDQGLVWV WR XQLWH DURXQG µWhe feeling of being 
H[SRVHG¶DQGXQGHUVXFKFLUFXPVWDQFHVSURSDJDQGLVWVZRXOGRIWHQWRWXUQWRZDUGVDOHDGHUWR
reinforce such unity. 21  IQ D V\VWHPDWLF FDPSDLJQ RI µUHG VFDUH¶, the Conservatives had 
throughout the 1920s EUDFNHWHG /DERXU DV D µFRPPRQ GDQJHU¶ E\ Dccusing them of being 
Bolshevik, most famously with the release of the Zinoviev letter in 1924. 22  By 1929, while 
the nuance of the attacks had changed, focussing to a much greater extent on Ramsay 
MacDonald, it was clear the Conservatives were still not beyond using such tactics [Figure 
2.2].  
 
The influence of developments in propaganda was also visible in the role the three party 
leaders played in the campaign. During the war, Lord Kitchener had famously appeared on a 
recruiting poster and in 1929 individual depictions of the leader were increasingly visible.23 
This was not surprising. It was much easier to construct images of trust, the modern man, or 
the efficient achiever ± all of which appeared in the leadership posters of 1929 ± in a single 
individual than it was in a party. The practice calls into question studies that argue it was only 
in the later decades of the twentieth century when parties thrust the leaders to the forefront of 
campaigning. 24  These leader posters allowed parties to personalise campaigns made 
impersonal by universal suffrage, bridging the gap between those who would represent and 
those who were represented. The most prominent example of this was the Baldwin poster 
SAFETY FIRST! [Figure 2.1]. 
 
 Philip Williamson has emphasised the CoQVHUYDWLYHVXVHRI%DOGZLQ¶VSRSXODULW\ in order to 
generate support in 1929, and the poster was a key facet of that.25 There have been several 
attacks on the campaign and poster, focussing especially on its supposed defensive strategy.26 
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In reality, the posWHUIRUPHGMXVWRQHSDUWRIDEURDGHUDWWHPSWWRFHPHQW%DOGZLQ¶VSRVLWLRQ
as the most trustworthy of the three party leaders. Pictorial imagery positioned Baldwin as the 
PDQRIµWUXVW¶DQGµVDIHW\¶LQFRPSDULVRQZLWKZKDWLWFODLPHGZDVWKHH[WUHPLVPof his rivals. 
The Conservative Party had been using this tactic ± relatively successfully ± throughout the 
century, positioning itself as the party that would defend Britain against the egregious 
behaviour of its opponents. This was a period when Disraeli was looked upon as a golden 
figure of the past, and Baldwin sought to link himself to that man. Steven Fielding has shown 
that fictional representations of Disraeli during this period concentrated on the personal rather 
than the political. 27 It was Baldwin the man rather than Baldwin the party leader which 
emanated from the billboard. This is not to say that leader posters were unique to the 
Conservatives. Both Ramsay MacDonald and Lloyd George featured prominently on the 
billboards. The appearance of Ramsay MacDonald as an upright statesman was part of 
Labours¶ broader campaign to reject Conservative accusations of Bolshevism and make a 
cross class appeal. 28  
 
The chapter begins with a demonstration of how parties began to explore the commercial 
world of advertising to produce posters. A post-war boom in the advertising industry 
occurred, in part buoyed by propaganda techniques learnt during the war.29 Parties were keen 
to take advice from advertising executives employed by much larger agencies than had 
existed before the war.  For the Conservatives this involved employing the advertising firm 
S.H. Benson. Labour and the Liberals conversely developed poster designs in a much more 
cost effective manner, in part though holding poster competitions.  
 
The chapter examines what visual languages parties developed as a means of speaking to the 
new female electorate. A number of gendered stereotypes were clearly present. The 
Conservatives based their campaign on the construct of women as domestic consumers. 
                                                                                                                              
1929-1931 (New Haven and London, 1988) p. 213.; C. L. Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, 1918-1940 
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Liberal Party posters promised women peace, while Labour insisted that women vote on 
behalf of their children.  
  
These were undoubtedly gendered stereotypes, but the chapter also shows how political 
billboards matched consumer billboards in promising women access to a modern Britain, 
defined in part by distinct fashion and consumer orientated culture. Such images reflected 
women semi-liberated by war work, and an independence derived in part from the fact there 
fewer men to marry.30  The image of this modern woman ± characterised in the modish attire, 
FORFKH KDW DQG µER\LVK¶ KDLUFXW RI WKH SHMRUDWLYHO\ WLWOHG µIODSSHU¶ ± represented the very 
antithesis RIWKHµURPDQWLF¶LPSHULDODQG%ULWLVKFXOWXUHRIWKHZDU, as Alison Light has argued. 
Instead, it was English domestic, and above all, feminine.31 The posters show that parties 
defined these modern women as dynamic actors who could determine the outcome of the 
election.  
 
In contrast to women, the vision of masculinity was decidedly one-dimensional. Labour and 
the Liberals pictured men either participating, or not participating, in paid work a reflection 
of the various election pledges to end unemployment. Given the relative different visions of 
women available on the billboards, it demonstrated that while the visual construction of 
female political identity had advanced quickly since becoming democratic actors in 1918, the 
vision of men seemed to have moved on little since the Edwardian period. The only 
difference came in Conservative posters that depicted all classes and genders together 
receiving the benefits of Conservative policy.  Many posters responded to leading 
&RQVHUYDWLYHV¶ fears ± notably Baldwin¶V ± that the addition of an uneducated mass to the 
electorate was leading Britain to an inevitable fracture along class lines.32 Inevitably, such 
fears were shot through with memories of the General Strike.  
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Modernity heavily influenced the presentation of the leaders and women who appeared on 
%ULWDLQ¶V ELOOERDUGV The use of photographic and design techniques reveals how far new 
advertising knowledge influenced the language of political posters. Although the use of 
photographic posters did not become commonplace until the second half of the twentieth 
century, the photograph was seen on billboards in 1929, especially on Liberal posters. As 
such, political posters mirrored wider scopic tendencies, as photography was increasingly 
LQIRUPLQJYLHZHUV¶YLVLRQRIWKHZRUOGThe public knew of course that photographs could be 
retouched, that the camera might lie. Nevertheless, the photo or film image had become an 
DFFHSWHG UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ RI µWUXWK¶ VXFK WKDW WKH GRFXPHQWDU\ ILOP-maker Dziga Vertov 
claimed the goal for his kino-H\H JURXS ZDV µWR PDNH WKLQJV RQ WKH VFUHHQ ORRN OLNH ³OLIH
IDFWV´¶33 Photography was not the artistic representation of truth against which Plato had 
riled, but a captured event, an incontestable view. The photographic poster ±political parties 
hoped ± would offer the viewer a familiarity unavailable to line drawn pictorial 
representation.    
 
This chapter deals extensively with the language of posters. Given that major developments 
in poster display would not come until after 1945, there is no significant section on display in 
this chapter. Despite the time and consideration that went into the design of posters ± detailed 
below ± some people in 1929, including members of the Publicity Club, thought such 
considerations irrelevant. Location and size were deemed the most important aspects of a 
good poster campaign. At one meeting of the Publicity Club as reported in the Conservatives 
Agents Journal, a delegate DUJXHGµWKDWWKHSRVLWLRQRIWKHSRVWHUZDVPRUHLPSRUWDQWWKDQWKH
design¶ DQG PDGH WKH IXUWKHU VXJJHVWLRQ WKDW DOO &RQVHUYDWLYH ELOOERDUGV VKRXOG EH D
standardised 10 feet high.34 In truth, the delegate spoke WR WKH FRQYHUWHG &HQWUDO 2IILFH¶V
substantial investment in 1929 meant that across Britain voters could see Conservative 
posters of 16, 32, and 64 sheets; the latter of which was almost 27 feet across.35 The reason 
the Conservatives could display such large scale images was, as Baldwin put it, 
µWEALTH¶.36 In all the party produced 464, 614 posters in 1929 and, as shown in section 2.1 
large sums were spent on the campaign.37 
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Conversely, Labour produced 310, 000 posters, having rejected a national campaign out of 
hand on cost grounds. Transport House put up no large posters, nor had any available for sale 
to agents. Of the 26 pictorial posters and two letter press posters produced by Labour, the 
largest available to purchase was a 4 sheet, just 5 feet across. Agents purchased the majority 
of these posters in packs of 125 posters ± 5 posters of 25 different designs. The content of 
these packs was suited to meet the needs of industrial and rural constituencies. 38 It was 
unclear just how much choice agents had in which posters Transport House sent them. 
Clearer was the fact that, despite the mention of rural constituencies, for practical reasons all 
parties concentrated their billboard campaigns in the towns. Posters in the country were 
considered a µQXLVDQFH¶DQGthere was little point in sending large posters to villages, as there 
was nowhere to put them.39 The issue of tied cottages also meant that Labour supporters were 
unwilling to show their allegiance by putting Labour posters in their windows. 40  The 
problems of using posters in rural communities only heightened the fact that while the 
billboards of 1929 often spoke to, and for, a new larger even modern public, it was one 
entirely metropolitan in character.  
 
 
2.1 Producing posters in 1929 
The appointment of J.C.C. Davidson as Chairman of the Conservative party in 1926 and the 
arrival several months later of former spy George Joseph Ball as Director of Publicity, 
heralded new ways of working at Conservative Central Office.41  Like many within his party, 
Davidson maintained a paradoxical relationship with propaganda. His memoirs claim that his 
motives for changing Central Office and its communication were in part an attempt remove 
those from within the party who GDEEOHGLQµXQWUXHSURSDJDQGD¶42 Yet, as will become clear, 
                                         
38
 LHASC: Report on General Election Propaganda presented to Publicity and Research Committee, July 18  
1929. 
39
 See Conservative Agents Journal (December, 1920) p. 15; Conservative Agents Journal (September, 1928) p. 
272; Labour Organiser (January, 1921) p. 12. 
40
 C. Griffiths, Labour and the Countryside (Oxford, 2007) p. 63. 
41
 There is some dispute over the speed at which these two changed the organisation. Tim Hollins indicated the 
Davidson Ball over-hall was immediate while Keith Middlemas and John Barnes suggest the change came after 
rather than before 1929 see T. Hollins, The Presentation of Politics, PhD Thesis (Leeds, 1981) pp. 35-37.; K. 
Middlemas and J. Barnes, Baldwin a Biography (London: 1969) p. 510. 
42
 Hollins, The Presentation of Politics, pp. 33-34.; R.R. James, 0HPRLUVRID&RQVHUYDWLYH-&&'DYLGVRQ¶V
Memoirs and Papers (London, 1969) p. 270. 
71 
 
Davidson presided over a campaign that regularly attacked rival leaders along the most brutal 
lines. In truth, Davidson sought new personnel because he thought they would be more adept 
at speaking to the transformed post-war electorate. He believed the most coherent and 
effective publicity could only come from, as one senior Conservative official stated, µRQH
FRPPRQ VRXUFH¶43  The aim was to centralise propaganda and to achieve this Davidson 
removed responsibility for communication from the Principal Agent. He then established Ball 
in the new post of Director of Publicity, to fully free the production of publicity from 
FRQVWLWXHQF\DJHQWV¶µGHDGKDQG¶DQGµREVWUXFWLRQ¶44  
With agents removed from the responsibility of producing propaganda, in February 1927 the 
Conservatives appointed the commercial advertising agency Holford Bottomley to produce 
their literature, the first party to make such a move. For an annual fee of £500 (estimated at 
just under £27,000 in 2014WKHDJHQF\DJUHHGWRµGHVLJQ IUHHRI charge, rough layouts for 
OHDIOHWV SRVWHUV HWF¶ VHQG LWV PDQDJLQJ GLUHFWRU WR ZHHNO\ PHHWLQJV DQG QRW WR ZRUN IRU
other political parties.45 The innovation was not, however, entirely successful given the party 
decliQHG WR UHQHZ +ROIRUG¶V FRQWUDFW Vupposedly because of changes to office 
arrangements.46  The experience was not so disastrous, as the Conservatives immediately 
appointed S.H. Benson to work on the 1929 election and in particular on the poster campaign 
that preceded dissolution of parliament. While constituency parties could opt out, Central 
Office took responsibility for renting billboard space for these posters, the most famous of 
ZKLFKZDVµ6DIHW\)LUVW¶47 The substantial cost contributed to the Conservatives spending on 
posters for the entire election, totalling as it did £26, 926, 9s 6p (about £1.4 million in 
2014).48  
 
%HQVRQ¶V LPSDFWRQWKHFDPSDLJQZDVVLJQLILFDQWThe agency persuaded the party to adopt 
WKHµ6DIHW\)LUVW¶VORJDQRQWKHBaldwin poster; µWKHPDQ\RXFDQWUXVW¶ZDVCentral OIILFH¶V
idea.49 The merits of the slogan as stated above have been questioned, but the fact that it 
DSSHDUHG RQ WKH SRVWHU GHPRQVWUDWHG &HQWUDO 2IILFH¶V ZLOOLQJQHVV WR WUXVW LQ WKH DGYLFH RI
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their agency. Given that only one photograph appeared on a Conservative poster ± that of 
SAFETY FIRST! ± this, too, could have EHHQWKHDJHQF\¶VLGHDAs discussed below, the use 
of photography in posters was at the very forefront of design during the period, so the person 
who made that decision would likely have had knowledge of commercial design. More 
certain is that &HQWUDO 2IILFH¶V HIIRUWV WR FHQWUDOLVH communication by appointing Bensons 
resulted in great standardisation. In addition to their other work the agency produced a series 
of letterpress posters each with a strong blue outline.50  This stylisation, albeit on a limited 
scale, was to become much more common after 1945, as the next chapter articulates.     
 
Conservative attempts to streamline their organisation were in stark contrast to those evident 
in the Labour party. Before the extension of the franchise in 1918, the party had reorganised 
itself. In 1917, the party established a specialist Press and Publicity Department to produce 
propaganda material and staffed by figures who had previously worked in the press industry. 
The head of the organisation in 1929 was William Henderson the son of Arthur, former 
Home Secretary in the last Labour government. William had too come from a journalistic 
background and while head of the Press and Publicity department served as MP for Enfield 
twice. 51  Overseeing the activities of the department was the Research and Publicity 
Campaign committee of the National Executive Committee. The ten members consisted of 
Labour MPs and senior figures from organisations within the party, such as J. L. Adamson, 
WKHZRPHQ¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRQWKH/DERXU1DWLRQDO([HFXWLYH 52 William Henderson was the 
FRPPLWWHH¶V 6HFUHWDU\ The committee made the overall decision about posters and other 
publicity. In November 1928, in anticipation of the coming election, this committee 
established an additional sub-committee to make final decisions on pictorial and other 
propaganda. This was smaller group made up of just Herbert Morrison, F. O. Roberts, Ellen 
Wilkinson, and the Secretary of the Party Arthur Henderson. 53   
 
Before Labour decided to publish a poster, designs travelled between department and 
committees. Firstly, the Press and Publicity department solicited a design from an artist they 
thought appropriate, which they then passed to the Research and Publicity committee whose 
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members discussed it before forwarding it to the sub-committee for final approval.54 While 
/DERXU¶V3XEOLFLW\'HSDUWPHQWVXJJHVWHGWKHH[LVWHQFHRIVSHFLDOLVDWLRQ LQWHUPVRISRVWHUV 
at least, it seemed simply to add another layer of bureaucracy. By commissioning its posters 
by committee, Labour perpetuated a production method that had been a feature of pre-war 
elections. 
 
Labour commissioned designs from various artists. The party continued to receive unsolicited 
work from sympathisers in the labour movement, for example rejecting a suggested poster 
from the cartoonist and journalist James Francis Horrabin, who in 1929 became Labour MP 
for Peterborough. 55   In an attempt, however, to instigate new ideas Labour initiated 
competitions. One such competition, run through the Labour Organiser in 1921, aimed at 
discovering being fresh talent and the introduction to the Labour movement µDrtists capable 
RIDGGLQJWRWKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVRI LWVPXUDO OLWHUDWXUH¶56 Four prizes were offered: £10 for the 
poster best depicting µ7KH0DUFKRIWKH:RUNHUV¶6HFRQGFODss received £7/10 for a cartoon 
WKDW LOOXVWUDWHG µWKH DSSHDO RI 3ROLWLFDO /DERXU¶ 7KH WZR ILQDO FODVVHV sought to award the 
finest letterpress poster, and poster advertising a meeting receiving £5 and £2.10s, 
respectively. The financial incentive for the winner demonstrated that the party took the 
competition seriously, even if judges thought that many of the submitted designs lacked µWKH
DUUHVWLQJHIIHFWVRQHFHVVDU\IRUHOHFWLRQHHULQJXVH¶57  
 
The second prize, however, ZHQWWRDSRVWHUGHVLJQHGE\)30HUUHWWDµ/DERXUGLVFRYHU\
and a professional advertising consultDQW¶ Labour Organiser announced that it hoped the 
UHSURGXFWLRQRI0HUUHWW¶VSRVWHUZRXOGµOHDGWRDQH[WHQVLRQRIKLV>0HUUHWW¶V@SUHVHQWIULHQGV
LQWKH/DERXUPRYHPHQW¶58 Frustratingly, it cannot be definitely established whether Labour 
HYHU SURGXFHG 0HUUHWW¶V SRVWHU +RZHYHU *5((7 7+( '$:1 *,9( /$%285 ,7¶6 
CHANCE [figure 2.3], produced for the 1923 election and re-issued in 1929 was signed by 
A.S. Merritt: were Merritt and Merrett the same man?  The response to his design does 
indicate that the party were keen to investigate the use of such expertise in their designs. 
Merrett was not the only professional advertiser whose work Labour admired. During the 
1929 election the party displayed three posters by V. L. Danvers, designer of posters for 
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London Underground and Shell. Though Labour had not entirely turned to commercial 
advertising ± professional cartoonists and artists continued to SURGXFH PDQ\ RI WKH SDUW\¶V
posters ± the enthusiasm for Merrett and Danvers work demonstrates a move towards an 
advertising centred approach. Of course, Gerald Spencer Pryse, who again worked for Labour 
during the 1929 campaign, had produced designs for the world of commercial advertising. He 
however had been approached because he was good socialist and a good artist. In 1929 the 
party were keen on the use of draughtsman who were simply good advertisers.   
 
Labour were not the only party to hold competitions to find new designs. In early 1929, The 
Manchester Guardian reported on a Liberal Party competition that had received a diverse 
range of entries.59 Judged E\ µDGYHUWLVLQJ H[SHUWV¶, with total prize money of £1000, those 
who won the Liberal competition received more lucrative prizes than their Labour 
counterparts7KHZLQQLQJHQWULHVZHUHDOOµLOOXVWUDWLRQVRIWKUHHSKDVHVRIWKH/LEHUDODSSHDO
µthe new unemployment programme¶, µthe land policy¶ and µthe appeal of Liberalism to 
ZRPHQ¶60 The competition was a success, with several of the designs featuring on Liberal 
posters during the 1929 campaign (see below). By providing themes the party attempted to 
negate one of the problems of holding a competition, that of inconsistency. Whether achieved 
by look or good judgement, as the next section demonstrates, the Liberals could point 
towards a uniformity of both message and design.   
 
The Liberals¶ search for new posters followed a re-organisation of its communication 
department. There was no intention of interfering µZLWKWKH VHSDUDWHH[LVWHQFHRI WKH OLEHUDO
Publication Department,¶ EXW LQVWHDG WR VROYH WKH SUREOHP RI µRYHU-ODS¶ EHWZHHQ
departments. 61  As with the Conservatives, the Liberals wanted more control at national 
headquarters so that propaganda wRXOG µUHDFK WKH HOHFWRUV PXFK PRUH HIIHFWLYHO\ WKDQ LV
SRVVLEOH DW SUHVHQW¶62 To that end there was a new Liberal Campaign Department (LCD) 
which would µlead to a very great improvement in the presentation of the Liberal policy to the 
HOHFWRUDWH¶63 The change appeared to cause controversy, as following the formation of the 
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LCD members of the Publication Department resigned arguing that the new organisation 
would not have the desired effect.64  
 
The party hoped that such reorganisation would improve its national voice, but the abject 
state of local organisation hampered such efforts. If Conservative agents were too influential, 
there were too few of their Liberal peers to make much of an impact. The absorption of the 
Land and Nation League in to the Liberal machinery did improve matters somewhat, but the 
League was a London based organisation, and the dispersion of posters and leaflets still 
required constituency workers. 65 This was the complaint made by one memo writer to Lloyd 
George in April 1929, who stated that Liberal publications were only being distributed in a 
third of all constituencies. The memo sagely FRQFOXGHGµSropaganda cannot go in advance of 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶66  
 
The Byzantine character of the Liberals funding arrangements compounded problems of 
orgDQLVDWLRQ/OR\G*HRUJHWUDQVIHUUHGEHWZHHQDQGIURPKLVµ)LJKWLQJ
)XQG¶WRVXSSRUWFDQGLGDWHVEXWVWLSXODWHGWKDWRQO\WKHLQWHUHVWRIWKLVDPRXQW± around 
£15, 000 ± could be spent on organisation. A further £20,000 was set aside to fund 
headquarters.67 That the leader held such a large sum of money caused a rift between himself 
and others, creating concerns about an over reliance on one source of funds.68 In spite of 
these problems, the Liberals did produce a coherent set of designs largely because they were 
able to stick to three single issues: the promise to end unemployment, an appeal to newly 
enfranchised women, and electing Lloyd George as leader. GLYHQWKH/LEHUDOV¶SUREOHPVRI
organisation, however, it is questionable just how many voters actually saw the posters.  
2.2 The posters of 1929 
As the next section demonstrates, parties constructed their appeal to women based on a 
number of gendered stereotypes. This meant that all parties spoke to women as domestic 
consumers, promising to lower household budgets. Labour meanwhile concentrated on 
ZRPHQ¶VUROHDVPRWKHUVDQGVXJJHVWHGWKDWZRPHQVKRXOGYRWHRQEHKDOIRIWKHLUFKLOGUHQ 
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The most notable exceptions to this were posters, designed principally by Labour and the 
Liberals that suggested young newly enfranchised women would dictate the outcome of the 
election. 
2.2.1 The Image of the People  
The image of women as consumers was a common site on the billboards in 1929. Parties 
believed that electoral success would come with a claim WKDWWKH\FRXOGVDWLVI\QHZYRWHUV¶
DVSLUDWLRQVWRSDUWLFLSDWH LQ%ULWDLQ¶VJURZLQJFRQVXPHUFXOWXUH Many Conservative posters 
couched the domestic in monetary terms, but mixed an appeal to the pocket with one to their 
responsibilities. µ:KDW GR WKH 7HD-OHDYHV VD\"¶ [Figure 2.4] depicts a young woman 
FRQWHPSODWLQJDSRWRIWHDWKHSRVWHU¶VVORJDQGHPDQGLQJWKDWQRZµ7KH7HD-Duty has gone 
<RXU'XW\5HPDLQV¶:LWKDQH\HWRWKHHOHFWLRQ&KXUFKLOOKDGDEROLVKHGWKHWD[RQWHDLQ
his 1929 budget. 69 All parties understood the significance of the issue and Philip Snowden 
UHVSRQGHG WR &KXUFKLOO¶V DQQRXQFement with the declaration that it was µhigh time the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer did something for the women, because in practically every one 
of his previous Budgets he has laid additional taxation upon them. This, therefore, is a death-
EHGUHSHQWDQFH,WLVDQHOHFWRUDODSSHDOZKLFK,DPTXLWHVXUH«ZLOOQRWDFKLHYHWKHSXUSRVH
LQYLHZ¶ 70 The Conservative parties message to the female consumer came as part of a much 
broader campaign during the 1920s in which the party appealed to what David Jarvis called a 
FHOHEUDWLRQRIµZRPHQ¶VILQDQFLDOFRPPRQVHQVH¶71     
Like their Conservative rivals, the Liberals promised cheaper goods for women. FAIR PLAY 
FOR WOMEN [Figure 2.5@ FDPH DV D VXEPLVVLRQ WR WKH /LEHUDO¶V SRVWHU FRPSHWLWLRQ
Although The Manchester Guardian stated that the woman in the image stood in front of a 
row RI µGDLQW\¶ VXEXUEDQ KRXVHV VKH ZDV LQ IDFW WRZHULQJ DERYH D SDUDGH RI FRORXUIXO
shops.72 The ZRPDQ¶VPRGHUQGUHVVDQGthe shops behind her spoke clearly of affluence. This 
was not the only example of a Liberal poster that made such an appeal, as another assured 
ZRPHQ WKDW µPRQH\ EX\V PRUH XQGHU IUHH WUDGH¶ >)LJXUH 6].  Such was the visibility of 
commerce and prosperity in these posters the Liberals seemed to speak not just of making the 
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essentials such as food, but all goods cheaper. It was a series of posters that spoke not just of 
lower prices but also of higher standards of living. The companion poster to Figure 2.6 made 
a similar promise but aimed at men [Figure 2.7], and remained a rarity in speaking to men in 
such terms. These Liberal posters were not just about bringing down the price of goods, but 
an appeal to a middle-class who based their aspiration on material advancement. With their 
use of photography they aped glossy magazines, to which inter-war women had seen the birth. 
Just as Vogue linked consumerism with modernity, so too did these posters.73  Indeed, the 
image of male consumerism pre-empted the arrival of the first male lifestyle magazine by 
four years. Men Only ZDVDSXEOLFDWLRQWKDWVSRNHMXVWDVWKHSRVWHUGLGWRWKHµPHWURSROLWDQ¶
middle class man.74  
 
Just as Figures 2.6 and 2.7 aped consumer magazines, so too did they utilise the most 
FRQWHPSRUDU\ OD\RXWVRISRVWHUGHVLJQ7KH\GUDZWKHYLHZHU¶VH\HGRZQ WKH URZRI VKRSV
and into the middle, while the triangle formation of people gives the image depth. Such an 
effect was much harder to achieve with black and white photographs than with hand drawn 
colour images. One DGYHUWLVLQJOD\RXWJXLGHERRNQRWHGWKDWµLWLVQRWHDV\WRPDNHWKHPDLQ
object or figure ³VWDQGRXW´IURPWKHEDFNJURXQG¶: to overcome this, the manual suggested 
µVWULSSLQJ DZD\¶ WKH EDFNJURXQG WR OHDYH ILJXUHV RU buildings standing proudly against a 
white background, which is exactly the steps taken by the designer of Figures 2.6 and 2.7.75 
The Manchester Guardian UHSRUWHGWKDWµDny political art critic would agree that the Liberal 
posters when they can be found are the best for the prime merit of a poster is that of catching 
WKH H\H¶ DQG WKH SDSHU FRQFOXGHG ODWHU µWKH\ DORQH DPRQJ WKH SDUWLHV PDNH XVH RI
SKRWRJUDSK\¶ 76  
 
Liberal pictorial languages also appealed to the female vote through the promise of peace. W. 
:DONHU WRRN WKH REMHFWV IURP $OIUHG /HHWH¶V .LWFKHQHU UHFUXLWPHQW SURSDJDQGD DQG
UHFRQILJXUHGWKHP7KHILQJHUSRLQWHGQRWDWWKHSRVWHU¶VYLHZHUEXWIURPWKHPWRZDUGVWKH
woman in the image [2.8]. The decision facing her ± possibly she represented motherhood ± 
ZDV ZKHWKHU %ULWDLQ¶V \RXQJ PHQ VKRXOG FRQWLQXH WR EH FLYLOLDQV RU EHFRPe soldiers. The 
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position of her hands as scales alluded to the allegorical figure of Justice. But the woman in 
the image was real, and the poster an instruction that now women had the vote, they had a 
duty to deliver justice rather than simply be a representation of it. 77  Privately the 
Conservatives too thought that a promise of peace might motivate female voters. After 
Baldwin signed the Kellogg-Briand peace pact, Davidson suggested that the office of 
Secretary of State for War should be re-branded as the Secretary of State for the Army, as this 
would play well with female voters (and Liberals presumably). Such ideas, however, seem 
QRWWRKDYHEHHQDGRSWHGLQWKHSDUW\¶VSRVWHUFDmpaign.78  
 
Like the Liberals Labour promised peace, but unlike their rivals the message was not gender 
VSHFLILF%RWKSDUWLHV¶PDGHXVHLQYDULRXVIRUPVRIWKHst %DURQ/\WWRQ¶VIDPRXVSKUDVHµWKH
SHQLVPLJKWLHUWKDQWKHVZRUG¶79 But while the Liberals used the words to speak directly to 
women [Figure 2.9], /DERXU¶VSRVWHUGLGQRW>)LJXUH2.10]. While the cuff in the latter image 
appears to belong to man ± perhaps even a middle class man ± the use of the possessive 
GHWHUPLQHU µ\RXU¶ VXJJHVWHGDFROOHFWLYH appeal. Never Again! [Figure 2.11] also employed 
the image of hand, on this occasion emerging from the wings to reveal a war cemetery. This 
time the hand was distinctly more feminine, and possibly Labour intended the two to be 
displayed together ± something the party had done in the past ± but there is no documentary 
evidence of this. It is hard to determine why the two parties constructed their message 
differently. In his pre-election address to his Caernarvon constituents, Lloyd-George spoke of 
peace beiQJµWKHJUHDWHVWZRUOGLVVXHEHIRUHWKHFRXQWU\¶EXWWKHUHZDVQRLQGLFDWLRQWKDWKH
spoke only to the female members of the audience.80 The Liberal manifesto contained no 
specific statement about promoting peace. The Labour manifesto did, however, twice, once in 
D VHFWLRQ GHGLFDWHG WR WKH VXEMHFW DQG DJDLQ LQ WKH µDSSHDO WR ZRPHQ¶ VHJPHQW 81  Such 
diversion, between manifestos and posters reveals that although communication was 
increasingly coming from one source, parties had yet to achieve a single consistent voice. 
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Where Labour did construct a specific electoral identity for women, involved the Labour 
voting mother.82 Gerald Spencer Pryse designed Mothers Vote Labour [Figure 2.12] for the 
1918 campaign and the poster was again available for agents to purchase in 1929.83 The 
striking image combined artistic technique with religious iconography. Just as Edwardian 
/DERXU SRVWHUV RIWHQ YLVXDOLVHG D µVSLULWXDO¶ W\SH RI VRFLDOLVP VR 3U\VH FRQWLQXHG WKH
tradition after 1918.  With a background of factory and chimney, the poster harked to 
/DERXU¶V KHDUWODQGV <HW WKH LPDJHU\ RI WKH ZRPDQ ± wrapped in a blue shawl, holding a 
child, and in the glow of a halo of golden light ± Pryse took directly from Christian 
symbolism. This was not just an image that appealed to women, but also placed them at the 
YHU\FHQWUHRIVRFLDOLVP-XVWDV2UWKRGR[LFRQVRIWKH9LUJLQEDQLVKHGµGDUNQHVVLWVHOI¶, so in 
MOTHERS-VOTE LABOUR the maternal image brings light to the new socialist world.84   
 
Thomas Henry Fisher, famous for illustrating 5LFKPDO &URPSWRQ¶V Just William books, 
produced WOMEN VOTE LABOUR-)25 7+( &+,/'5(1¶6 6$.( [Figure 2.13]. It was 
poster with very clear sentiments. Before female enfranchisement, parties instructed men to 
vote for the benefit of their wives. After reform in 1918 and 1928, Labour in particular, urged 
women to think of the children when enacting their democratic responsibility. Labour spoke 
to women in this fashion because the party believed that ultimately even if new women voters 
did not initially vote as mothers they eventually would. One writer in the Labour Organiser 
UHDVVXUHGUHDGHUVWKDWµHDFK\HDUDODUJHVHFWLRQRIWKLVYRWH³VHWWOHVGRZQ´WRZLHOGWKHPRVW
commanding influence in Society-DVPRWKHUVDQGDVZLYHV7KHFDSWXUHRIWKH³IODSSHUYRWH´
meanV LQILQLWHO\ PRUH WKDQ LW ORRNV¶85 Moreover, Labour posters reflected opinions about 
JHQGHUKHOGE\ODUJHVHFWLRQVRIWKHSDUW\0DULRQ3KLOOLSVWKHSDUW\¶VFKLHIZRPHQ¶VRIILFHU
wrote in Women and the Labour Party WKDW WKH µLQWHUHVWVRI PHQDQGZRPHQZHre one and 
LQGLYLVLEOH¶ IXUWKHU TXDOLILHG E\ VWDWLQJ WKDW ZRPHQ¶V LQWHUHVWV OD\ PDLQO\ LQ WKH GRPHVWLF
realm.86 This demand that women vote responsibly for someone else represented a shift in 
communication since the expansion of the franchise. Just as it was before female 
enfranchisement, men were expected to vote on behalf of their wives and families, now 
women had the vote they, too, had to act responsibly on the behalf of others.     
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In truth, peace, motherhood, and domestic consumption were unsurprising ways of speaking 
to women. They mirrored, as we have seen, parties¶ internal reflections on what might 
motivate women at the ballot box. But this was not the only image of women that appeared 
RQ%ULWDLQ¶VELOOERDUG$VHOHFWLRQRI/DERXUDQG/LEHUDOSRVWHUs constructed the image of a 
political woman, neither domestic nor consumer but defiant political actor. Moreover, in the 
VDPHSRVWHUVZRPHQFRXOGGHILQHPRGHUQLW\7KH/LEHUDO¶Vµ&20(21'$'¶[Figure 2.14] 
was a typical example of this type. The young fashionable and well-to-do women led their 
dapper father by the arm to vote Liberal. It is the young women who lead the way; the posters 
state that is they who will dictate the outcome of the election. Labour, too, showed this image 
of the young modern woman deciding the outcome of the campaign. In THE NEW VOTER 
[Figure 2.15] cartoonist Ern Shaw drew Ramsay MacDonald next to a young voter, whose 
attire marked the epitome of the new. The poster was as much about MacDonald being the 
new modern man in comparison with the antique Liberal and Conservative party leaders in 
the background, something discussed below. What Shaw constructed here ±in his image of 
woman ±was a defiant political actor making a choice. This poster and [Figure 2.14] show the, 
albeit brief, emergence on the billboard of a new image of womanhood.87 
 
Two further posters reflected the modernity of the new female voter, though in different 
forms from above.  ,Q /DERXU¶V MEN & WOMEN WORKERS YOUR CHANCE AT LAST 
[Figure 2.16] workers leave a closed factory and enter a polling station. The woman at the 
centre of the crowd stares directly at the viewer. The words demonstrate a message to the 
entire workforce regardless of sex. This equality was not unique in Labour communication in 
1929. Gerald Spencer PU\VH¶V LABOUR STANDS FOR ALL WHO WORK [Figure i.4] 
depicted a group of male and female workers standing shoulder to shoulder. The difference 
between the two images was the direct contact between female worker and viewer. Although 
this was a message to all workers, as with those Labour and Liberal posters who showed 
women deciding the election, the agency here was with the woman. As such it marked a new 
dimension in the development of billboard languages.     
 
That said this image of the female worker was rare. On the majority of billboards paid work ± 
or lack of it ± was a masculine concern. In part this was because the Liberal posters reflected 
WKHSDUW\¶V PDLQ policy offer in 1929 as they claimed that the solution to joblessness was a 
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mass programme of roaG EXLOGLQJ $Q DFWLYLW\ WKH  PDQLIHVWR DUJXHG ZDV µSHFXOLDUO\
suitable for a time of unemployment; because a large variety of labour can be employed, 
widely spread over the country, and because a very high proportion of the total expenditure 
represents ZDJHV¶ 88  The NEW ROAD [Figure 2.17] showed just how many trades road 
construction needed, but by their nature (in 1929 at least) these were jobs for men. The poster 
also visualised other manifesto promises such as maintenance of canal-bridges, and the 
construction of telephone wires.89  The man in the bottom right of the poster with his open 
armed stance both invites the worker seeking employment and the viewer, to witness how the 
Liberal plan will bring jobs; the gaze directed beyond the initial point of focus to the scene 
behind.  In WE CAN CONQUER UNEMPLOYMENT ROAD MAKING EMPLOYS 47 
DIFFERENT TRADES, [Figure 2.18] the party was more explicit still about how their road 
building scheme would alleviate unemployment.  
 
The casting of unemployment as a masculine issue in Liberal posters, however, went beyond 
depictions of the construction industries.  It was further emphasised in the Liberal poster NO 
MORE OF THIS [Figure 2.19]. The image traded on an accepted view that unemployment 
was a male issue. Indeed, it reinforced that perception. While the men queue outside the 
employment exchange the three women visible in the poster ± one walking in the opposite 
direction of the queue and two beside her strolling arm in arm alongside it ± appear wholly 
detached. It was inaccurate image; joblessness was far from a male problem. In the 
Lancashire cotton industry in 1931, there was a higher percentage of unemployed women 
than there were men.90 
 
For Labour, billboards yoked masculine identity with hard physical work. This was 
particularly evident in a number of Labour posters, which promoted the importance of 
ZRUNLQJ FODVV PDVFXOLQH HQGHDYRXU WR %ULWDLQ¶V LQGXVWULDO PLJKW 9/ 'DQYHUV SURGXFHG
three posters along this theme in 1929.  6$9(%5,7$,1¶6&2$/,1'8657< [Figure 2.20], 
SECURE INDUSTRIAL PROPERITY [Figure 2.21], and A NATION AT WORK (not pictured) 
all presented a visual representation of the nobility of industry.91 Danvers emphasised the 
ZRUNHU¶VPDVFXOLQLW\DQGSK\VLFDOLW\WKURXJKWKHLUPXVFXODU WRUVRs. Moreover, the image of 
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the man in SECURE INDUSTRIAL PROSPERITY, kneeling in a heroic pose atop a pedestal, 
DQGVXUURXQGHGE\WKHREMHFWVRI%ULWDLQ¶VHQJLQHHULQJVXFFHVVIXUWKHUOLRQLVHGWKHLQGXVWULDO
male being. The posters conflated Britain, its industrial might, and its industrial workforce. 
They evoked Soviet imagery with its lionisation of the worker, when images of the 
blacksmith could GHSLFW µVNLOO¶ µGLJQLW\¶, and µphysical SURZHVV¶. 92  Despite a universal 
franchise, this group of posters adhered to and maintained a masculine form of pre-feminised 
politics. Moreover, with the marked difference between these posters and those intended for 
the female eye, parties clearly felt able to project multi-faceted depictions of themselves, 
even when using such a highly public form of communication such as posters.   
 
While Labour and Liberal depictions of working-class men were clearly defined by their 
work, Conservative posters did something different. Three surviving posters show how 
leading CoQVHUYDWLYHV¶± notably Baldwin ± feared that the addition of an uneducated mass to 
the electorate would lead to society fracturing along class lines. It was a fear crystallised by 
the 1926 General Strike.93 Working and middle-class men appeared alongside one another as 
the Conservatives promised to promote and preserve society. All of society was visible in 
'21¶7%(&$8*+7[Figure 2.22] and in The ESCALATOR to PROSPERITY [Figure 2.23]. 
In both posters class and position were fixed by dress. The new female voter is visible in her 
cloche hat, the working-class man in his flat cap and the middle-class businessman in his 
bowler. In the last chapter we saw how in Edwardian posters the bowler was worn by both 
working and middle-class men. Now it was exclusively the attire of the latter. Just as the poet 
$6-7HVVLPRQG¶VZURWHRIWKHDQRQ\PLW\EXWVWXUGLQHVVRIWKHPDQLQWKHERZOHUKDW µ,DP
WKH PDQ WKH\ FDOO WKH QDWLRQ¶V EDFNERQH¶, so the poster shows the businessmen forming a 
central component of British society.94  The posters message was clear: if the people followed 
Conservative plans all would ascend to a brighter more prosperous world. 
  
The presentation of the Conservatives as a party of healing and benign faith ran across their 
range of posters. The CONSERVATIVE SUN-RAY TREATMENT [Figure 2.24] showed the 
suns rays cast WKH SDUW\¶V EHQHILFH DFURVV DOO of society. The whole image is one of 
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togetherness. The Sun-Ray treatment was a cure for tuberculosis and the poster was a visual 
LPDJH RI KRZ &RQVHUYDWLYH SROLF\ ZRXOG µFXUH¶ VRFLDO IUDFWXUes, appropriate given the 
general strike. All classes are here. On the left is a young woman attired in the cloche hat so 
familiar from the billboards during the campaign. Then comes an old women protected by the 
strong arm of a working-class man. The largest figure in the scene, around which all others 
revolve, is the working-class man. His straight back, protective character, and outstretched 
arm is far removed from some of the supine figures that appeared in 1910. The schoolboy and 
man in a top hat complete this image of society, the totality of which was further emphasised 
with the inclusion of the urban and suburban landscape.  
 
2.2.2 Promoting the leader 
 
The CONSERVATIVE SUN-RAY TREATMENT [Figure 2.24] demonstrated that posters when 
depicting complex entities, such as society, required high level of sophistication. Viewers 
were required to interpret a number of visual metonyms and symbols (and read extensive text) 
to determine exactly what the poster was trying to say. Such complexity demonstrated that 
the symbol rich pictorial languages of the Edwardian period still had a role in the languages 
of universal democracy. In contrast, posters featuring party leaders relied on a relatively 
simple visual language. The turn to the leader in part reflected a belief amongst campaigners 
that traits already extant within them naturally drew voters towards them. Conservative 
SROLWLFLDQDQGHFRQRPLVW:LOOLDP+HUZLQVZURWHWR%DOGZLQDORQJWKHVHOLQHVµ(YHU\ZKHUH¶
+HUZLQV ZURWH µ, KHDU WKH YLHZ LV WKDW DW DQ\ UDWH WKis is your election, there is no other 
PHPEHURIWKH*RYHUQPHQWZKRUHDOO\FDUULHVDQ\JXQV¶95 Moreover, students of propaganda 
had highlighted the importance of leadership in successful mass persuasion. Writing on war 
propaganda in 1927, Laswell stated it µLQYROYHV WKH HQHP\ WKH DOO\ DQG WKH QHXWUDO ,W
LQYROYHVOHDGHUVRQERWKVLGHVDQGWKHVXSSRUWRIFHUWDLQSROLFLHVDQGLQVWLWXWLRQV¶96 With the 
leader posters of 1929, parties both sought to reinforce and indeed construct archetypes of 
men to whom the voters would rally. In turn, to diminish their rivals claims to be the most 
suited to hold power, electoral posters hammered opposition leaders.    
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The most widely circulated Conservative poster was SAFETY FIRST! [Figure 2.1], which 
FDUULHG%DOGZLQ¶VSKRWograph. In it Baldwin stares directly at the viewer to project statesman-
like solidity. The restraint of the image matched the restraint of the slogan.  
Clearly WKH SRVWHU¶V GHVLJQHU felt that there was no need to say whom Baldwin was, the 
restraint of thH LPDJH UHIOHFWHG %DOGZLQ¶s reputation for deliberating the pros and cons of 
every question.97 The slogan did not originate with the poster, but had been used in numerous 
road and rail safety campaigns.98 :KLOHWKHSDUW\¶VRZQRIILFLDOVZDQWHGWRXVHµWKHPDn you 
FDQ WUXVW¶ WKH QRPLQDO H[SHUWV LQ VXFK PDWWHUV 6+ %HQVRQ IDYRXUHG µVDIHW\ ILUVW¶  99 The 
Conservatives adopted a slogan with which some of the public were already familiar; a form 
of words widely used in non-political public advertising. Just as people associated the slogan 
with safety in transport, so Baldwin would keep the nation safe.  
 
SAFETY FIRST! attempted to surmount the difficulty of speaking directly to millions of very 
different voters. An appeal on behalf of a man rather than a party: BDOGZLQ¶V connection with 
the Conservative party the poster left unsaid. Safety First was moreover just one part of a 
campaign that aimed to reinforce the trust that the electorate was thought to hold in Baldwin. 
The Conservative strategist Philip Cambray cRQFOXGHG WKDW %DOGZLQ µKDV FRPH WR EH
regarded as the plain man, without subtlety or guile or superabundant ability, just smoking his 
SLSH DQG WKLQNLQJ KRZ KH FDQ EHVW KHOS KLV FRXQWU\ DQG KLV IHOORZ PHQ DQG ZRPHQ¶100 
Cambary wrote this in 1932, and the posters of 1929 had helped reinforced this view. In 
TRUST BALDWIN He will steer you to safety! [Figure 2.25], viewers saw the Prime Minister 
guiding the British ship of state through a storm. The poster played on the mythology of 
%ULWDLQ¶V sea fairing history; Baldwin the captain of the national ship, steering through 
difficult times. Just as Safety First achieved intimacy with the mass electorate through 
%DOGZLQ¶VGLUHFWJD]HWKHZRUGµ\RX¶LQTRUST BALWIN aimed at achieving the same effect.  
 
%DOGZLQ¶V pipe adds to the sense of solidity. 602.( %$/':,1¶6 6(&85,7< 0,;785( 
[Figure 2.26] did the same. Parodying tobacco advertising, the scene created a sense of 
familiarity for the onlooker. The image of a pipe is coupled with tobacco spilling out from its 
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packagLQJ ZKLFK ERUH WKH 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU¶V likeness and those policies on the packaging 
were same he articulated on his eve of poll speech at the Drury Lane theatre on 18th April.101 
7KHXVHRI WKHSLSH LQ WKHZDV WKHQ PRUHWKDQDQ µLQVWDQWO\ LGHQWLILDEOH 
SURS¶DVRQH
scholar has claimed.102 It was a symbol for the very things Baldwin wanted the public to 
recognise him for, honesty, trust, and thoughtfulness. The use of the pipe in these posters 
built on and extended this perception of Baldwin. And as later chapters demonstrate, Baldwin 
was not the only Prime Minister who would use his fame as a pipe smoker, to portray a 
trustworthy and safe persona. 
 
As Figure 2.27 shows the Conservatives were not the only party to use posters to popularise 
their leader. Liberal billboards depicted Lloyd George as the war winner who would now 
organise the country to solve unemployment.103 The poster further demonstrated just how 
advanced Liberal communication could be. Photographs were one thing but here the Liberals 
once again repeated their manifesto title and election slogan, in a clear belief that a single 
PHVVDJH RIW UHSHDWHG ZRXOG EHWWHU SLHUFH WKH YRWHU¶V FRQVFLHQWLRXV Reinforcement of the 
message came with Lloyd George holding the manifesto. Here was a man with ideas and as 
the image showed, a man who could demonstrate a history of having seen these ideas through 
to success. Just as Conservative posters sought to imagine society in an act of togetherness so 
did the Liberals; the image on the right of the poster shows all classes and gender existing 
and working in harmony.  
 
There were considerable similarities between the Baldwin and Lloyd George posters. Both 
articulated a single message: Baldwin was trustworthy and safe, while Lloyd George was the 
man who was dynamic and could achieve change. Labour did something quite different, as 
the party projected two different images of Ramsay MacDonald. Firstly they wanted to 
reassure established voters that the Labour man was every bit the Statesman as Baldwin and 
Lloyd George. Secondly, the party spoke to the youthful cohort as MacDonald the modern 
man. The first of these two quite distinct visions was as part of a long running campaign to 
combat Conservative claims that Labour were effectively Bolshevik.  In 1929 Labour posters 
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formed part of an effort to relocate the party in the eyes of middle-class voters, from that of 
Trade Unionist and extreme socialist, to a one with broad based appeal located at the centre 
of the democratic inter-war politics. By creating an image of MacDonald as a statesman equal 
to his rivals, the party hoped to be seen as one worthy of another term in office. In 
/$%285¶6 /($'(5 0$.( +,0 7+( 1$7,21¶6 /($'(5 [Figure 2.28] MacDonald 
looked as Baldwin did in SAFETY FIRST; wearing a stiff collar, morning coat, and tie of a 
man in public administration. Although formal dress of this type was increasingly rare it 
remained the image of international statesman. This was the persona of a man easy in the 
highest office of government, as much an established leader as were his rivals. The sheer 
numbers of the poster the party produced demonstrated the importance they placed on 
projecting this image, 20000 in all, double the number of any other example.104 MacDonald-
as-capable leader was also evident in GENERAL MANAGER WANTED [Figure 2.29] where 
he is seen accepting the job of Prime Minister from John Bull, the acme of conventional 
Britishness.  
 
As shown above, MacDonald also appeared on the billboards as the modern man. In THE 
NEW VOTER [Figure 2.15 ] Lloyd George and BaldwLQ¶V ROG- fashioned top hats and 
morning coats contrast sharply with 0DF'RQDOG¶V lounge suit and homburg. It was a poster 
demonstrating the fluidity of visual symbolism. Symbols could easily represent the same 
thing but generate different meanings depend on FRQWH[W %DOGZLQ¶V SLSH LQ &RQVHUYDWLYH
posters was a reassuring sign of geniality; in the NEW VOTER, it represented an out of touch 
old man. In /$%285¶6 /($'(5 MacDonald is presented in the traditional attire of an 
international statesman, in the NEW VOTER his opponents are ridiculed for wearing the same. 
The posters had different audiences, MacDonald as statesman a panacea to reassure middle-
class voters, MacDonald as youthful leader a message to new voters. Potentially these posters 
never occupied the same space where all were visible. But given that Labour produced both 
and both were available for agents to buy for their particular constituency, it demonstrated 
WKDW /DERXU¶V WUXVW LV WKH YLHZHU WR LQWHUSUHW WKH DOWHUQDWLYH PHVVDJHV RI WKH SRVWHUV ± even 
those who had previously never been enfranchised ± was high indeed. 
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2.2.3 Attacking the leader   
 
Just as the billboard could promote the merits of one leader so they could attack another. The 
µSHUVRQDOLW\¶ RI WKH ELOOERDUG WKDW KDG EHHQ VR HYLGHQW Ln 1910 remained. Just as in that 
campaign, Asquith was seemingly depicted as an inebriate /OR\G *HRUJH¶V PDFDEUH ZLQN
towards the NEW VOTER hinted at his reputation as a serial philanderer.  This focus on 
identity provided poster designers with ammunition upon which to base their attacks. 
Baldwin was widely regarded as a highly affective radio performer. Sir Arthur Salter 
GHVFULEHG%DOGZLQ¶VUDGLRWHFKQLTXHDVµFRPPRQVHQVHDQGVZHHWUHDVRQDEOHQHVV¶DQG
µ0U %DOGZLQ ZDV PDGH IRU WKH PLFURSKRQH DQG LW IRU KLP¶105 Labour in 1929 sought to 
undermine this perception through the billboards, producing a poster depicting a radio with 
µHPSW\ words¶SRXULQJRXWRIWKHVSHDNHU [Figure 2.30]. 
 
The most vicious attacks were those made by the Conservatives on MacDonDOGµ5HGVFDUe¶
had morphed into a more vigorous assassination of the personality and politics of the Labour 
leader. S.H. Benson designed both the SOCIALIST SCHEMES MEAN £250,000,000 MORE A 
YEAR IN TAXES! [Figure 2.31] and THE CHEAPJACK! [Figure 2.32]. The figure of £250 
million in SOCIALIST SCHEMES MEAN was, according to the Conservatives, what taxation 
would need to produce should Labour get into power.106 The theme of both posters was the 
deceitful, untrustworthy, and ultimately crooked nature of Ramsay MacDonald. THE 
CHEAPJACK! suggested MacDonald was a con artist, a man whose promises about the effect 
of his policies should not be trusted. The image echoed the language of medical adverts with 
LWV WDON RI µOX[XULDQW JURZWK¶ 7KH SRVWHU ZDV evidently more nuanced than SOCIALIST 
SCHEMES, which left viewers in little doubt about what the mask and gun meant. 
MacDonald is not so upfront about his schemes in the CHEAPJACK. He instead deliberately 
tricks the public by telling them he had the cure to all ills, but keeping secret the fact his 
µUHPHG\¶ZRXOGRQO\EULQJJUHDWHUHYLO These posters were different from the simplistic fear 
UDLVLQJ LPDJHV RI µUHG VFDUH¶ 7KH\ XQGHUPLQHG /DERXU¶V FODLP IRU FURVV FODVV VXSSRUW In 
BEWARE OF THE SERPENT [Figure 2.33] MacDonald was accused of letting socialism out 
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of the cage, with the result of crushing both workers and employers. MacDonald appears in 
the background dressed as a zookeeper, incompetent and ambivalent to the ensuing panic. 
 
$VLGH IURP DWWDFNLQJ 0DF'RQDOG¶V SHUVonal integrity, Conservative posters also suggested 
the Labour leader was in unholy alliance with Lloyd George. The reason for attacking both 
/DERXUDQG/LEHUDOV VLPXOWDQHRXVO\ZDV WRGLVFUHGLW WKHLU ULYDOV¶SODQV IRUGHDOLQJZLWK WKH
problem of unemployment.107 In SO PRETTY!-µ7,// 7+(< %8567¶ [Figure 2.34] Victor 
+LFNV¶GUHZLQVSLUDWLRQIURPERWKWKHIDPRXV3HDUVDGYHUWDQGWKHSRSXODUVPXVLFKDOO
hit ,¶PIRUHYHUEORZLQJEXEEOHV7KHSRVWHUFRPELQHVWKHILUVWWZROLQHVRIWKHILUVWYHUVHµI'm 
dreaming dreams, ,
PVFKHPLQJVFKHPHV¶ZLWKWKHILUVWWZR lines of the FKRUXVµI'm forever 
blowing bubbles, Pretty bubbles in the air¶ ,Q ILQHDUW, bubbles were a symbol of both awe 
but also the fragility of human ideas and experience.108 ,Q+LFNV¶SRVWHU0DF'RQDOG¶VDQG
Lloyd George¶V µVFKHPLQJ¶ DPRXQWHG WR SURPLVHV ZKRVH IUDLOW\ meant they would simply 
burst. As the last chapter demonstrated, Edwardian poster designers also took from Pears 
advert. It remained during the inter-war period, a recognisable visual language that artists 
could deploy towards political ends. Conservative posters highlighted the cost of Labour and 
Liberal plans for unemployment, in order to undermine their legitimacy in the public eye. Just 
as Conservative posters positioned women as domestic budget keepers, so the party couched 
national finance in personal terms. '21¶7 /(7 7+(0 *$0%/( :,7+ <285 021(< 
[Figure 2.35], which showed MacDonald and Lloyd George betting bags of public money on 
a game of crown and anchor. Although the two play agaLQVWHDFKRWKHUXVHRIµRWKHUSHRSOHV¶
money and the smiles on their faces show that they fully understood that it would not be they 
who lost. The play on words in the poster The Socialists will be LIBERAL with your money! 
drew similar conclusions.109  
 
A further reason why the Conservatives attacked Lloyd George and MacDonald conjointly 
was in attempt to minimise losses in three-cornered seats. There were 150 more of these than 
had existed 1924 and it was not just the Conservatives who considered them a problem. 110  
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/OR\G *HRUJH WROG 3KLOLS 6QRZGRQ LQ 2FWREHU  WKDW µ,I ZH ILJKW HDFK RWKHU LQ
constituencies where Liberal or Labour, as the case may be, has no chance of winning, but 
can only keep the other out, the Conservatives, will have a good working majoULW\¶111   
Although Philip Williamson has claimed that senior Conservative politicians discounted the 
possibility that three corned contests would result in a minority Labour government propped 
up with Liberal support, Conservative posters suggest otherwise.112  In ANOTHER LEG-UP 
FROM THE LIBERALS! [Figure 2.36] Victor Hicks showed Lloyd George literally 
supporting Ramsay MacDonald LQ KLV HIIRUWV WR µVWHDO¶ IURP WKH SHRSOH In depicting 
MacDonald in a pair of trews, the poster hinted at his Scottishness, a subtle nod to English 
YRWHUVVRWRRKLVUHGVFDUIDVXJJHVWLRQRIKLVµH[WUHPH¶VRFLDOLVPThe inclusion of the word 
µDQRWKHU¶ UHPLQGHG YLHZHUV RI /DERXU¶V ILUVW PLQRULW\ JRYHUQPHQW 7KH SRVWHU ZDV an 
H[WHQVLRQ RI %DOGZLQ¶V UKHWRULF $W %ULVWRO LQ $SUil 192 KH VWDWHG µLf the contest were a 
straightforward one between the Socialist party and the Unionist Party, the result would be a 
IRUHJRQH FRQFOXVLRQ«, GR UHFRJQL]H WKDW WKH ILJKW LV FRPSOLFDWHG E\ WKH IDFW WKDW RQ RXU
flank is fighting in battle array the /LEHUDO3DUW\¶%DOGZLQZHQWRQVSHDNLQJWRWKRVHµZKR
realize the gravity of this election and the issues at stake, if they are conscientiously opposed 
to the Socialist doctrine, to give their strength to the one party that is capable of beating the 
SocLDOLVWV¶113 The poster was another reminder that whether it came in the form of socialism 
with a hand from the Liberals, or as class war, extremism could only be avoided by voting 
Conservative.  
2. 3 Conclusion  
Given the large numbers of new voters in 1929 the question arises just how new was the 
billboards that confronted them. Perhaps predictably the vision of women on the hoardings 
was premised on the notions of gender that ran through much of the parties and society. In 
appealing to the consumer and motherhood, parties reflected their own notions of sex. When 
the Conservative Attorney General Sir Thomas Inskip told the Constitutional Club in 
February 1929 that WKH QHZ YRWHUV µUHSUHVHQWHG D VWDEOH HOHPHQW LQ WKH FRXQWU\¶ ZLWK 
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µDVSLUDWLRQVFHQWUHGDURXQGWKHKRPHDQGWKHULVLQJJHQHUDWLRQ¶KHPLJKWKDYHEHHQVSHDNLQJ
on behalf of any of the parties.114 But what while parties may have believed that women 
PLJKWHYHQWXDOO\µVHWWOHGRZQ¶WKHUHH[LVWHGRQWKHELOOERDUGVRIDOOWKUHHSDUWLHVWKHLPDJHRI
modern woman defined though youth and fashionable style. Moreover, the image of this 
woman on Labour and Liberal billboards dictating the outcome of the campaign as a defiant 
political actor appeared a one off. All too quickly parties returned to a less dynamic appeal to 
women, premised on the trusted stereotypes of motherhood and consumption.    
  
It would be decades before leaders featured so prominently again on the billboards. All 
parties actively pushed the merits of their respective leaders, and used the visual medium to 
undermine the efforts of their rivals to seek power. The posters provide the feeling of a 
genuine battle between leaders, not something that would really occur again until the latter 
part of the twentieth century. Was this then the start of a type of campaigning focussed 
almost entirely on leader, or an anomaly? In truth it was both, as it would not be until the end 
of twentieth century when elections would have the true feel of being battles against 
individuals rather than parties. However, it was from 1929 when parties began to routinely 
use the billboard to push the merits of their leader. This could be on a large scale such as 
Winston Churchill in 1945 or a relatively small way such as the one poster featuring Clement 
Attlee in 1955.115 Nevertheless, 1929 appears to be the point when the positive image of the 
leader really takes off.   
 
Did 1929 represent a type of war propaganda? Certainly parties adopted methods employed 
GXULQJZDUFRQGLWLRQVQRWOHDVWWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHµFUHDWLRQ¶RIDQHQHP\ in MacDonald. All 
parties by focussing on the leader used techniques applied during the creation of mass unity. 
1929 was, however, a campaign based solely on the pursuit of votes through irrational 
impulse. In any case, the Conservatives turn to the politics of fear failed, because as Philip 
&DPEUD\ZURWHFRPPHQWLQJRQWKH³6DIHW\)LUVW´VORJDQµSXEOLFRSLQLRQZDVXQFRQYLQFHGRI
WKHSUHVHQFHRIDQ\LPPHGLDWHGDQJHU¶116 Instead, 1929 reflected a contest on who was best 
suited to move Britain into a new age. 5DPVD\ 0DF'RQDOG¶V ORXQJH VXLWV DQG /OR\G
*HRUJH¶V YLVLRQ RI a new road system, VDW DORQJVLGH %DOGZLQ¶V VWHDGIDVWQHVV LQ VKRZLQJ 
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three leaders demonstrating that only they could manage what was ultimately a transitional 
period of %ULWDLQ¶V KLVWRU\
92 
 
3.0 The General Elections of 1950 and 1951 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Remember? Labour Party, 1950, PHM: 1995.39.226 
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Polling for the 1950 election took place on 23rd February and the result was close. Labour 
won 315 seats, the Conservatives 298 (including those won under the National Liberal banner) 
and the Liberals nine. With a majority of just six, Attlee went to the people again a year later. 
That election, which took place on 25th 2FWREHU VDZ WKH &RQVHUYDWLYHV RYHUWXUQ /DERXU¶V
majority. The new party of power had 321 seats, Labour 295 and the Liberals just six. 
Despite the change in government, Labour had, in the second election, polled more votes than 
the Conservatives, 13,948,385 compared to 13,747,840.  
Turnout for these two elections was the highest of the post-war period, 83.9% and 82.6% 
respectively. David Butler argued that the long lead into the election had provided parties 
with more time to get voters to turn out. As further possible reasons for the high numbers 
turning out, Butler also claimed that voters were better educated (in part stimulated by 
newspaper reading); he further propositioned that there had been a visceral response to the 
significant changes brought in by the Labour government.1  
This period was supposedly the apogee of class voting. For many the 1945 result proved that 
efforts to convert a majority of electorate to socialism had been successful.  Keeping Left a 
SDPSKOHW SXEOLVKHG E\ WKH .HHS /HIW JURXS RI /DERXU 03V DUJXHG WKDW WKH µ/DERXU 3DUW\
won power precisely because its message differed for the electoral programmes of the two 
ROGHUSDUWLHV¶2 Ralph Mililband reflected on the popular radicalism of the period. During the 
warVR0LOLEDQGFODLPHG WKHFODVVHVKDGEHHQXQLWHGEXW LQSHDFH µWKHPHQZKRKDGEHHQ
imperilled in that survival were remembered, as well as the class to which they belonged, and 
WKH3DUW\ZKRVHODEHOWKH\ZRUH¶3 However, more recently there has been a reaction against 
this claim of mass conversion, and instead a move to suggest that 1945 represented an anti- 
Conservative rather than pro-Labour vote. DHVSLWH &KXUFKLOO¶V SRSXODULW\, people voted 
Labour because of long held resentment over high unemployment in the 1930s and a short-
term annoyance at the Conservatives failure WR DSSUHFLDWH SHRSOH¶V desire for a more 
considered response to the housing shortage.4  
                                         
1
 H.G. Nicholas and D.E. Butler, The British Elections of 1950 (London: 1951), p. 296.   
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 µ.HHSLQJ/HIW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January 1950) p. 3. 
3
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4
 6HHIRUH[DPSOH6)LHOGLQJµ:KDWGLGWKHSHRSOHZDQW"7KH0HDQLQJRIWKH*HQHUDO(OHFWLRQ¶The 
Historical Journal, (1992) 35:3, p. 639; S. Fielding, P. Thompson and N. Tiratsoo, ³(QJODQG$ULVH´7KH
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Seemingly, many of the electorate had established their convictions well before Labour called 
WKH HOHFWLRQ 2QH 0DVV 2EVHUYDWLRQ SXEOLFDWLRQ UHSRUWHG WKDW µ6R FRPSOH[ DQG GHHS-seated 
are voting impulses in fact that it sometimes seems surprising that anybody ever changes 
VLGHVDWDOO¶5 Party membership appeared to reflect such conviction. Both the Conservatives 
and Labour claimed rising numbers in the early 1950s, with the peak coming in 1953, at just 
over 2.8 million and 1 million respectively.6  
The efforts of activists in the 1950 and 1951 elections have been given prominence over the 
role of billboards in corralling these committed voters to the poll. A study of election 
behaviour in Greenwich How People Vote, reported the point of election posters was to 
inform the voter which candidate represented which party, in a period before affiliation was 
SULQWHG RQ EDOORW SDSHUV µ7KH FDQYDVVHU LV WKH PRVW LPPHGLDWH FKDQQHO RI FRPPXQLFDWLRQ
betweeQWKHSDUW\RUJDQLVDWLRQDQGWKHHOHFWRUDWH¶7 Indeed, the study dismissed the influence 
RISDUW\SROLWLFDO OLWHUDWXUHFODLPLQJWKDWµ7KHVSDVPRGLFDSSHDUDQFHRIHOHFWLRQSURSDJDQGD
LV OLNHO\ WR H[FLWH OLWWOH PRUH WKDQ LQGLIIHUHQFH RU VFRUQ¶8 Jon Lawrence suggests that the 
importance of posters to campaigning was declining, citing as a reason the fewer used during 
the 1950-51 campaigns, than in 1945.9  
This chapter, through a detailed study of the billboards, challenges this view of the 1950 and 
1951 elections. The first section explores the different ways in which the two largest parties 
organised themselves, and argues this brought a significant difference to their respective 
campaigns. Labour was able to produce posters which utilised all that was best in 
contemporary design. However, due to internal disputes could not integrate the billboard 
campaign into its wider message. While Conservatives Party posters lacked the visual quality 
RI /DERXU¶V WKH SDUW\ EHJDQ Wo use its pictorial propaganda as part of a more coherent 
broader campaign.  
/DERXU¶VVXFFHVVLQGHVLJQFDPH following the development of a small in-house design team 
that sat within the Press and Publicity Department. The staff pushed the ethos of good design 
practice through the production of highly regarded posters for national campaigns, and by 
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writing a series of articles for party publications that outlined best practice for those activists 
producing material at the local level. But the wider party was divided: should Labour try to 
µVHOO¶VRcialism, or instead push specific socialist policies like nationalisation?10 Those on the 
left of the party, believing the electorate converted, advocated a campaign in 1950 that 
promised greater socialist reform. Others such as Herbert Morrison thought restraint was 
required in order to maximise voter appeal.11 0RUULVRQZDVLQFKDUJHRISURGXFLQJ/DERXU¶V
posters and these articulated middle class concerns. However, the manifesto had wider input 
from the party, and in a bid to end monopoly in the cement and sugar industries Labour stated 
its intention to nationalise them.12 Steel was already undergoing nationalisation, following the 
passing of the Iron and Steel Act in 1949. 'XH WR 0RUULVRQ¶V HIIRUWV WKLV SROLF\ GLG QRW
feature in the posters. As a result one-half RI/DERXU¶VFDPSDLJQ said one thing, the other half 
another.  
The Conservatives continued with their policy of using an external advertising agency to 
produce posters. And, as they had done in the past, the party trusted the company without 
ever questioning the quality of the finished product. Such confidence had implications for the 
final quality of individual posters. However, tKH &RQVHUYDWLYH¶V UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK WKH
advertising agency Colman Prentis and Varley (C.P.V) enabled the party to create a 
campaign where the same message ± visual or verbal ± crossed platforms. While not a phrase 
used at the time µLQWHJUDWHGFDPSDLJQ¶KDVEURDGO\EHHQGHILQHGE\6SDUURZDQG7XUQHUDV a 
µFHQWUDOLVHG FRQWURO RYHU FHQWUDO SDUW\ PDFKLQHV¶ a µVXEVHUYLHQW UROH IRU Sarty activists and 
FDQGLGDWHV¶ and µWKH FRQVWUXFWLRQ RI PRUH XQLIRUP DQG RUFKHVWUDWHG PHVVDJHV¶. In a 
completely integrated campaign, parties accompany these actions with a pervasive electoral 
pragmatism and a reliance on messages obtained from focus groups. 13  While the 
Conservatives could not claim to be fulfilling the last of these tasks, they were attempting to 
centralise communication, and construct a uniform message.  
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6FKRODUVEHJDQGLVFXVVLQJWKHFRQFHSWRIµLQWHJUDWHGFDPSDLJQLQJ¶LQHDUQHVWLQWKH980s but 
this chapter shows how election organisers in the 1950s already understood that presenting a 
simple idea, with a single look across a variety of outlets, would better persuade a wavering 
elector than a series of inconsistently presented  adverts.14 Several Labour posters in the past 
had shared colours, fonts, and layout, giving some sense of integration. Small groups of 
Conservative posters in 1929 and National Government posters in 1935 had shared 
characteristics, but not to the extent of Conservative and Labour posters in 1950. The 
expertise of C.P.V meant that integration in the Conservative campaign went even further, as 
centrally produced posters, press adverts, and leaflets all shared characteristics. By working 
through C.P.V the Conservatives were also able to target marginal constituencies up to a year 
before the campaign, through the formers experience of buying up billboard space for 
commercial clients. Conservative Central Office would have been unable to achieve this 
without the unprecedented close relationship with the agency. Scholars have too readily 
overlooked the importance of the relationship between the Conservatives and C.P.V before 
+DUROG0DF0LOODQ¶VIDPRXVYLFWRU\LQ15 This chapter suggests that the partnership was 
flourishing in 1950 and 1951.The chapter also shows how integration extended beyond the 
boundaries of party literature to include the prominent and ostensibly non-party anti-
nationalisation campaign. The extent of complicity between the Conservative Party and Aims 
of Industry ± the public relations wing of the sugar industry ± demonstrates that the 
Conservatives had a sophisticated understanding of how to promote its ideology across 
multiple outlets.  
 
Section two begins by examining how both Labour and to some extent Conservative posters 
exploited contemporary design practices, in order that they could more effectively deliver 
their message. While Conservative posters were less successful at using photography during 
the period, the section does illustrate how all posters reflected prevailing ideas that the 
simplest billboard messages were the most effective. This simplicity included the use of font, 
colour and image, hence the interest in photography. Undoubtedly, the simplification of 
pictures in posters matched the general evolution of the mediums look during the period. 
                                         
14
 )RUDGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHLQWHJUDWHGFDPSDLJQOLWHUDWXUHVHH2+ROPµ,QWHJUDWHGPDUNHWLQJFRPPXQLFDWLRQ
IURPWDFWLFVWRVWUDWHJ\¶Corporate Communications: An International Journal (2006) 11: 1, pp. 23-24. 
15
 51HJULQHµ3URIHVVLRQDOLVDWLRQLQWKH%ULWLVK(OHFWRUDODQG3ROLWLFDO&RQWH[W¶LQ51HJULQH30DQFLQL&
Holtz-Bacha and S. Papathanassopoulos (eds.) The Professionalisation of Political Communication: Changing 
Media  (Bristol, 2007) p. 57. 
97 
 
Section two then looks at the figures that appeared on political billboards. Despite the 
supposed ideological and class motivations of the voters, this determinism was not reflected 
in the language of Labour posters. Just as recent scholarship has suggested that class 
structured identity, then too ± as Steven Fielding states ± could gender, generation, ethnicity, 
locality and status. Certainly, some contemporary politicians were suspicious of the notion 
that class and ideology was the sole determinate in voting behaviour.16 Therefore, reflecting 
0RUULVRQ¶VZLVKIRUDOOFDWFK-all strategy that avoided overt references to class and socialism, 
/DERXU¶V SRVWHUV GHSLFWHG children. For both parties the depiction of youth helped appeal 
across class lines. Images of children also represented the post-war baby boom as the posters 
spoke to family voters.  Indeed, what with the Conservatives acceptance of welfarism (so 
FDOOHG µ7RU\ VRFLDOLVP¶ DQG /DERXU PDNLQJ RYHrt appeals to the middle class ± Miliband 
VSRNH RI /DERXU HOHFWLRQ VWUDWHJLVWV ZDQWLQJ WR µVHGXFH¶ WKHP ± it was little wonder 
FRPPHQWDWRUV VSRWWHGRYHUODSV LQ WKH SDUWLHV¶ PHVVDJHV 17 Just as Bill Schwarz argued that 
WKH &RQVHUYDWLYHV DWWHPSWHG WR µDSSURSULDWH WKH ODQJXDJH RI WKH SHRSOH¶ DW WKLV WLPH VR
posters show Labour took the same approach to the middle class.18  
Both Labour and the Conservatives depicted women principally in the home and as mothers, 
a result of the universal acceptance of BeveridgisPDQGLWVDUJXPHQWWKDWZRPHQ¶VUROHZDV
primarily domestic.19 The female worker that had appeared in the posters of 1929 was gone. 
As a result, the posters contest Ina Zweinigier-%DUJLHORZVND¶VFODLPVWKDWWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHV
polled more female votes in 1950 and 1951 because it associated itself with gender equality.20 
There is no reference to equality in billboard propaganda, but, instead, an emphasis on 
demonstrating how each party would improve the lives of the stay-at-home wife and mother. 
Admittedly, while the female workforce had shrunk after 1945, scholars maintain that women 
represented 31 per cent of the workforce in 1951.21  Posters did not reflect this, however, and 
instead mythologised home life.  
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Mothers of course had been seen on the billboards before, fathers, however, had not. The 
increased visibility of the father demonstrated how parties were restructuring male identity 
away from that of workers to more domestic figures. Classic depictions of work ± or 
worklessness appear as Figure 3.1 demonstrates ± but they were much rarer than they had 
been before 1945. More usually, the posters of 1950 and 1951 speak of a generalised appeal 
to the protection and advancement of family life.     
The final section highlights the changing nature of the billboard in the post-war world. It 
demonstrates how posters were now much larger, and tended to stand alone rather than 
FRQWHVW ZLWK RWKHU SLFWRULDO DGYHUWLVLQJ IRU WKH YLHZHU¶V H\H 7KH VHFWLRQ WKHQ RXWOLQHV how 
the relationship with commercial industry enabled the Conservative party to gain billboard 
space during the campaign of 1951, billboard space denied to Labour because of the election 
coming at short notice.  
3.1 Producing posters in 1950 
The internal organisation of the Labour party had changed significantly since the inter-war 
period. A team of in-house designers were responsible for laying out most RI WKH SDUW\¶V 
literature; their remit included billboard advertising.22 Although Labour still used outside 
specialists ± Philip Zec, designer of some of the most iconic images of the 1945 campaign, 
created four posters for the party in 1950 ± this now became the exception more than the 
rule.23 The Policy and Publicity committee also spoke with the cartoonists Vicky, Horner and 
Ronald Searle about potential designs, but these conversations appear to have come to 
nothing.24 
The creation of an in-house design department was one result of a concerted attempt to 
LPSURYHWKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVRI WKHSDUW\¶V OLWHUDWXUH7KLVFDPHWKURXJKWKHGHSDUWPHQW¶V own 
work, but also through a series of educational articles. For example, in 1951 Labour 
Organiser published a review of the design of a number of candidate addresses issued in that 
year; it judged them to be mostly mediocre.25 In the pursuit of good design and effective 
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communication, the party even published a guide to typefaces and lay out. Soldiers of Lead 
was written by Michael Middleton, DPHPEHURI/DERXU¶VGHVLJQ WHDP and responsible for 
laying out publications.26 Middleton wrote in the publication WKDW LQ WKH SDVW µ/DERXr Party 
SULQWLQJ KDV LQ WKH PDLQ EHHQ QHLWKHU IXQFWLRQDOO\ QRU DHVWKHWLFDOO\ VDWLVIDFWRU\¶ ,W
FRQVHTXHQWO\ DLPHG IRU µD GHJUHH RI VWDQGDUGL]DWLRQ RI W\SRJUDSK\ LQ /DERXU SXEOLFLW\ D
µXQLW\ RI VW\OH¶ D µJHQHUDO UDLVLQJ RI WKH TXDOLW\ RI WKH PRYHPHQW¶V SULQWLQJ¶27  While the 
appointment of in-KRXVH GHVLJQHUV GHPRQVWUDWHG /DERXU¶V FRPPLWPHQW WR LPSURYLQJ LWV
communication, the educational element of their role pointed to a wider issue. Conservative 
Central Office achieved centralisation by actually producing or at least commissioning 
literature itself. With limited resources Labour continued to rely on the production of most 
literature at a constituency level, and could only try and persuade those workers to improve 
the quality of their product. Labour attempted to enforce control, but was ultimately 
constrained by its limited means.     
/DERXU¶V UH-organisation may have been successful in raising the quality of the posters 
produced, but it did not necessary result in a successful poster campaign. The party remained 
dominated by its overly bureaucratic committee structure, underpinned by what R.T. 
0F.HQ]LH GHVFULEHG DV D µGDQJHURXVO\ ULJRURXV FRQFHSWLRQ RI SDUW\ GLVFLSOLQH ZKLFK
VRPHWLPHVDSSHDUV WR UHVHPEOH WKH&RPPXQLVWFRQFHSWLRQRIGHPRFUDWLFFHQWUDOLVP¶28 The 
Policy and Publicity committee was responsible for long-term election planning but 
organisational practicalities were dealt with by an ad-hoc Campaign Committee, which the 
SDUW\ HVWDEOLVKHG LQ -XO\  ,Q WKH VXFFHVVIXO  FDPSDLJQ /DERXU¶V 'HSXty Leader 
Herbert Morrison had chaired both of these committees and while his biographers claim he 
did the same in 1950, the minutes suggest otherwise. 29  Reflecting his waning influence, 
Morrison only headed Policy and Publicity while Party Chair Sam Watson was responsible 
for the Campaign committee.30 This division of influence inevitably meant the 1950 and 1951 
campaigns suffered from a lack of strategic direction. 
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Morrison at the Policy and Publicity committee felt if Labour was to secure victory, rather 
than make an overtly ideological pitch, the party needed to focus on how socialism had 
LPSURYHGHOHFWRUV¶ OLYHV31 $IWHU/DERXU¶VYLFWRU\ LQ0RUULVRQ KDGFRQWLQXHG WRDVVHUW
WKDWWKHSDUW\PXVWFKDVHWKHµIORDWLQJYRWHU¶DQGDVHDUO\DVKHZDVFRQsidering how 
Labour should conduct the next election. 32 He was therefore in an ideal position to ensure 
WKLV DSSURDFK ZDV H[SUHVVHG WKURXJK WKH SDUW\¶V SRVWHUV  $W WKH ILUVW PHHWLQJ RI WKH
Campaign Committee in July 1949, members had tasked him along with Sam Watson to 
speak to designers about drafting posters.33 As the next section demonstrates, Morrison¶V
influence on the design of billboards was evident in posters that spoke of the benefits Labour 
had made on peoples lives. They certainly made no specific promise about socialist policy.  
1RWDOOLQWKHSDUW\DJUHHGZLWK0RUULVRQ¶VDSSURDFK,DQ0LNDUGRDQGWKHµ.HHS/HIW¶JURXS
RI ILIWHHQ 03V DUJXHG IRU PRUH µVRFLDOLVW¶ SROLF\ FRPPLWPHQWV QRWDEO\ LQ WKH NH\ DUHD RI
nationalisation. 0RUULVRQ¶VZDQLQJJULS on the party left him unable to control the egresses of 
the far left entirely and a promise for further nationalisation duly appeared in the 1950 and 
1951 manifestos. As chair of the Policy and Publicity committee, Morrison did control the 
posters and appears to have had only those posters produced that he believed would win 
Labour the campaign. Therefore, when BULWDLQ¶VEXVLQHVVHVFRPPXQLW\ODXQFKHGD ferocious 
anti-nationalisation campaign ± including posters ± 0RUULVRQ¶VJULSRQWKHSXEOLFLW\RXWSXWRI
the Labour meant they issued few rejoinders. 34 There are no extant posters promoting the 
benefits of nationalisation. The Aims of Industry campaigns bombarded the electorate with a 
message outlining the terrors of state control, often from the billboard. Labour posters did not 
counter the argument. The virtues or otherwise of nationalisation was not a debate Labour 
lost on merit, but one with which they largely failed to engage.  
3UDFWLFDO RUJDQLVDWLRQDO GLIILFXOWLHV DOVR KLQGHUHG /DERXU¶V FDPSDLJQ LQ  /DERXU¶V
victory in 1945, the subsequent practicalities of governing, and the splits over the platform, 
meant the campaign techniques which had helped the party win in 1945 were allowed to let 
slip. Campaigning was sporadic, conducted through local organisations, and beset by an 
inability to overcome practical organisational difficulties. The party dropped plans for a 
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poster campaign in Birmingham in February 1949 because the Conservatives had booked all 
the best sites.35 A poster campaign in March 1949, during which the party posted 10,000 
sixteen-sheet posters, was not a national effort but a one off to coincide with local elections.36 
7KHIDLOXUHOHG/DERXU035LFKDUG&URVVPDQWRUHIOHFWWKHµ%LJOHVVRQVRI)HEUXDU\rd is 
that the votes are won betweeQDQGQRWGXULQJHOHFWLRQV¶37    
3.1.1 7KH&RQVHUYDWLYHVDQGWKHLUµDOOLHV¶ 
In contrast to Labour the Conservatives had developed organisationally after 1945. The 
appointment of the advertising agency Colman, Prentis and Varley (C.P.V) in 1948 provided 
a sLJQLILFDQW ERRVW 7KLV IROORZHG QHZ SDUW\ FKDLU /RUG :RROWRQ¶V ZLGH UDQJLQJ
UHRUJDQLVDWLRQRI&HQWUDO2IILFHDIWHUWKHGHIHDWRI'XULQJWKLVUHRUJDQLVDWLRQ7RQ\2¶
Brien ± a Daily Telegraph journalist who had been part of the wartime anti-Nazi propaganda 
machine ± was appointed Director of Information Services.38 This was part of a wider effort 
to make the Central Office publicity department more efficient, and better able to quickly 
UHVSRQG WR GHYHORSPHQWV GXULQJ DQ HOHFWLRQ FDPSDLJQ 2¶%ULHQ KHDGHd the Tactical 
Committee, a group that assessed the news of the day and planned how to maximise its 
SURSDJDQGDSRWHQWLDO :RROWRQ¶VJUHDWHVWDFKLHYHPHQWZDVKRZHYHU WRSHUVXDGH&KXUFKLOO
to allow him a free hand to conduct changes as he thought fit.39 For just as Central Office had 
constantly sought to wrest control from local agents, the Chairman sought freedom from the 
meddling of Westminster politicians.  
%HIRUH WDNLQJ XS WKH &KDLUPDQVKLS :RROWRQ KDG EHHQ 0DQDJLQJ 'LUHFWRU RI /HZLV¶V
department store. $OWKRXJKDGPLWWLQJ WKDW µLWZDVYDVWO\ PRUHGLIILFXOW WR VHOO LGHDV WKDQ WR
sell goods¶ SUHYLRXV commercial experience influenced his work on the Conservative 
propaganda machine.40 Conservative pictorial propaganda RIWHQ PLUURUHG/DERXU¶V LQ WKDW LW 
depicted a vision of the party providing a happy existence for idealised classless families. A 
pictorial language premised on the independent family unit supported through state benefits, 
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easily co-existed ZLWKWKHSDUW\¶VSROLF\ shift conducted by R.A. Butler. This had established 
an acceptance of Keynesian economics, whilst still emphasising the limits of state power.41  
Woolton established a number of guiding principles to direct the Conservatives 
communication strategy and thereby the poster campaign. Personal attack was to be avoided, 
SHUKDSV KDUGO\ VXUSULVLQJ JLYHQ &KXUFKLOO¶V PXFK FULWLcised comparison of Labour to the 
Gestapo in 1945. However, from January 1948 Woolton did seek to create a climate of fear 
surrounding the Labour government as an organisation.42 He wanted ± before the election 
arrived ± to cement within the public consciousness the image of Labour as a party failing. 
Central to that plan was a three-month national poster campaign.43 Moreover, in a further 
innovation Woolton and Central Office targeted the campaign at marginal seats. It 
commenced in January 1949 and eventually covered 8,100 sites throughout the United 
Kingdom. The first part of the campaign ran for thirteen weeks, allowing for one change of 
SRVWHUV,WWKHQGHYHORSHGµLQVWDJHV¶Xntil the election.44  
Internal communication shows the Conservatives judged the campaign a success. One report 
SURGXFHGDIWHUWKHHOHFWLRQVSRNHRIµ7KHLPSDFWRIDFRPSUHKHQVLYHQDWLRQDOFDPSDLJQ
DVGLVWLQFWIURPVSRUDGLFORFDOHIIRUWV¶45 The statement came after the close result in 1950, as 
part of continued planning for a second national poster campaign should the Labour 
government call another election. Indeed, planning anticipated three various scenarios should 
the election come immediately, or in the mid-or-long term.46 In the end it was the short-term 
VWUDWHJ\ WKDW ZDV QHHGHG &OHDUO\ :RROWRQ¶V UHRUJDQLVDWLRQ KDG VXFFHVVIXOO\ FHPHQWHG DQ
approach to poster campaigns based on mass national coverage rather than sporadic local 
efforts.  
The campaigns also demonstrated the tight co-operation between Central Office and C.P.V. 
7KHSDUW\EHQHILWHGIURPWKHDJHQF\¶VH[SHULHQFHRIUXQQLQJQDWLRQDODGYHUWLVLQJFDPSDLJQV
and particularly their knowledge and experience of buying up large numbers of poster sites. 
For the 1950 election they did this as and when sites became available. Such assistance 
enabled the Conservatives to improve the quantity and quality of places to display their 
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posters in the period leading up to both elections.47 Thus, aside from the obvious advantage 
of the Conservatives constantly plugging their message to the public throughout 1949 (when 
/DERXUZDVQ¶WGRLQJWKHVDPHwhen Labour called both elections the Conservatives were in 
possession of the best sites within marginal constituency.   
&39¶VH[SHULHQFHDOVRIDFLOLWDWHGWKH&RQVHUYDWLYH¶VGHYHORSPHQWRIDQLQWHUJUDWHGFDPSDLJQ
The idea was not entirely novel. Hassall had spoken of newspaper and billboards linking up 
µZKHQ WKH 3UHVV KDV H[SODLQHG DQG FRQYLQFHG WKH SRVWHU UHPLQGV¶48 A 1927 article in the 
Conservative Agents Journal ZDVOHVVQXDQFHGEXWGLGQHYHUWKHOHVVDUJXHWKDWµ7KHFRQVWDQW
re-iteration of three telling facts, conspicuously displayed in newspaper advertisements or on 
hoardings ± preferably both-is worth 3,000 argumeQWV¶49 
Yet, C.P.9¶V H[SHULHQFH IDFLOLWDWHG WKH &RQVHUYDWLYHV LQWHJUDWLRQ RI WKHLU SRVWHUV ZLWK WKH
other aspects of campaigning in a particularly cohesive way.  The national billboard 
campaign ran in conjunction with complementary press advertising under the same title 
µ7KLQN¶ ZLWK DGYHUWV UXQQLQJ LQ WKH QDWLRQDO DQG ORFDO SUHVV IURP 2FWREHU  WR WKH
dissolution of parliament in January 1950 [Figure 3.2].  The entire cost to the party was 
£18,223, the equivalent in 2013 of half a million pounds.50 A letter to Central Office Agents 
reiterated the benefits of this cohesive campaigning, by claiming that the adverts were 
µGHVLJQHGWRLPSOHPHQWWKHQDWLRQDOSRVWHUFDPSDLJQDQGWRLQIOXHQFHWKHHOHFWRUDWHLQDZD\
QRWSRVVLEOHRQWKHKRDUGLQJV¶51  
The repeated use of the same photograph in poster and newspaper (examples below) provided 
Conservative literature with a visual coherence. The advanced nature of the Conservative 
FDPSDLJQ ZDV HYLGHQW WRR LQ D FRQMRLQLQJ RI WKH SDUW\¶V FRPPXQLFDWLRQ ZLWK WKH
campaigning efforts of those industries threatened by nationalisation. There was an 
intentional and conspiratorial overlapping of these two notionally separate campaigns, which 
iterated a single message. In March 1949, Lord Lyle had told the annual general meeting of 
Tate and Lyle that the company would not meekly accept nationalisation. To this end and in 
WKHVDPH\HDUKLVFRPSDQ\¶VPDUNHWLQJRSHUDWLRQVKDGPHUJHGZLWK$LPVRI,QGXVWU\$2,
The AOI was a public relations company formed in 1942 that campaigned against the 
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nationalisation of private companies. 52  7KH RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V RXWSXW RI QHZVSDSHU DGYHUWV
posters, and the famous Mr Cube cartoon figure, who appeared on every packet of sugar 
produced by Tate and Lyle, took the anti-nationalisation campaign directly into millions of 
homes. 
Labour then in 1950, faced a two-pronged attack. Anti-Labour ideas overlapped and flowed 
from one form of literature to another, from one campaign to another. The Conservatives and 
AOI sought organisation, synchronicity and cohesion. There was a simple message to the 
&RQVHUYDWLYHVDQG$2,¶VFROODERUDWLRQIXUWKHUQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQZDVQRW LQWKHSXEOLF LQWHUHVW 
of the consumer 2Q WK 0D\  WKH &RQVHUYDWLYHV¶ FKLHI SXEOLFLW\ RIILFHU 0DUN
Chapman-Walker, told the steel executives the Conservatives were keen to work with them. 
Their publicity, Chapman-Walker, told the group ought to go right up to the brink of saying 
µ¶9RWH&RQVHUYDWLYH¶EXWVKRXOGVWRSWKHUHVRWKDWWKH\PDGHQRSDUW\SROLWLFDODSSURDFK¶+H
then stated that after the SXEOLF KDG EHHQ OHG WR WKH µEULQN¶ E\ WKH DQWL-nationalisation 
FDPSDLJQ WKHSDUW\ZRXOG µSXVK WKHPRYHU¶53 'RQ¶W WKURZDVSDQQHU LQ WKH67((/ ZRUNV
[Figure 3.3] was a clear example of this tactic.  
Moreover, the Central Office programme of gathering the best billboard sites throughout 
 PHDQW WKH\ ZHUH DEOH WR OHQG WKHVH WR µDQ\ LQGXVWU\ WKUHDWHQHG E\ QDWLRQDOLVDWLRQ¶54 
Industries paid for the sites ± ZKLFK ZHUH UHJLVWHUHG LQ &HQWUDO 2IILFH¶V QDPH ± through 
C.P.V. 55  When the election was called, the sites used by AOI then reverted to the 
Conservatives, who in turn made over the sites to constituency agents for their use during the 
campaign proper. 
Collaboration between the party and AOI extend beyond sharing billboard sites. Central 
Office also requested WREHµFRQVXOWHGDVUHJDUGVWKHFRQWHQWDQGGHVLJQRIWKHELOOVSRVWHGE\
WKH³DOOLHV´¶ 56 This was not to ensure consistency of design but to guarantee that the posters 
were not too similar. The party was concerned about a potential backlash should the public 
become aware of their collusion. Chapman-Walker hoped, however, that voters would remain 
LJQRUDQW µDV WKH FRQWHQW RI WKH GHVLJQ RI WKH ELOOV VKRZV QR REYLRXV FRQQHFWLRQ ZLWK RXU
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FXUUHQW FDPSDLJQ¶57 Nevertheless, the party still took several steps to ensure there was no 
OHDNZKLFKPLJKWµEHYHU\GDPDJLQJWRWKHSDUW\¶58  
The Conservatives had embarked on a type of campaigning that stretched beyond the 
boundaries of official party literature. The benefits were clear. The Conservative and AOI 
campaign may not have always carried the Conservative name, but it pressed on the public a 
consistent coherent thought; rejecting a policy across multiple media to which only one party 
had approved. Both organisations clearly thought the collaboration worthwhile, as they 
embarked on the same course of action a year later. 59   
Labour worried about the anti-nationalisation campaign. Morrison complained to the NEC 
WKDWLWµPLJKWEHFRQVLGHUHGDVDQDWWHPSWWRLQWHUIHUHZLWKWKHULJKWVRIWKHLQGLYLGXDODQGWR
influence KLV RU KHU SROLWLFDO RSLQLRQV E\ XQGHVLUDEOH PHWKRGV¶60 It is not clear whether 
Labour knew about the Conservative role. More certain is that Morrison recognised the anti-
nationalisation campaign as anti-Labour.  
Before moving on to examine the content of the posters of the two largest parties, the Liberal 
party poster campaign merits some attention. Given the size of the parliamentary party, with 
its twelve MPs ± reduced to nine in 1951 ± dedicating space to them might thought 
indulgent.61 However, the part\¶V VSHFLILF SUREOHPV RXWOLQHG EHORZ UHVXOWHG LQ D XQLTXH
poster campaign.  As we shall see while the design of Liberal posters was unusual, even 
futuristic, Liberal organisation was antiquated. 62  
Desmond Banks combined heading up the Liberal Publication Department with being 
candidate for Harrow East. An election committee took charge of the campaign,  the 
leadership of which kept changing as firstly Banks, and then his successor in post Frank 
Byers ± Liberal chief whip and candidate for North Dorset ± left to fight in their 
constituencies leaving Lord Rea in charge.63 It is significant that, for the sake of efficiency, 
Lord Woolton expected Central Office staff to choose between professional party 
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employment or candidature during elections. The Liberals did not have enough personnel to 
afford this luxury.  
The committee matched instability in leadership with woeful decision-making. Although 
Byers had reformed the Liberal organisation after 1945, including the re-establishment of 
local associations that had fallen into disrepair, the party still lacked the machinery to fight a 
national campaign. Despite this the party decided to contest 475 seats in an attempt to win a 
majority, or at least appear to want to win a majority. It was a decision that meant spreading 
resources thinly. Moreover, while they could not have known so at the time, it was a decision 
that made the 1951 contest harder to fight than it might have been.64  The first campaign had 
XVHGXSWKHSDUW\¶VUHVRXUFHVDVDUHVXOWE\WKHQXPEHUof full-time agents had fallen 
to 44; in October 1949 it had been a 149.65  The next section shows that while the Liberal 
organisation and decision-making was poor its posters were highly unusual.   
3.2 The posters of 1950 
Certainly compared to many of those that came before, the defining aspect of posters 
produced in the post-war period was their simplicity. In this respect, political posters strongly 
evoked commercial advertising, incorporating as they did a straightforward image with a 
clipped slogan. As this section will go on to show, colour pallets, and the variety of fonts 
were deliberately limited. This would enable the public to identify a particular poster as 
originating from a particular party, or so the parties hoped. Each poster would be inherently 
µ&RQVHUYDWLYH¶ RU µ/DERXU¶ LQ LWV SUHVHQWDWLRQ LI QRW FRQWHQW 3KRWRJUDSK\ DOVR EHFDPH WKH
norm after 1945, rather than the exception it had been in 1929. TKHLQFOXVLRQRIµUHDO¶SHRSOH 
further enhanced the µUHDOLVP¶ of the posters. Thus, Labour and Conservative posters 
increasingly projected images of the voters back at themselves. Although this construct of the 
voter by the party, very much as the latter wanted the former to be.   
Like those of their two main rivals Liberal party posters used colour consistently, and 
employed a standard format. However, disunity among its leading figures and an ongoing 
EDWWOH ZLWK RWKHUV ZKR XVHG WKH µ/LEHUDO¶ WLWOH IRUFHG WKH SDUW\ WR GHGLFDWH DV PXFK RI LWV
SRVWHUFDPSDLJQ WR VKRZLQJ WKHSXEOLF MXVWZKRWKH µ/LEHUDO WHDP¶ZHUHDVZKDW WKHSDUW\
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stood for. It was, and remains, a highly unusual campaign, one that paradoxically anticipated 
WKHPXFKODWHUµSHUVRQLILFDWLRQ¶Rf politics, and it is with this that this section begins.     
37KH/LEHUDOVµ$QXPEHURILQGLYLGXDOV¶ 
Reflecting on the problems of disunity amongst his parliamentary colleagues, Liberal leader 
&OHPHQW'DYLHVFODLPHG µ7KHUH LV QRSDUW\¶ EXWµD QXPEHURI LQGLYLGXDOVZKREHFDXVHRI
the adherence to the party, come together only to express compleWHO\ GLYHUJHQW YLHZV¶66 
Thus, while those on the Liberal left, such as Megan Lloyd George favoured co-operation 
with Labour ± Tom Horabin having already defected to Labour in 1947 ± counterparts on the 
right, notably Gwilym Lloyd George were in effect by 1950 already Conservatives.67 These 
internal debates often spilt over into embarrassing, and damaging, public rows.68  
To add to its problems the party was in a battle for its own name. Sir John Simon had formed 
the Liberal Nationals in 1931 to align liberalism with the Conservative-led National 
Government.69 In 1943 those who had remained outside government in 1931 attempted to 
bring those who had followed Simon back into the fold. But the two sides became separated 
permanently with the Woolton-Teviot association of May 1947, which formally linked the 
Conservatives with the renegade Liberals. In 1950 fifty-three candidates stood under the 
µ&RQVHUYDWLYH/LEHUDO¶ banner. So often were candidates declaring themselves to be liberal, 
the Liberal party proper was forced to declare its own independence.70  
Liberal posters addressed these twin problems by avoiding matters of policy let alone 
ideology, and instead depicted WKHSDUW\¶VOHDGLQJILJXUHVDnd concentrated on their personal 
qualities. These posters sidestepped the awkward question of what a Liberal represented in 
terms of an idea, E\ DVVRFLDWLQJ WKLV FRQWHVWHG µOLEHUDOLVP¶ ZLWK FRQFUHWH ± and relatively 
well-known ± individuals.   
Two posters pictured Clement Davies [Figures 3.4 and 3.5]. In 1950, >@ WKH µ/LEeral 
/HDGHU¶DSSHDUHGDVD MRYLal figure sporting a large grin. A year later [3.5] he seemed more 
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statesmanlike, the hand on a lapel suggesting a man at home on the world stage. A poster 
featuring the Liberal Chief Whip Frank Byers [Figure 3.6] uses a cinematic font ± the 
shadowing and the text growing out the page ± perhaps the only instance in twentieth century 
campaigning when a party felt the need to inform the electorate who occupied that relatively 
obscure position. Another design featured Megan Lloyd George, and yet another, the Liberal 
leader in the House of Lords, Lord Samuel [Figure 3.7]. All were relatively well known: 
Megan Lloyd-George carried the dynastic surname of course, but both she and Samuel were 
noted pre-war Liberals, while Byers was a broadcaster. Liberals used these personalities to 
ILOO WKHJDS OHIWE\WKHSDUW\¶V ODFNRIDJUHHGVXEVWDQFHWRVKRZWKHHOHFWRUDWHZKR ± rather 
than what ± was Liberalism. Perhaps further indicating the tricky position Liberals were in at 
this point, the SRVWHUVPDGHQRPHQWLRQRIWKHWHUPµSDUW\¶ 
This focus on individuals was highly unusual for this period. The last chapter demonstrated 
WKDW  ZDV WR VRPH H[WHQW D µSUHVLGHQWLDO¶ FDPSDLJQ ZKLOH LQ  D IHZ 1DWLRQDO
Government posters featured Baldwin.71 Ten years later, surviving Conservative posters show 
KRZIDU WKHSDUW\PDGHSOD\RQ&KXUFKLOO¶VSUHVXPHGSRSXODULW\EXW LWVHHPVWRKDYHEHHQ
relatively limited.72 Labour, in comparison did not feature Attlee on billboards. In promoting 
a group of politicians, Liberal posters were doing something quite different, appealing to the 
QDWLRQRQWKHEDVLVRIWKHSDUW\¶VWHDPDOEHLWDWHDPRILQGLYLGXDOV 
This tactic would become increasingly more common in later campaigns. In 1959 Hugh 
Gaitskell, Nye Bevan and Barbara Castle appeared together and in 1970 Wilson appeared 
with his cabinet. But if these later Labour examples were meant to suggest a unity many 
thought was lacking, the Liberals in 1950 were attempting to remind people who they were. 
The posters were a highly original response by a divided and marginalised party. A party 
some feared was doomed to be hovered up by Labour and the Conservatives.  
3.2.2 Design simplicity 
While the content of Liberal posters differed from that of their two main rivals, they shared in 
the adoption of a universal colour scheme. This section demonstrates how all parties began to 
employ a cohesive style across all their posters and indeed literature. If a viewer could easily 
recognise that a poster belonged to a particular party, the parties hoped, understanding the 
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SRVWHUVPHVVDJHZRXOGRFFXUPRUHTXLFNO\/DERXU¶VSoldiers of Lead for example reflected 
RQ KRZ SRVWHUV VKRXOG EH SDUW RI D ODUJHU FDPSDLJQ RQH GHILQHG E\ µEUHYLW\¶ DQG WKH
µFXPXODWLYH UHSHWLWLRQ >RI@ D VORJDQ RU IDFW WKDW VXPV XS WKH ZKROH FDPSDLJQ¶ DQG ZKLFK
FRXOGEHµUDPPHGKRPH¶WRYRWHUV73 This conviction reflected the assimilation of ideas from 
the broader world of design, such as that promoted by the inter-war modernist movement. In 
1925, a member of the %DXKDXV -DQ 7VFKLFKROG VWDWHG WKDW µ7KH DLP RI W\SRJUDSK\ ZDV
FRPPXQLFDWLRQ¶DQGµ&RPPXQLFDWLRQPXVWDSSHDULQWKHVKRUWHVWPRVWSHQHWUDWLQJ IRUP¶74 
By simplifying the message designers thought there was more chance voters would imbibe it. 
A 1949 article in Labour Organiser informed its constituency agent readers if they were to 
µSLHUFH WKH VKHOO RI UHVLVWDQFH WKDW HYHU\ LQGLYLGXDO KDV EXLOW URXQG KLPVHOI DV SURWHFWLRQ
against the demands made on him from hoardings, railway carriages, newspapers, and so 
RQ¶75 
By publishing Soldiers of Lead Labour showed it thought type crucial to effective 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQµ7\SHLVDPHDQVWRDQHQG¶WKHGRFXPHQWVWDWHGµ,WVXFFHHGVRUIDLOV LQVR
IDU DV LW FRQYH\V LWV PHVVDJH FOHDUO\ HDVLO\ DQG ZLWKRXW VWUDLQ¶76 Writing in the Labour 
Organiser Peter Harle, a Labour designer, further articulated the importance of using the best 
typefaces, instructing readers towards those it favoured, such as Gill Extra Heavy, Karnack, 
Beton, Rockwell, Gothic Condensed, Playbill, and Ultra Bodoni.77 Transport House literature 
used these fonts, and the party was clearly interested in promoting an aesthetic uniformity.  
Uniformity did not end at the edge of printed-paper, however. Party designer Jack Brewer 
advised that when dressing constituHQF\RIILFHZLQGRZVDQ\ OHWWHULQJVKRXOG EH LQ µEORFN-
lettering or Gill-Sans. This will fit in with the material being supplied by the Publicity 
'HSDUWPHQW¶78 Colour was thought crucial, too. Black ink on yellow paper was encouraged to 
provide a good contrast. 79  :KLOH /DERXU¶V  SRVWHUV LQFOXGHG VRPH EODFN VFULSW RQ D
yellow background, the majority of text was in red. Furthermore, in 1951, the party instead 
chose the startling yellow on black for its text based posters, for example <RX¶UHZLQQLQJWKH
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peace and PEACE the way to plenty [Figure 3.8]. Clearly, designers even at Transport House 
did not always follow their own guidelines. 
Figures 3.8-3.10 demonstrate how colour and font were used to create a uniform look. The 
common motifs were graffiti like font, black-EDFNJURXQG DQG µ927( /$%285¶ LQ WKH
dotted square. With such consistent style, viewers could rapidly appreciate that it was indeed 
a Labour poster.  In centrally produced Conservative posters, combinations of blue and red 
predominated. The party had formally adopted the royal blue colour scheme in March 1950. 
µ2QH QDWLRQDO FRORXU¶ ZDV PHDQW WR UHIOHFW LWV VWDWXV DV D QDWLRQDO SDUW\ DQG LQ DGGLWLRQ
&HQWUDO 2IILFH UHSRUWHG WKDW D µVLQJOH FRORXU LV PRUH KHOSIXO LQ WKH SURGXFWLRQ RI SULQWHG
matter IRU DGYHUWLVLQJ¶80  7KH µQDWLRQDO SDUW\¶ RI FRXUVH XQGHUPLQHG ORFDO FXVWRP DQG LQ
some parts of Britain traditions remained, Norfolk being one such example.81 However, there 
was a clear effort by both parties to create advertising whose universal look made it 
recognisably Conservative or Labour.   
3.2.3 Photography 
 
Simplification did not just come through colour and font. The drive to convey a posters 
message in the most expedient time possible, led designers to remove all detail from images 
that was irrelevant to the posters core point.  A comparison between the 1951 Conservative 
poster, after four years LABOUR [Figure 3.11] and the 1931 National Government poster, 
WEIGHED UP AND FOUND WANTING [Figure 3.12] demonstrated this. The artistic 
rendering of the scales had given way to a flat graphic representation. By 1951, artistic detail 
was old, outdated, and superfluous.  
The greatest innovation in expressing information quickly, during the period, however, came 
in the use of photography. Although rare, photography had appeared in election posters 
before 1939, Safety First being only the most famous, or perhaps infamous, instance. 82 
Moreover, as shown already, the photograph did not completely displace the work of 
cartoonists or draughtsman in 1950 and 1951. Labour liaised with News Chronicle cartoonists 
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9LFWRU :HLV] RWKHUZLVH NQRZQ DV µ9LFN\¶ $UWKXU :DNHILHOG +RUQHU ZKR SURGXFHG
cartoons for Tribune and the News Chronicle, and in 1951 the satirist Ronald Searle, famous 
for inventing the girls of St Trinians. What happened to the posters designed by these figures 
is sadly unknown, the minutes of the policy and publicity sub-committee being unclear.83 The 
fact that Labour was talking to such eminent cartoonists ± Vicky was described by Randolph 
&KXUFKLOODVDµJHQLXV¶± demonstrated the belief that politicians still felt they still had a role 
to play.84 During the 1950 campaign, Labour re-employed Daily Mirror cartoonist Philip Zec, 
who had undertaken significant work for the party in 1945.85 Despite employing a famed 
cartoonist, however, Labour did not get cartoons. Before his employment at the Mirror Zec 
had worked in commercial advertising, and his output for Labour reflected his first rather 
WKDQ VHFRQG FDUHHU 7KXV =HF¶V  DQG  SRVWHUV ZHUH ILHUFHO\ VLPple, containing a 
strong central image, a succinct slogan and minimal use of colours [Figure 3.13]. 
+DG SKRWRJUDSKV UHSODFHG =HF¶V GUDZQ ILJXUHV WKH SRVWHUV ZRXOG KDYH FRPPXQLFDWHG WKH
same message. Zec had created appealing images of real people, but the fact remained that 
technology existed for photography to do the same and do it more effectively. Designers 
certainly thought SKRWRJUDSKVZHUHPRUHDWWUDFWLYHWRYRWHUVWKDQGUDZLQJV2QHRI/DERXU¶V
in-KRXVHWHDP3HWHU+DUOHVWDWHGWKDWDQµDSSHDOLQJSKRWRJUDSK¶ZDVDµQHYHUIDLOLQJ¶ZD\RI
getting people to look at your posters. Photography had the ability to resonate with the 
PDVVHVEHFDXVHLWPRUHDFFXUDWHO\HYRNHGKRZWKH\QRZVDZWKHZRUOGµ/RWVRISHRSOHWDNH
WKHLU RZQ µVQDSV¶ ZKHQ RQ KROLGD\¶ ZURWH +DUOH µVR WKDW D ZHOO SUHVHQWHG DQG LQWHUHVWLQJ
SKRWRJUDSK LPPHGLDWHO\ VWULNHV D FKRUG¶ 86  Visual theorist John Berger reflected on the 
SXEOLF¶V HDVLQHVV ZLWK SKRWRJUDSKLF LPDJHV FODLPLQJ WKH\ GLG QRW YLHZ SKRWRV DV DUW DQG
therefore did not think of pKRWRJUDSK\DVµbeyond WKHP¶87  
Labour had given considerable thought to the use of photography before 1950. Soldiers of 
lead VWDWHGWKDWLIDSKRWRJUDSKRUGUDZLQJZDVWREHXVHGPDNHVXUHWKDWLWZDVµJRRG¶DQG
WRDYRLGWKHµJUH\DQGMDGHGSKRWRJUDSKZLWKRXWOLIHRUVSDUNOH¶88  In contrast to Labour, the 
Conservatives did not given use of the medium quite such systematic thought and ultimately 
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regretted the decision. A London area report sent to Central Office following the 1950 
campaign highlighted the evocative imagery of a Labour poster that featured an image of the 
-DUURZ PDUFK >)LJXUH @ µ:H FRQVLGHU WKH VRFLDOLVW PDGH D YHU\ HIIHFWLYH XVH RI
photographs showing unemployment between the wars, while we relied solely on figures and 
JUDSKV¶ 3KRWRJUDphs had persuaded where data had not (in twenty years time poster 
designers would reverse their opinions on this)7KHUHSRUWZHQWRQµ,QYLHZRIWKHIDFWWKDW
the biggest increase in unemployment occurred between 1929 and 1931 when there was a 
Labour government in office, it should be possible to illustrate this with pictures taken during 
WKRVH \HDUV¶89 The comment perhaps expected more of photography than it could possibly 
deliver, but it highlighted the belief that it could help deliver a posters meaning swiftly. 
Others in Conservative Central Office noted the Jarrow posters success. Worker Vyvyan 
Adams also spoke of the billboards impactµ0DQ\FRPPHQWDWRUVKDYHUHSHDWHGDGQDXVHXP¶
KHZURWHµ± WKDWWKH/DERXU3DUW\¶V-DUURZ0DUFKHUVSRVWHUKDGDGHDGO\ HIIHFW¶90  
While Labour had success with its photograph posters, the use of this type of imagery was 
not in itself a guarantee of success. Good image selection was required alongside good design. 
2QHRI WKH&RQVHUYDWLYHSDUW\¶VSXEOLFLW\RIILFHUVFRPSODLQed of ,W¶V&RPPRQVHQVH [figure 
3.14]  
the Bulbrook head [the name used in party minutes of the poster] with the pointing 
finger defeated its object of arresting the passers-by attention by superimposing the 
finger on the face, which does not show up too clearly. Had the pointing finger been 
positioned slightly to one side, clear of the face, it would have been far more 
effective.91 
The stern Bulbrook head with its foreshortened finger deliberately HYRNHG $OIUHG /HHWH¶V
recruiting poster %5,7216 ³:$176 <28´ [Figure 3.15]. Two of the three salient points 
Paul While identified in the Kitchener image ± WKHµJD]H¶WKHSRLQWLQJILQJHUDQGWKHµ<28¶±
were evident in the Bullbrook head.92 However, those factors which had combined to make 
the Leete image so memorable, were lacking in the Conservative poster, largely because of 
the failings highlighted by the Conservative official. Such is the arrangement of face and 
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shoulder, forearm and hand, the method of pointing is strangely un-authoritative. TKHPDQ¶V
arm is not (aQG DQDWRPLFDOO\ FDQQRW EH RXWVWUHWFKHG .LWFKHQHU¶V RQ WKH RWKHU KDG PRVW
GHILQLWHO\ EHHQ 0RUHRYHU ZKLOH .LWFKHQHU¶V DXWKRULW\ ZDV HPSKDVLVHG LQ KLV PLOLWDU\
bearing of uniform and moustache, the same was less evident in the open-necked shirt and 
braces of the man in the Conservative image. Although intentionally evoking the Kitchener 
image, there were other concerns with the poster. Presumably, the Conservatives intended the 
SRVWHU¶VPHVVDJHWRFRPHIURPRQHZRUNLQJFODVVYRWHUWRDQRWKHUIURPHTXDOWR equal. Yet 
to achieve this it evokes symbolism from a poster based on authority. The Filed Marshall 
spoke from a position of authority to the intended viewer (those who had not yet enlisted). By 
evoking Kitchener, however, Bullbrook appears to be telling or shouting rather than acting 
from the intended position of equivalence.  
This was not the only problem the Conservatives had when using photography. The 
iconography of the family in family ± happiness ± and a home [Figure 3.16] is discussed 
below. It is, KRZHYHU DQRWKHU H[DPSOH RI D SRRUO\ FRPSRVHG LPDJH 'DG¶V ULJKW KDQG
vanishes into absent space between Daughter and dog. Had the photo not been a montage of 
VKRWV0XP¶VULJKWKDQGZRXOGEHRQWKHDUPRUVKRXOGHURIKHUVRQUDWKHUWKDQYDQLVKLQJ
behind his back. It was clear that despite the expertise of C.P.V in running campaigns, the 
Conservatives remained unable to maintain quality of design across the spectrum of posters 
produced during the election.  
3.2.4 Women, Children and Men 
Before 1950 the class position of those women and children who populated political posters 
had usually been clear: now they were often classless. Moreover, if working class men were 
still invariably linked to employment, male identity was now more domestic, and their class 
while determinedly not working (as it was not linked to employment) was much harder to 
define. Some of the changes reflected SDUWLHV¶ DWWHPSts to make their universal appeal, but 
there is evidence of them constructing a new image of the post-war electorate.  
Both Labour and Conservative posters habitually spoke to women as mothers. Labour in 
particular were keen to highlight how families had benefited from the welfare state. In 
Healthy thanks to Labour [Figure 3.17], a mother and son celebrate the foundation of the 
National Health Service in 1948. Labour even claimed credit for actions not entirely of their 
own undertaking, a demonstration of the use of billboards to build and maintain false truths. 
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One poster, depicting a mother holding a rotund baby while a toddler looks on, reminded 
mothers of the family allowance [Figure 3.18].  What the poster failed to mention was that 
while the government had started family allowances in 1946, it was the Churchill coalition 
which had passed the legislation. The irony certainly was not lost on William Beveridge ± 
writer of the eponymous report that had laid the foundations of the welfare state ± who noted 
the inaccuracy.  93   
In the maternalistic posters of 1950 and 1951 Labour and Conservative both claimed they 
would continue to support mothers through the state. 7KH &RQVHUYDWLYH¶V give him security 
and a proud future [Figure 3.19] argued a vote for the Conservatives would mean the 
continued security of welfarism, but ± WKURXJKWKHXVHRIWKHZRUGµSURXG¶ ± the poster also 
evoked the spirit of nationhood, implying %ULWDLQ¶VSRVLWLRQLQWKHZRUOGZRXOGEHPDLQWDLQHG
The accompanying newspaper advert expounded on this idea, highlighting how a 
Conservative Britain would bring long term prosperity µ+LV IXWXUH¶ LW VWDWHG µZLll it be the 
NLQGRIIXWXUH\RXZRXOGOLNHKLPWRJURZLQWR¶94  
Clearly, both parties spoke to women about the same issues in the same manner. Labour¶s 
search for universal support, meant women in their posters mirrored Conservative examples. 
The mothers were young, well dressed, and smiling; the children adoring, the babies plump, 
healthy and happy. It was to some extent the perfect vision of the perfect mother. As such we 
need to recast Zweinigier-%DUJLHORZVND¶VDUJXPHQWWKDW LWZDVWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHSURPise of 
female equality that resulted in such large support for the party at the polls.95 There is no 
evidence from posters that the Conservatives made this promise in public. While the party 
may have promised equality and equal pay in the Conservative publications cited by 
Zweinigier-Bargielowska, such as True Balance, they certainly did not do so in their posters.  
Unpicking the reason why the party promised something to the specific readership of a party 
publication and not to the public, via posters, is problematic. Perhaps, given what a very 
public form of communication, billboards were the Conservatives were unwilling to make 
promises of equal pay to an audience who often would have rejected the idea. 
Conservative and Labour posters linked women, children, and the home because they 
reflected the prevailing political opinion that after 1945 women should return to the domestic 
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sphere, thus freeing jobs for returning servicemen. Indeed, the government forced the issue 
by withdrawing subsidies for day nurseries in 1946.96 Both parties ± like Beveridge ± saw 
women as part of a household team. The welfare state had been founded on the principal of a 
sole male breadwinner and benefits were intended to relieve rather than abolish the drudgery 
of domestic life.97 Posters reflected the assumptions of those politicians responsible for them, 
invariably hailing women as wives and mothers. Following the 1950 election Morrison wrote 
WKDWµWKHQHHGVRI WKHFRQVXPHUDQGWKHSUREOHPVRIWKHKRXVHZLIHPXVWEHUHFRJQLVHGDVD
reDOIDFWRULQSROLWLFVDQG3DUW\SROLF\DQGSURSDJDQGDVKRXOGWDNHIXOODFFRXQWRILW¶98  
Morrison appeared to ignore the six million women in paid employment yet his reductive 
view did reflect that of wider society. As well as discussing issues relevant to any worker, 
such as accident prevention and permissible overtime, delegates at the 1951 Annual 
Conference of the Representation of the Trade Unions for Women Workers also dedicated 
time to discussing maternity benefits. Florence Hancock who chaired the conference declared 
that µZRUNLQJ ZRPHQ KDG QRW HQWLUHO\ RU HYHQ WR DQ\ JUHDW GHJUHH VKHG WKHLU GRPHVWLF
UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV¶99 It was clear that while political posters spoke to the domestic aspect of 
female life in post-war Britain, their audience was larger than those not in paid employment. 
This reductive view of gender was not surprising, but it is telling that where as Labour did 
feel willing or able to appeal to women as workers in 1929, albeit in a limited means [Figure 
2.16] it had withdrawn from this in 1950.  
Aside from their being a way of communicating to women, children symbolised a better 
IXWXUH WKHLU DSSHDUDQFH DQ DWWHPSW WR µRZQ¶ WKH LGHD RI RSWLPLVP ,I D FKLOG¶V OLIH ZDV
improved now, then their future would be improved.100 What was better for children was 
better for Britain, and without a vote for the respective party, it was the next generation who 
would pay. Parties used children as an encouragement to parents to vote both, on behalf of 
their own offspring, but also to construct a future in which parents would want their offspring 
WRJURZ=HFLQDQGLQV\PEROLVHGµWKHIXWXUH¶WKURXJKWKHLPDJHRIDVPDOOER\
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In the 1950 image the onus on the electorate was clear, HIS FUTURE YOUR VOTE.101 In 
-XO\  DV SDUWRI WKH µ)RUZDUG¶ FDPSDLJn ± the very title premised on a better future ± 
/DERXU UHOHDVHG WKH SRVWHU µ+(¶6 0,*+7< ),1( 7+$1.6 72 /$%285¶ [Figure 3.20] a 
reference to the decrease in infant mortality. One Conservative poster reminded voters that 
the young would suffer with the alleged slow pace of house building under Labour. µ7KHZD\
WKLQJV DUH JRLQJ , VKDOO EH JURZQ XS EHIRUH ZH JHW 285 +286(¶ [Figure 3.21] linked 
children with housing, the key issue after the war.102   
While the class identity of these mothers and babies was left vague, when fathers appeared, 
they appeared not be working class'DG¶VVKLUWDQGWLHVXJJHVWVDQRQ-manual occupation in 
the Conservative deliver family ± happiness ± and a home [Figure 3.16]. It was an idealised 
vision, a positive message, with the Conservatives promising to deliver an emotion that while 
desirable was impossible to measure. Labour too spoke to, and of, the nuclear family, Figure 
3.22 depicting three generations. With all the adults focussing on the girl, the youngest 
member of the group, it was a message that still adhered to the principle of looking to the 
next generation. As with many earlier examples, determining the class of this family is 
difficult, but the jacket and tie on the men hints towards lower-middle. But both posters hint 
at a catch-all strategy; the ultimate appeal to those who belonged both to the middle class, but 
also to those who wanted to join. It was not the only Labour poster that spoke ± in elliptical 
terms at least ± to the middle class father. The 1947 Daddy's jealous - he says I'm a lucky so-
and-so to be growing up under Labour [Figure 3.23.] depicts an angelic middle-class girl 
skipping, and speaking directly to the viewer, divorcing the appeal from the party it was 
instead a direct message from the next generation.  
Posters placing fathers at the centre of family life were a development unique to 1950. One 
1935 poster did depict a small girl declarLQJWKDWµ'DGG\¶VJRWDMRE¶LWZDVVWLOODSRVWHUWKDW
adhered to a well-established language linking masculinity to paid employment. 103  The 
posters mirrored development in society. Sociologists argued that by the 1950s men, 
especially in the middle class, were more likely to define themselves through their domestic 
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rather than employment role. 104  Moreover, they came during a period when there was worry 
about the collapse in marriages and family breakdown.105 Posters reflected this change and 
concern. Showing men now active in domestic life, Conservative and Labour billboards 
associated themselves with the presumed benefits of that life and promised to help maintain it.  
While posters addressed middle-class men as fathers, the billboards continued to define 
working-class men in terms of their work, focussing on the importance of maintaining full 
employment. Work for all thanks to Labour [Figure 3.24] showed a man employed in 
physical labour. His spade indicates this, as does his haircut (short back and sides with more 
OHQJWKRQWRSDQGVWXEEOH7KHPDQLQ3KLOLS=HF¶V LABOUR FOR SECURITY [Figure 
3.25] had strikingly similar haircut and stubble. The Conservatives Fair wages, fair prices 
and a house to live in [Figure 3.26] adopted a similar iconography. The flat-capped 
agricultural worker leans on his shovel (or other tool) his shirt too is open-necked, his sleeves 
rolled up.  We know the Conservatives intended the man to be a farm-worker because the 
same image appeared in a Conservative newspaper advert DLPHGDWWKDWJURXSµ)DLUZDJHV
IDLUSULFHVDQGKRXVHVWROLYHLQ¶ZHUHRIFRXUVHUHOHYDQWWRPDQ\EXWLQWKLVFDVHWKHy spoke 
specifically to rural workers. Such posters show that masculinity depicted through 
muscularity, remained a vital visual tradition. 
Certainly, designers wanted working class viewers to self-identify with billboard imagery. 
Labour posters evoked the bitterness of working-class male unemployment in areas of heavy 
industry during the 1930s. The well received remember? poster [Figure 3.1] matched a 
photograph of the 1936 Jarrow marches with the slogan 8QHPSOR\PHQW'RQ¶W*LYHWKH7RULHV
Another Chance. It was an image that reminded the working class of that period, should they 
need it. The party displayed five thousand of these Jarrow posters in the large 16-sheet format 
(10ft by 6ft 8ins) nationally. 106 Although not mentioned in the archive, arguably, it was an 
image whose message would have been most pertinent in the North and areas of employment 
in heavy industry poster Labour intended for particular in the North   
It is worth considering the Jarrow poster within the wider contexts of visual languages of the 
election. With its use of photography to portray a real event, the poster demonstrates how 
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advances in design technique had come to define a new aesthetic to the billboard in 1950. 
And yet, by using a visual language that cemented working-class male identity to issues of 
work (and ultimately unemployment) Labour had moved on little. For aside from the 
emergence of the father in Labour and Conservatives posters, both parties continued to appeal 
to voters based on traditional conceptions of class and gender. Indeed, if anything parties 
were becoming more reductive, not less so, given the imperative to simplify their messages. 
3.3 Displaying posters in 1950 
By 1950, legal and cultural factors had changed the way the public saw posters. The 1948 
Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) Regulations Act had curtailed fly 
posting, and shifted responsibility from those who stuck up the bills to the organisation that 
benefited from it.107 This is why the packed billboards of the Edwardian and inter-war period 
were replaced by the single massive image, which became the feature of all succeeding 
elections. This section explores first the use of posters of different sizes in the elections of 
1950 and 1951. Size was an issue that divided constituency and national parties, and formed 
another point of difference in the ongoing battle between centre and the constituencies. It 
WKHQ H[DPLQHV WKH SKHQRPHQRQ RI µEODQNLQJ RXW¶ LQ ZKLFK &RQVHUYDWLYHV DQG DOOLHG
billboards were over-pasted with white paper, in order to comply with election law. Such was 
the extent of the practice that blank billboards appeared to have as much impact, as the actual 
designs.    
In 1950 Labour issued 173,300 posters, of these 10,000 were 16-sheet.108 The party displayed 
far fewer of the larger 16-sheet type posters in 1951, numbering just 2,978. 109  The 
Conservatives by comparison displayed 10,500 16-sheet posters in 1950 and 6,835 in 
1951.110 Although David Butler cited cost as a factor in the declining use of posters between 
one campaign and another, the lack of available sites was as important.111 Prior to the 1950 
campaign, both party organisations had time to plan and book sites for the coming election. 
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$WWOHH¶V GHFLVLRQ WR FDOO D VQDS HOHFWLRQ LQ 6HSWHPEHU  SURYLGHG QR VXFK RSSRUWXQLW\
Moreover, the election coincided with the launch of a number of nationwide advertising 
campaigns by large companies blocking billboards.  
Labour could do little about this, hence the limited number of their larger posters. The 
Conservatives on the other hand were able to rely on contacts in the business world to secure 
sites. %RYULO0DF'RQDOG¶V%LVFXLWV*(&DQGWKH'LVWLOOHUV&RPSDQ\DOOUHOHDVHGVLWHV IRU
the party while CPV gave it access to even more sites.112 Many of these liberated sites were 
in key maUJLQDOVVRIRULQVWDQFHZKLOHWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHVKDGµVXIILFLHQW¶VKHHWSRVWHUVLWHV
in Birmingham in 1951, Labour had none.113 It was a further instance when the Conservatives 
campaign had gone beyond the confines of party structure to secure help for their campaign. 
With help from the above-mentioned companies and the ongoing collaboration with Aims of 
Industry, the Conservatives in 1950 echoed (though not mirrored) associations with the 
Leagues in 1910. 
The election of 1950 was not the first time the electorate had seen such large posters but it 
was the point at which 16-sheet posters IRUPHGWKHPDLQVWD\RIHDFKSDUW\¶VYLVXDOFDPSDLJQV 
These large displays changed the visual dynamic of the election. Where as the Edwardian 
viewer was required to pick out the political poster from a packed billboard the electorate 
were now faced with a single image, unaccompanied by others µVKRXWing¶ to be heard. 
Contemporary imagery suggests that even when posters stood side by side, over posting and 
the crazy-paving effect of previous elections was gone. [Figure 3.27] The strength of 16 sheet 
posters did not mean the end of smaller type posters. Fly-posting continued ± a Labour agent 
disowned a young Robin Cook for doing so ± though it was becoming increasingly less 
common.114 More commonly smaller posters were produced to display in the gardens and in 
windows of local activists.115 These were often smaller versions of larger imagers, their aim 
to reiterate what parties hoped voters had seen on larger billboards.  
The conquest of the large poster, standing as it often did on a billboard away from other 
advertising sanitised campaigning. Not all were happy with the development. Local agents 
preferred the smaller type. One writer to Labour Organiser commented that large posters at 
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ground level were unsuitable, as the whole impact of the poster was lost on the pedestrian. 
This rendered the large billboards suitable only for those travelling on vehicular transport, 
rather than on foot. As the next chapter makes clear, posters were adapted after the war, to 
speak increasingly to those in mechanised transport. The simplification of the poster 
highlighted above was a reflection of these changing trends. John M. Smith, the agent for 
West Dumbartonshire, complained about large posters, stating there were IHZSODFHVµoutside 
of big cities which have suitable hoardings for this size of poster and still fewer Agents who 
can afford to spend seven SHQFH >VLF@ D ZHHN IRU GLVSOD\¶ 6PLWK¶V VROXWLRQ ZDV WKH
production and use of many smaller posters that constituencies could panel together. 116 
Centrally produced posters in their largest form represented the party machines assertion of 
itself over local campaigns. Some local Labour activists clearly resented such intrusion, but 
constituencies did also produce 16 sheet posters to their own design, such as Michael Foot in 
Plymouth Devenport [Figure 3.28].  
Large Conservative posters were adaptable so local associations could use them for their own 
PHDQV$OHWWHUIURPWKH&RQVHUYDWLYH¶V&KLHI3XEOLFLW\Officer Chapman-Walker to regional 
agents suggested that they could, at the call of the election, have a local printer produce a slip 
for the bottom of posters. The slip could contain the candidates name and vote Conservative, 
ZLWKWKHFDQGLGDWH¶VHOHFWLRQ expenses meeting the cost. Perhaps such adaptability at a local 
level averted similar complaints received by Labour. Chapman-:DONHU¶V OHWWHU IXUWKHU
suggested for practical reasons the largest posters, 48 sheet and above, were not suitable for 
this adaptation.117 The use of adaptable of designs did allow local concerns some degree of 
autonomy, but the fact that parties were using Central Office material demonstrated that 
centralisation was becoming increasingly more apparent, and moreover that communication 
more homogenised.  
One peculiar aspect of the display in 1950 was the Conservatives blanking out of sites. 
Election law dictated that after parliament was dissolved, candidates were liable for the 
expense of all the party posters in their area. This is to what Chapman-Walker referred when 
he wrote to agents about adapting posters for their own means. Not all constituencies could 
afford this and in order to circumvent the law and prevent candidates shouldering heavy costs, 
Conservative central office blanked out the effected billboards with reversed posters, so only 
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a white mass of paper was visible. Central office seemed not to consider this a problem. The 
HYDOXDWLRQRI WKHSRVWHUFDPSDLJQVWDWHG µ(DFKVXFFHVVLYHSKDVH IURP WKH EODQNLQJ-out of 
sites to their reposting for election purposes, was completed according to the time-table 
SUHYLRXVO\ SUHSDUHG¶118 The absurdity of the situation, however, was not lost on Low who 
satirised the issue for a cartoon in the Evening Standard [Figure 3.29].  
3.4 Conclusion  
The General Election of 1950 represented the stark possibilities and restrictions of 
organisation. Working withLQWKHVWUXFWXUHRIWKHSDUW\/DERXU¶VLQ-house design team were 
able to apply developments of contemporary design directly to their posters. ThHSDUW\¶VXVH
of photography in particular, meant Labour posters could genuinely claim to have coherency 
of graphic superior to that of the Conservatives. The party were, however, through the 
machinations of Herbert Morrison, guilty of producing their posters in bubble. Labour¶V 
billboards sought to sell the benefits of socialism, but the wider party was attempting during 
the campaign to educate the working class in socialism. The Labour membership at large 
remained unconvinced that the middle-classes would ever vote anything other than 
Conservative.119 Posters and party were not at one. While Labour innovated in design, the 
&RQVHUYDWLYHV GLG VR LQ VWUDWHJ\ 7KH SDUW\¶V FRQWLQXHG XVH RI DQ DGYHUWLVLQJ DJHQF\ DQG
contacts with the business community resulted in a campaign that crossed between billboard, 
newspaper, leaflet, and the Aims of Industry campaign. In method at least, the Conservatives 
in 1950 and 1951 heralded a type of election organisation that would in the latter half of the 
century become increasingly centralised, and dominated by a single voice.  
Considering the billboard campaign of 1950 (and to some extent 1951) in isolation. It is hard 
to move beyond the conclusion that both Labour and Conservative party were attempting to 
make the same points, to the same people, in exactly the same way. Only the Liberals 
demurred from this approach, as they attempted to maintain a grip on their name and party in 
a politics dominated by two much larger rivals.    
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4.0 The General Election of 1970 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 <(67(5'$<¶60(17KH\)DLOHG%HIRUHLabour Party, 1970, PHM. 
123 
 
On the 18th May 1970, Harold Wilson asked the Queen to dissolve Parliament, with the 
general election set to take place on 18th -XQH7KHUHKDGEHHQDµXQDQLPRXVFRQYLFWLRQ¶WKDW
Wilson would win a third successive term, but a large swing of 4.7% to the Conservatives 
saw Labour lose ten per cent of its 1966 vote. The Conservatives won 330 seats, Labour 288 
and the Liberals just six. Harold Jackson of The Guardian called the Conservative victory 
µWKHJUHDWHVWPDMRULW\SROLWLFDOXSVHWLQ%ULWDLQVLQFH¶1 Pointing to the future, turnout at 
72 per cent was the lowest in 35 years. The 1970 election represented the final moment of the 
WZRSDUW\µKHJHPRQ\¶WKDWKDGEHHQLQSODFHVLQFHZKat followed was what Crewe and 
6lUOYLNFDOOHGµWKHGHFDGHRIGHDOLJQPHQW¶2  
The posters of 1970 spoke to a society much transformed since 1950. The manner in which 
the political classes had interpreted this change, shaped the way posters were produced. In 
particular, the work of J.K. Galbraith had resonated with MPs. In his 1958 book, The Affluent 
Society Galbraith stated that it was no longer adequate to talk in classical economic terms of 
organic growth. Western states, the Harvard economist argued, had met demand for those 
JRRGVQHFHVVDU\ IRU OLYLQJZDJHVZHUHULVLQJDQGWKHQHZFDSLWDOLVWµPDFKLQHU\¶ ± such as 
advertising ± was creating artificial demand for luxury goods. 3  Frequently in the years 
following its publication, MPs returned to the book as reference point to explain current 
conditions.4 That the Conservatives had won the 1959 election with a campaign that focussed 
on the promise of continued prosperity only strengthened the case. Conservative billboards of 
that year featured happy families surrounded by the benefits of material life, including cars 
DQGWHOHYLVLRQV>)LJXUH@/DERXU¶VOHDGHUVLQWHUSUHWHGWKHORVVDVDIDLOXUHRQWKHLUSDUWWR
GHDOZLWKWKHµQHZ%ULWDLQ¶5  
$OWKRXJKWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHVEDVHGWKHLUFDPSDLJQRQµLQWXLWLRQDQG LPSUHVVLRQV¶SRVW-
election research on the affluent society confirmed what they had longed believed to be true.6 
Work by the pollster Mark Abrams and the sociologist Ferdynand Zweig demonstrated to the 
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parties that workers benefiting from rising wages and those employed in the expanding 
white-collar and service sector were deserting Labour.7 The number of skilled manual, semi-
skilled manual and unskilled manual workers was almost 21 per cent lower in 1971 than it 
had been in 1951.8 Politicians believed the new affluent voter to be disinterested in policy and 
ideology, and more likely to be swayed by impressions. 9   
Just as Herbert Kitschelt argued that party culture and context affected strategies, a similar 
view was expounded by Richard Rose, who suggested tKDW LQ WKH IDFH RI µREMHFWLYH¶
information from pollsters and academic observers, politicians were still swayed by their own 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIVRFLHW\ZKLFKKHGHILQHGDVµHJRLVWLF¶ 10  Therefore, while many, if not all, 
politicians accepted that affluence was changing Britain, their disposition meant they were 
XQDEOH WR DGDSW DQG UHDFW LQ D µSUDJPDWLF¶ PDQQHU 11  %LDV VKDSHG /DERXU SROLWLFLDQV¶ 
understanding of how affluence caused support for the party to decline. W.R. Williams 
argued that wives of newly SURPRWHG PHQ ZHUH SURQH WR µVQREELVKQHVV¶ DQG SXVKHG WKHLU
husbands into voting Conservative.12 ,Q  /DERXU¶V *HQHUDO 6HFUHWDU\ 0RUJDQ 3KLOOLSV
offered a more considered response, though no less egotistical, arguing voters were becoming 
more educated, cynical, and self-serving.13 It was not a view unique to Labour. A year later 
the leading Conservative R.A Butler also highlighted the rise of popular cynicism and 
HGXFDWLRQ FDOOLQJ RQ VRFLHW\ µWR WHPSHU WKH DFTXLVLWLYH ZLWK D VLPLODU VHQVH RI VHUYLFH DQG
rHVSRQVLELOLW\¶14 
For many, the young epitomised the emerging politics of affluence.  The 1969 Representation 
of the People Act extended the franchise to 18 year olds, adding an estimated 2.8 million to 
the franchise in 1970. They joined a further 2.8 million people who had reached the voting 
age since 1966.15 This youthful cohort contained the highest levels of non-partisan electors 
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and so increased the pool of those who were open to vote for any of the main parties.16 While 
some saw the young as more radical DQGLQWHUHVWHGLQYDULRXVµSRVW-PDWHULDO¶LVVXHVWKDQWKHLU
parents, survey evidence suggested that the motivations of child and parent were often one in 
the same.17 This was one reason why the Conservatives made no special effort to appeal to 
the young. LDERXUKRZHYHUWRRNDPRUHµHJRWLVWLFDO¶YLHZDQGSURGXFHGDQXPEHURISRVWHUV
meant to appeal just to the new youthful voter. 
Both parties believed the key to winning elections was attracting this affluent, intelligent, but 
ideologically unsettled cohort. Consequently, sections within the Conservative and Labour 
parties saw an appeal to individual self-interest as key to victory. Crucially, however, they 
framed their appeals in different ways. Throughout the 1960s Conservative posters often 
focused directly RQ WKH PDWHULDO LQWHUHVWV RI WKH µIORDWLQJ YRWHU¶ 7KLV LQIRUPHG WKH 
/,)(¶6%(77(5ZLWK WKH&216(59$7,9(6 [Figure 4.2]± the family prospering under the 
Conservative government ± and the 1970 The £ in your pocket [Figure 4.3] which, as 
demonstrated below, highlighted declining real incomes under Labour.  
Labour too adopted a catchall strategy, though it placed less emphasis on material wealth. 
This reflected its political position, as the party could not point to an improved standard of 
living. +HDWK¶V victory may have been a surprise, but the Labour governments from 1964 to 
1970 had failed to live up to expectations.18 :LOVRQ¶V:KLWH+HDWRIWHFKQRORJ\VSHHFKWRWKH
Scarborough conference in 1963 had set the tone for a new type of politics. However, the 
devaluation of Sterling in 1967 had created a rise in the cost of living, despite Wilson 
famously declaring that it would do otherwise. Just prior the election there was an 
improvement in both the polls and the trade balance, yet :LOVRQ¶V µSRXQG LQ \RXU SRFNHW¶
statement remained a phrase upon which the Conservatives would draw repeatedly. As Butler 
and Pinto-Duschinsky highlighted, deflationary measures may have secured the position of 
the currency, but it had come at a political price.19    
Labour adopted slogans of the widest possible relevance, which might appeal to virtually all 
voters, and not just committed socialists or trade unionists. The 1964 /HW¶V*R:LWK/DERXU
[Figure  4.4] campaign ZDV DLPHG DW WKH µDIIOXHQW¶ ZKR YRWHG RQ WKH EDVLV RI µYDJXH
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LPSUHVVLRQV¶20 In the subsequent six years Labour deviated little from this thinking, and its 
1970 posters had equally all-encompassing phrases such as /DERXU¶V *RW Life and Soul 
[Figure 4.5] and $UHQ¶W/DERXUV,GHDOV<RXUVDV:HOO? [Figure 4.6].  Both poster campaigns 
were almost entirely devoid of any reference to class or even people. Just as in 1950 the 
image of the worker had all but gone, by 1970 the only members of the public who appeared 
in imagers were children.    
Experts employed by the parties, and the techniques they adopted to better communicate with 
affluent voters, exerted a heavily influence on the posters of 1970. Section one shows how far 
FRPPHUFLDO ODQJXDJH GRPLQDWHG ERWK SDUWLHV¶ FDmpaigns. This led parties to portray their 
respective leaders as analogous to successful company managers. In their use of external 
commercial expertise Labour emulated the Conservatives more than ever before. This, 
however, ZDV RIIVHW E\ µSUHVLGHQW¶ :LOVRQ¶V IDLOXUH WR FRRUGLQDWH WKH FDPSDLJQ ZLWK D
Transport House he held in contempt. Consequently, conflicting messages, at one moment 
EHLQJ µSRVLWLYH¶ DERXW /DERXU¶V DFKLHYHPHQWV LQ RIILFH DQG DW DQRWKHU KLJKOLJKWLQJ WKH
&RQVHUYDWLYHµWKUHDW¶XQGHUPLQHG the campaign. <(67(5'$<¶60(1[Figure 4.1] the image 
that defined and its aftermath exemplified this point.  
If the centrality of advertising expertise to both poster campaigns was unprecedented, 1970 
was part of an evolutionary process. Advertising professionals David Kingsley, Denis Lyons, 
and Peter Davis were iQ  NQRZQ DV /DERXU¶V µWKUHH ZLVH PHQ¶. The trio had helped 
mastermind the 1964 and 1966 campaign. As previous chapters have shown, Conservative 
Central Office had long relied on external advertising expertise. The employment of Geoffrey 
Tucker to be Director of Publicity demonstrated, however, an increasing fluidity between the 
political and advertising world. Tucker came directly from an advertising agency to work at 
Central Office, it was move that demonstrated the Conservatives had begun to match Angelo 
3DQHELDQFR¶V PRGHO RI SURIIHVVRQDOL]DWLRQ RQH LQ ZKLFK SDUW\ EXUHDXFUDF\ LV LQFUHDVLQJO\
UHSODFHG E\ µH[SHUWV¶21 Although advertising had proved a central part of campaigns in the 
past, during 1970 there was as much discussion and rancour about the advertisers as about the 
advertising. How parties were being represented, had become as important as what was 
represented. Posters had themselves become as political as the message they carried.  
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<(67(5'$<¶6 0(1 reflected this change. Complaints in the press about the image, and 
refusals to carry the accompanying press advert harked back to 1906 and posters of Chinese 
slaves.22 ,W ZDV D SRVWHU WKDW KLJKOLJKWHG +HDWK¶V VXSSRVHG µRWKHUQHVV¶ UHSUHVHQWHG E\ KLV
bachelorhood, lack of social charm and personal warmth. His cabinet appear as shadowy 
figures in the dark. It contrasted sharply with other billboards in the Labour campaign that 
KLJKOLJKWHG:LOVRQ¶VIDPLO\OLIHDQGHDVHZLWK\RXQJYRWHUV6HFWLRQWZRGHPRQVWUDWHVKRZ
Wilson dominated the billboards in 1970 as he had in the previous two elections. It was the 
visual manifestation of his belief that the image of the party was best delivered through his 
RZQµSUHVLGHQWLDO¶SHUVRQD23 This was not necessarily a modern development as some posters 
were reminiscent of those featuring Stanley Baldwin in 1929. Crossman certainly thought the 
two-ZDUUDQWHG FRPSDULVRQ ZULWLQJ LQ KLV GLDU\ RI WKH µ7UXVW 0\ +DUROG¶ DQG µ'RFWRU¶V
0DQGDWH¶FDPSDLJQ24  
The 1970 election was an important staging post in the changing nature of politics. To appeal 
WR µDIIOXHQW¶ µIORDWLQJ¶ YRWHUV WKH SDUWLHV IRFXVHG PRUH WKDQ HYHU RQ KRZ WKH\ FRXOG EHWWHU
manage the economy and improve their material existence. Parties ± increasingly 
personalised by their leaders ± were less likely to promote themselves or attack each other for 
ideological reasons. The posters produced during the campaign give us an ideal means of 
assessing the transforming character of electoral activity.  
4.1 Producing posters in 1970 
By 1970, all three parties were using the expertise of those who worked in advertising 
agencies to help them produce literature and co-ordinate their campaigns. The Conservatives 
and Liberals had contracts with individual agencies to produce material. Labour ± who 
maintained an at times antagonistic relationship with the industry as whole ± used volunteers, 
who became to all extents embedded within the party organisation. Wilson ± if he listened to 
anyone ± paid greater heed to his advertising advisors than Transport House staff. Where 
once Conservative Central Office had employed journalists to work in its publicity 
department, it now used advertising professionals. Moreover, the very techniques of 
advertising were becoming part of the campaign. The press openly commented upon and 
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ridiculed the production of communication. Posters now spoke to an electorate who knew the 
exact methods of their production. The electoral landscape in which posters now existed had 
therefore, radically altered.  
The first part of this section demonstrates how each party used professional advertising 
expertise and explains how this differed from previous elections. The second part explores 
WKHGLIIHUHQFHVLQKRZWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHDQG/DERXUSDUWLHV¶XVHGQHZSROOLQJWHFKQLTXHVDQG
how this influenced their posters. The third section suggests how far advertisers and their 
methods were becoming as much a part of the campaign as WKHSDUW\¶VPHVVDJH 
4.1.1 The advance of advertising  
7KH/LEHUDO3DUW\¶VRYHUDOO VORJDQ LQZDV µ6KRZµ(P<RX&DUH9RWH/LEHUDO¶ 7KDW
Bridge Advertising had helped develop it demonstrated the extent to which parties now relied 
on professional help to develop their messages. What the Conservatives had done in 1929 
ZLWK µ6DIHW\ )LUVW¶ DOO QRZ HPXODWHG 'HPRQVWUDWLQJ KRZ IDU WKHVH SURIHVVLRQDOV KDG
VXSSODQWHG WKH SROLWLFLDQV %ULGJH¶V PDQDJLQJ GLUHFWRU VSRNH WR The Times to explain the 
SXUSRVHRIWKH/LEHUDOVORJDQ+HDOVRFODLPHGWKDWWKHSDUW\¶VSRVWHUVZHUHPHDQWWRFRQWUDVW
with the alleged negativity of the two main parties, and appeal to those µZKRVD\WKH\ZRXOG
YRWH/LEHUDOLIWKH\WKRXJKWLWKDGFKDQFH¶25  
,Q  *HRIIUH\ 7XFNHU WKH &RQVHUYDWLYHV¶ QHZ 'LUHFWRU RI 3XEOLFLW\ HQGHG WKH
&RQVHUYDWLYH¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK&ROPDQ3UHQWLVDQG9DUOH\&39DQGDSSRLQWHG'DYLGVRQ
Pearce, Berry, and Tuck (DBPT) in their place. 26  A well-established firm, DBPT had 
ambitious new directors who had already won the accounts of many well-known brands 
including Monte Cristo sherry, Austin Reed and Texas Instruments. While not one of 
/RQGRQ¶V ODUJHVW DJHQFLHs, one anonymous commentator stated they were the most 
µXQGHUUDWHG¶ &RQVLGHUHG µFUHDWLYH¶ '%37 KDG D UHSXWDWLRQ IRU XQXVXDO WKLQNLQJ27 Tucker 
had joined Central Office from the advertising firm Young and Rubicam, having previously 
worked on the Conservative account for CPV. This experience had played a role in his 
appointment although not everyone at Central Office staff was enthusiastic. Some were 
reticent about bringing in an outsider who was not used to the more sedate ways of the party 
bureaucracy. Critics railed against his abrasive character and were annoyed by his habit of 
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returning to an idea until he got his way. Tucker also failed to show the party leaders the 
accustomed deference and his relationship with Heath was often antagonistic.28  
Heath and Tucker nonetheless had a close working relationship and it was this, along with 
input from DBPT, which essentially determined the nature of Conservative posters in 1970. 
For thanks to yet another reorganisation of Central Office, most senior officials were kept 
DZD\IURPWKLVPDWWHU7XFNHU¶VFRPPHUFLDOEDFNJURXQGZDVHYLGHQWLQWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRI
D µVHUYLFH VHFWLRQ¶ LQ WKH 3XEOLFLW\ 'HSDUWPHQW ZKHUH µ3XEOLFLW\ ([HFXWLYHV¶ ZHUH
UHVSRQVLEOH IRU µDFFRXQWV¶ LQFOXGLQJ WHOHYLVLRQ SUHVV DQG JHQHUDO SXEOLF relations, design, 
advertising liaison (which included posters), production and publication, and letter writing. 
As Tucker aimed to make the production of material as consistent as possible, each Publicity 
Executive reported directly to him, and he in turn to the Deputy and Chairman of the party. 
Ideas were generated at the top, passed down the chain for production and then aloft again for 
approval. A senior figure from the Publicity, Research, and Organisation departments was 
required to authorise poster designs, as were the Deputy and Chairman. Tucker stated of the 
reorganisation  
 
The service section, as in commercial organisations, is not the actual producer 
of the end product. It does not make television films. It does not publish 
leaflets. It does not create advertisements. It commissions films and it puts 
out pamphlets and leaflets to be published. Its expertise lies in the area of 
knowing what different types of talent are available and choosing the best 
types of talent.29 
 
Tucker was in effect outsourcing the production of Conservative communication.  Given his 
background he moved with ease between the worlds of politics and advertising, personifying 
the extent to which two now meshed, although on terms dictated by the latter. Thus Tucker 
did not stick to his own system if it did not give him sufficient authority. Stanley Rowland the 
µ3XEOLFLW\ ([HFXWLYH¶ LQ FKDUJH RI µ$GYHUWLVLQJ /LDVRQ¶ ZDV PHDQW WR EH UHVSRQVLEOH IRU
                                         
28
 Conservation with Douglas Hurd, 3 July 2012. 
29
 &3$&&27XFNHUµ0HPRWR+HDGVRI'HSDUWPHQWV¶ January 1969.  
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liaising with the agency to produce poster designs. Records show, however, that when it 
came to posters Tucker dealt with DPBT directly. 30  
In contrast to the Conservatives, Labour had turned to commercial advertising more 
reluctantly. Although advertising expertise was at the centre of the 1970 campaign, resistance 
remained. As it had in the past, the party relied on expertise from sympathetic professionals ± 
notably David Kingsley, Denis Lyons, and Peter Davis ± who worked as volunteers. 
Superficially, Labour prepared for the election as it always had, establishing the usual ad-hoc 
Campaign Committee, which took responsibility for the production of posters from the 
Publicity Committee, in July 1969.31 ,QWKHRU\/DERXU¶VDGYHUWLVLQJDGYLVRUVSURSRVHGWKHLU
ideas, which included ideas for posters, for the consideration of the Campaign Committee. In 
UHDOLW\KRZHYHULWZDV:LOVRQDQGKLVµWKUHHZLVHPHQ¶WKDWPDGHDOOWKHNH\GHFLVLRQVWKH
&RPPLWWHH¶V UHDO IXQFWLRQ EHLQJ WR HQGRUVH WKHP 7KHUH ZHUH VRPH VLPLODULWLHV ZLWK WKH
centralisation occurring at Conservative Central Office. But where as there was structure to 
that development, with Labour it was more improvised as the advertising men gravitated 
towards Wilson.  
The production of the <(67(5'$<¶6 0(1 campaign illustrated how things worked in 
practice. Before commissioning artist Alan Aldridge to make the models, which were to be 
photographed for the poster, Kingsley discussed the move with Bernard Donoughue.  
Donoughue was, like Kingsley, an academic; he was also a Governor of the London School 
of Economics (and would subsequently become DQDGYLVRUWR:LOVRQDQG$OGULGJH¶VQH[W-
door neighbour and friend.32 7KH DUWLVW GHVFULEHV LQ KLV DXWRELRJUDSK\ KRZ .LQJVOH\¶V µKLS
DGYHUWLVLQJ DJHQF\¶ .LQJVOH\ 0DQWRQ DQG 3DOPHU DSSURDFKHG KLP DQG WKDW KLV ILUVW
meeting was with Wilson at Downing Street and from that came a request that he produce the 
poster.33 Significantly, Aldridge never met the Campaign Committee. 
7KH DG KRF QDWXUH RI SURFHHGLQJV ZDV IXUWKHU UHLQIRUFHG E\ :LOVRQ¶V DORRIQHVV $OWKRXJK
closer to Lyons, Davis and Kingsley than his own party staff, the Labour leader remained 
detached. As early as June 1969, The Times had LGHQWLILHGDµJDS¶EHWZHHQKLPDQGWKHµWKUHH
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ZLVH PHQ¶ 34  0DUFLD :LOOLDPV VXJJHVWV :LOVRQ ZRXOG KDYH OLNHG WR OHW WKHP µLQWR KLV
tKLQNLQJ¶PRUHWKRXJKKHGLGQRW6KHclaims that one consequence of this distance was they 
SODQQHGIRUDµORQJHU-WHUPFDPSDLJQWKDWZHZRXOGKDYHZLVKHG¶35 Williams was referring to 
:LOVRQ¶VIDLOXUHWRWHOOKLVDGYLVRUV¶WKHGDWHRIWKHHOHFWLRQXQWLOYHU\ODWHZKLFKPHDQWWKH
second and positive half of the <(67(5'$<¶6 0(1 campaign ± including a poster of 
/$%285¶6:,11,1*7($0 was never released.36   
7KLV ODFN RI FRRUGLQDWLRQ PHDQW WKH SHUVRQDO DWWDFN FRQWDLQHG LQ WKH µ<HVWHUGD\¶V 0HQ¶
poster defined the campaign. There was in any case some significant uncertainty about the 
nature of that attack. Writing to the Publicity Committee in May 1969 Lyons had demanded, 
µ/(7¶6+$9($1$'8/7(/(&7,21¶7KHFDPSDLJQKHVXJJHVWHGVKRXOGEHµ%DVHGRQ
IDFWV RQ SROLFLHV DQG RQ UHDOLVWLF SODQV¶ DQG VKRXOG UHMHFW µSROLWLFDO UXPRXU-mongering, 
sensationalism and mud-VOLQJLQJ¶ 37  When, however, Labour commissioned Aldridge to 
SURGXFHWKHSRVWHUKHZDVRUGHUHGWRGHSLFWµWKH&RQVHUYDWLYH3DUW\6KDGRZ&DELQHWOHGE\
7HG+HDWKDVWLUHGRXWRIGDWHROGPHQ¶7KHse instructions he followed, although arguably 
Aldridge LJQRUHGWKHSURYLVRWKDWµDQ\WKLQJWRRFDUWRRQ\RUJURWHVTXH¶EHDYRLGHG38 Lack of 
FODULW\ LQ SXUSRVH DQG H[HFXWLRQ ZDV DOVR HYLGHQW LQ WKH MXVWLILFDWLRQ WKH µWKUHH ZLVH PHQ¶
gave to the Publicity Committee for the attack, claiming µ7KLV LV DQ DWWDFNLQJ \HW SRVLWLYH
DSSURDFKWRWKHSUREOHPRISXEOLFLVLQJWKH/DERXU*RYHUQPHQW¶VYHU\UHDODFKLHYHPHQWV¶39 
Yet, even had Labour released the second and more positive poster, <(67(5'$<¶6 0(1
was a strikingly negative advert aimed at leading Conservatives. What Lyons was advocating 
was a type of attack not properly seen since inter-war elections.  
-XVWDV/DERXU¶VDGYLVRUVSDUDGR[LFDOO\DUJXHGWKDWSRVLWLYHSROLWLFVFRXOGEHpursued through 
attacks on the opposition, so too did certain Cabinet ministers. Repeating one of his favourite 
arguments of the time, Tony Benn informed the first meeting of the Campaign Committee 
that the electorate was better educated than ever before. This, he argued, was especially true 
of the young and they would therefore be immune to the old-fashioned electioneering 
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WHFKQLTXHV ZKLFK LQYROYHG µH[WUDYDJDQW DWWDFNV DQG SHUVRQDO DEXVH¶ +RZHYHU %HQQ WKHQ
ZHQWRQWR VWDWHWKDW WKHREMHFWLYHRI/DERXU¶VFDPSDLJQVKRXOGEH µ7RFDVW WKHRSSosition 
GHOLEHUDWHO\LQDKLVWRULFDOUROHWKDWFRUUHVSRQGVZLWKWKHSXEOLF¶VIDGLQJPHPRU\RIWKHPDVD
µJRYHUQPHQWIURPWKHSDVW¶DQGWROLQNWKHLGHDRIYRWLQJ&RQVHUYDWLYHZLWKWKHLGHDRIJRLQJ
EDFN¶40 Benn therefore argued for a positive message that was nonetheless critical of the 
opposition. Unsurprising therefore, when he first saw the YESTERDAY MEN models Benn 
was enthusiastic.41 %DUEDUD &DVWOH ZDV PRUH UHVHUYHG VWDWLQJ DOWKRXJK PDQ\ LQ /DERXU¶V
senior cabinet thought the <HVWHUGD\¶V0HQFDPSDLJQµFOHYHUDQGOHJLWLPDWH¶ LWZDVZURQJO\
timed for a June election.42     
&DVWOH DQG %HQQ¶V FRQWUDVWLQJ UHDFWLRQV ZHUH LQGLFDWLYH RI /DERXU¶V SUREOHPV LQ 
During the 1960s the party yoked optimism, modernity and progress together. First Hugh 
Gaitskell had attempted to cast Labour in a contemporary mould, a process followed by 
Wilson ZLWKpODQDIWHUZLWK µ/HW¶V*RZLWK/DERXU¶43 In 1970, however, Wilson was 
no longer a youthful figure and Labour had been in power since 1964 with a tricky record to 
defend. Labour was WKHUHIRUHKDUGO\µQHZ¶LQ and so the only way it could seem current 
was by associating the Conservatives with the past. This meant at the very least obscuring its 
positive message, difficult enough to defend with such a poor economic record. In addition, 
confusion at the heart of the campaign meant the party failed to release the positive part of its 
campaign.  
µ6FLHQWLILF¶FDPSDLJQLQJ 
Despite the greater sophistication of psephological research during the 1950s neither party 
utilised polling data in the design of propaganda to a significant degree.44 When, however, 
after 1959 first *DLWVNHOODQGWKHQ:LOVRQVRXJKWWR LPSURYH/DERXU¶V LPDJH WKH\XVHGWKH
latest research techniques into public opinion to help the party shape the communication.45 
Throughout the 1960s, the information gained from polling about what issues voters 
considered most important, informed how the parties designed their posters. Despite this, in 
1970 Labour chose to not apply what little polling information it commissioned to the 
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SURGXFWLRQRISRVWHUV,QVWHDGWDNLQJDVWHSEDFNZDUGVWKHSDUW\UHOLHGRQLWVRZQµHJRLVWLF¶
ideas.  
+DYLQJ DFKLHYHG RIILFH LQ  /DERXU¶V LQWHUHVW LQ SROOLQJ GHFOLQHG46 Indeed, the party 
seemed to ignore its own research. Before his retirement, in 1969 Mark Abrams produced a 
survey of the voting habits of young people, which suggested they did not differ much from 
older members of the electorate. 47 As the next section demonstrates, despite this Labour 
produced material specifically intended to attract the youthful gaze. Influential sections of the 
party saw young voters as very different from the rest.48 Labour had long mistrusted survey 
HYLGHQFHLQ$EUDPVOLVWHGWHQGLIIHUHQWUHDVRQVIRUµUHOXFWDQFHRULQLQGLIIHUHQFH¶WRWKH
use of polls.49 He thought polls denied politicians the right to interpret the public mood for 
themselves and react accordingly. Nye Bevan had been an especially ardent critic and 
FODLPHGSROOLQJZRXOGµWDNHWKHSRHWU\RXWRISROLWLFV¶.50  
The majority of Conservatives were much more willing to use polling data than Labour. 
Sceptics did exist: Lord Hailsham, echoing Bevan, argued polls were simply not what 
µSROLWLFV LV DERXW¶51 Hailsham was in the minority, however, and in the years before 1970 
senior Conservative workers emphasised its advantages. Anthony Barber, the party Chair, 
informed subordinates that the choice of newspapers in which the Party would advertise was 
EDVHGRQ µVFLHQWLILF LQYHVWLJDWLRQ¶RI WKH µWDUJHWDXGLHQFH¶DQG WKHFRQWHQWVRI WKRVHDGYHUts 
KDG EHHQ µUHVHDUFKHG XVLQJ WKH PRVW PRGHUQ WHFKQLTXHV DYDLODEOH¶ %DUEHU FRQFOXGHG
KRZHYHU UDWKHU GHIHQVLYHO\ WKDW µ7KH DFWXDO FRQWHQWVRI WKH DGYHUWLVHPHQWV DUHRI FRXUVH
HQWLUHO\RXU UHVSRQVLELOLW\DQGQRW WKDWRI WKHDGYHUWLVLQJDJHQF\¶52 The Conservatives had 
begun exhaustive research on public opinion following their defeats of 1964 and 1966, 
annually spending £30,000.53 %XWOHU DUJXHG WKDW µMXVW DV 0DUN $EUDPV¶ SULYDWH SROOV RI WKH
HDUO\VSOD\HGDPDMRUSDUW LQ/DERXU¶VHVFDSHIURP LWVFORth cap image, so in the later 
                                         
46
 Butler, The British General Election 1970, p. 190. 
47
 LHASC:  PUB/6/6/61(&0LQXWHV-XQHEULHILQJQRWH0$EUDPVµ7KH<RXQJ9RWHU¶ 
48
 For the Young Socialist view see, LHASC:  N.E.C Minutes 26 0DUFKµ9RWHDQGDQG<RXWK
6XSSRUWHUV/DERXU¶&DPSDLJQ¶)RU%HQQFRPPHQWVVHH/+$6&&DPSDLJQ&RPPLWWHH0LQXWHVAugust 
µ)LUVW7KRXJKWVRQ&DPSDLJQ6WUDWHJ\¶ 
49
 0$EUDPVµ3XEOLF2SLQLRQ3ROOVDQG3ROLWLFDO3DUWLHV¶The Public Opinion Quarterly (Spring, 1963) 27: 1, 
pp. 9-18; Lawrence Black suggests the same see L. Black, Redefining British Politics : Culture, Consumerism 
and Participation 1954-1970 (Hampshire: 2010), p. 193. 
50
 $EUDPVµ3XEOLF2SLQLRQ3ROOVDQG3ROLWLFDO3DUWLHV¶S50:RUFHVWHUµPollsters, the Press, and 
3ROLWLFDO3ROOLQJLQ%ULWDLQ¶Public Opinion Quarterly (1980) 44, p. 550. 
51
 Quoted in D. Kavanagh, Election Campaigning: The New Marketing of Politics (Oxford: 1995) p. 131. 
52
 CPA: CCO 500/21/, Barber to Area Chairman, 14 November 1969. 
53
 Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky, General Election, p. 190. 
134 
 
V WKH ZKROH PHVVDJH RI &RQVHUYDWLYH VSHHFKHV ZDV FRQFHUQHG ZLWK /DERXU¶V IDLOXUH WR
VDWLVI\WKHQHHGVRILWVRZQVRUWRISHRSOH¶54 There were parallels in the tZRSDUWLHV¶LQWHUHVW
in polling. It was only in defeat that they really wanted to know what the people thought.  
How precisely the Conservatives applied the information gained to the production of posters 
is unclear. Certainly polling gave the party information about which policies the electorate 
was most concerned, and Conservative posters concentrated on these issues. The next section 
GHPRQVWUDWHV KRZ WKHLU SRVWHUV HPSKDVLVHG WKH IDLOXUH RI µ/DERXU¶V EURNHQ SURPLVHV¶ DQG
spoke to a group that had voted Labour but now felt dispossessed.  
µ0DGLVRQ$YHQXHVlickness¶ 
The advancing role of advertising professionals over the course of the century had largely 
been out of the public eye. In the past when popular press reporting had focussed on posters, 
they rarely mentioned the agency or producer.  As advertising executives moved closer to 
centres of power so these figures and their techniques became almost as newsworthy as what 
they were communicating. What was more, parties now found themselves attacked for how 
or who produced their advertising. In 1959, Richard Crossman had accused the Conservatives 
RI VHOOLQJ 0DFPLOODQ µDV WKRXJK KH ZHUH D GHWHUJHQW¶55 During the 1970 campaign Dennis 
+HDOH\FODLPHGRI WKH &RQVHUYDWLYH¶V WKDW µ7KRXVDQGVRIZHOO-paid professionals man their 
nation-wide machine. Their television programmes have a Madison Avenue slickness. No 
ZRQGHU WKH\ FDQQRW XQGHUVWDQG ZK\ WKH\ DUH QRW JHWWLQJ RYHU¶ 56  Given the central role 
DGYHUWLVHUV SOD\HG LQ /DERXU¶V RZQ FDPSDLJQ +HDOH\¶V FODLPV ZHUH, however, somewhat 
disingenuous. 
Throughout the 1960s, an increasing number of political commentators parodied and 
criticised developments in political communications. In 1963 Vicky drew Wilson in front of 
the thumbs up slogan of /HW¶V*R:LWK/DERXUnext to a Conservative billboard with the two 
fingers victory sign shown [Figure 4.7] to suggest the Conservatives were leaning on the ad 
men. Wilson then was deemed to have been the last of the golden age of politicians free from 
WKH WDLQW RI DGYHUWLVLQJ :KDW 9LFN\¶V FDUWRRQ GLG QRW PHQWLRQ ZDV WKDW :LOVRQ WRR ZDV
reliant on ad men, the same as those working in 1970. As volunteers, however, David 
Kingsley and Peter Davies sat in the background, far less visible that the Conservatives and 
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&39 6HYHQ \HDUV ODWHU /DERXU¶V XVH RI DGYHUWLVLQJ ZDV PRUH ZLGHO\ NQRZQ :KHQ WKH
Evening News FDUWRRQLVW %HUQDUG &RRNVRQ VDWLULVHG :LOVRQ¶V UHOLDQFH RQ DGYHUWLVLQJ
personnel, he was suggesting that those people who had once been behind the design of 
campaigns were now at the front of them. The advertisers are shown crying with laughter at 
:LOVRQ¶VLQVLVWHQFHWKH\PDNHKLPORRNµFUHGLEOH¶>)LJXUH@WKHUHE\PRFNLQJKLVEHOLHILQ
WKHSRZHURIDGYHUWLVLQJ0RUHGDPPLQJVWLOOZDV.HYLQ%LOOLQJWRQ¶V The Rise and Rise of 
Michael Rimmer which had to be released after the 1970 campaign, which depicted Peter 
&RRN DV D VKDGRZ\ SROOLQJ DQG DGYHUWLVLQJ JXUX ZKRVH µVFLHQWLILF¶ SROOLQJ PHWKRGV SURSHO
him up the greasy pole and into Number 10.57  
Previous chapters have explored earlier occasions when politicians and commentators 
questioned the ethics of party communication. By 1970, however, debates over the 
techniques of mass persuasion had entered the public discourse. For advertising now did not 
simply facilitate SDUWLHV¶FDPSDLJQLQJ behind the scenes, but had become a public expression 
of it, and this had to have an impact on the way voters consumed posters. For if the public 
had ever trusted the content of posters, cynical media discussions of the ways in which 
posters were produced could only further erode their perceived truth claims.  
The newly public role of advertising radically altered the way it spoke for the representative. 
In the decade before, and during the election of 1970 a new voice of concern was evident. 
Writing in 1970 the academic Richard Hodder-:LOOLDPV FRPSODLQHG µ7KHUH LV VRPHWKLng 
distasteful in the thought of British politics degenerating into a competition between two 
JURXSVRIHOHFWRUDOPDQLSXODWRUV¶58 Writing of television but with a position highly relevant 
to posters Milton Shulman argued that the 1970 General Election was µDKXFNVWHU¶V3HWWLFRDW
/DQG LQZKLFKWKHSXEOLFKDGDFKRLFHEHWZHHQSROLWLFDOGHWHUJHQWVEHWZHHQµ2PR¶:LOVRQ
DQGµ'D]¶+HDWK¶59 
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4. 2 The posters of 1970 
Labour posters sought to draw clear distinctions between Wilson and Heath. <(67(5'$<¶6
MEN [Figure 4.1] overtly pointed towards the alleged inadequacies of Heath and his cabinet. 
Yet other Labour billboards more subtly undermined Heath by contrasting his bachelorhood 
ZLWK :LOVRQ¶V IDPLO\ OLIH ,I /DERXUDGRSWHGDQ LQQRYDWLYH YLVXDO ODQJXDJH LWV LPSDct was 
however, OHVVSRVLWLYHWKDQLWVFUHDWRUVKRSHG3HUKDSVGXHWR+HDWK¶VRZQVKRUWFRPLQJVWKH
Conservative campaign was less personal. In 1966 the party had feature the new leader in 
three billboard designs but reflecting his diminished status, in 1970, there was just one.60 The 
SDUW\LQVWHDGIRFXVVHGRQ/DERXU¶VIDLOXUHWRLPSURYHWKHSHRSOH¶VSURVSHULW\ LISRVWHUVWKDW
UHSURGXFHG :LOVRQ¶V LQIDPRXV µSRXQG LQ \RXU SRFNHW¶ OLQH FOHDUO\ DWWDFNHG WKH 3ULPH
Minister they did so for policy reasons.  
4.2.1 /DERXU¶VFampaign 
<(67(5'$<¶6 0(1 [Figure 4.1] was at once the most aesthetically significant and 
SROLWLFDOO\ FRQWURYHUVLDO SRVWHU RI WKH FDPSDLJQ /DERXU¶V DGYHUWLVLQJ H[HFXWLYHV KDG
originally wanted to photograph images from Madame Tussauds but its owners denied the 
party permission.61 Instead, Labour commissioned the in-vogue designer, Alan Aldridge, to 
SURGXFHWKHQHFHVVDU\ILJXUHV8VLQJ$OGULGJHZDVSDUWRI/DERXU¶VLQLWLDWLYHWRSURMHFWLWVHOI
as the party of the moment; he was well known for designing covers for Penguin, working for 
WKH%HDWOHV¶ record label Apple, and in 1968 even designed an album cover for The Who.62 
Aldridge fitted a concept of modernity that attracted Wilson, who saw merit in projecting 
Labour as being at the forefront of the new+LVµ:KLWH+HDWRI7HFKQRORJ\¶VSHHFKKDG
IDPRXVO\VHWDWRQHQRWMXVWLQSROLF\WHUPVEXWDOVRLQDHVWKHWLFVRXWOLQLQJDQµLFRQRJUDSK\
RIPRGHUQWDVWH¶DV0RUWSXWVLW2WKHUVLQWKHSDUW\DOVRVRXJKWWRPDNH/DERXUILWIRUKRZ
they saw the new Britain, a conception which moved beyond the economic.  Notable 
UHYLVLRQLVWV OLNH $QWKRQ\ &URVODQG DQG 5R\ -HQNLQV SURPRWHG µJDLHW\ WROHUDQFH DQG
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EHDXW\¶63 $SSURDFKLQJ$OGULGJHZDVQRWMXVWPHDQWWRKHOS/DERXUFUHDWHDµPRGHUQ¶SRVWHU
but an attempt to be seen to be modern.64  
$OGULGJHZDVQRW MXVWDµPRGHUQ¶GHVLJQHUKHZDVa notorious figure. That Wilson was not 
unnerved by his previous work showed that at least some in the party were ready to embrace 
a more visceral visual language. Aldridge had after all produced a front cover for Roald 
'DKO¶VKiss Kiss which showed a screaming figure being minced up [figure 4.9], and a poster 
IRU$QG\ :DUKRO¶V ILOPChelsea Girls which featured a nude model whose body contained 
various windows through which were visible a variety of sexual acts rendered in clay. 65  
Aldridge used his model making skills to caricature and parody Heath and his Shadow 
Cabinet. The figure of Quintin Hogg mocked his reputation as an old-fashioned orator, 
showing him in a traditional stance, finger raised and apparently in full flow. The depiction of 
Heath, hands held behind his back, staring straight at the camera, makes him a distant and 
sinister figure: his piercing eyes evocate of the Big Brother posters in Ninety Eighty Four, 
ZKLFKZHUHµVRFRQWULYHG¶2UZHOOZURWHµWKDWWKHH\HV IROORZ\RXDERXWZKHQ\RXPRYH¶66 
Aldridge lit the figures from below and photographed them from above, continuing the darkly 
malevolent Orwellian motif.  
<(67(5'$<¶60(1 ZDVSDUWRI/DERXU¶VZLGHURIIHQVLYHDJDLQVW the Conservatives. It was 
the visuDOLQFDUQDWLRQRIµ6HOVGRQ0DQ¶$QDPH:LOVRQKDGJLYHQWR Heath after the January 
1970 Selsdon Park conference, at which the Shadow Cabinet discussed policy for the 
forthcoming election. Wilson hoped that the slur would cast his rival as a reactionary figure, 
with extreme views on trade unionism and law and order.  While the term caught on in the 
PHGLD:LOVRQKDGKRZHYHUPLVMXGJHGWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFK+HDWK¶VSROLFLHVHYRNHGDSRSXODU
response.67  
There was further misjudgement in the design of <(67(5'$<¶60(1 Just as the policies of 
µ6HOVGRQ 0DQ¶ SURYHG SRSXODU VR WKH LQFOXVLRQ RI (QRFK 3RZHOO LQ WKH SRVWHU PD\ KDYH
bolstered Heath rather than damage him. Heath had dismissed Powell from his Shadow 
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Cabinet in April 1968 IROORZLQJ KLV µ5LYHUV RI %ORRG¶ VSHHFK ZKHUH KH IRUHWROG D IXWXUH
when white people would become strangers in their own country and predicted race war. 
3RZHOO¶V DQWL-immigration rhetoric split both the country and the Conservative party, and 
Heath attempted to marginalize the controversial figure. For those who masterminded 
/DERXU¶V  FDPSDLJQ 3RZHOO ZDV D GHPRQLF ILJXUH. During the 1970 campaign, Benn 
FRPSDUHG 3RZHOO¶V  VSHHFK ZLWK WKH IODJ UDLVHG RYHU %HOVHQ 68 3RZHOO¶V LQFOXVLRQ LQ
<(67(5'$<¶6 0(1 ZDV LQWHQGHG WR XQGHUOLQH +HDWK¶V DVVRFLDWLRQ ZLWK VRPHRQH ZKR
remained a Conservative MP. Indeed, The Times UHIHUUHG WR 3RZHOO DV +HDWK¶V µVSHFWUH¶
arguing that the only reason why his inclusion in the poster had not been effective was 
EHFDXVHLWµZDVORVWLQWKHUXPSXVWKDWIROORZHG¶69  
Powell was certainly a problem for Heath ± he was often spoken of as future leader.70 
However, many voters did not see Powell as demonic. His dismissal met with huge public 
outcry, and excrement being sent to Central Office in protest.71 A significant number shared 
his views on immigration, to such an extent some suggested he helped win the election for 
the Conservatives.72 ,Q  %HQQ VDLG RI 3RZHOO >KH@ µZDV PRUH RI D WKUHDW WR WKH 7RU\
3DUW\WKDQKHZDVWRXV¶EXWBenn LJQRUHGKRZPDQ\RI/DERXU¶VRZQZRUNLQJFODVVYRWHUV
agreed with him.73 In this climate <(67(5'$<¶6 0(1 may have had the exact opposite 
effect than was intended. It remained a poster for the people who produced it. Those who 
ZRUNHGRQ/DERXU¶VFDPSDLJQYiewed the world through the lens of their own cosmopolitan 
outlook.  It was removed from much of the posters audience, hence the apparent gaffe with 
the inclusion of Powell. 
In a campaign that cost £60,000, <(67(5'$<¶6 0(1 was posted on 200 sites around the 
country, quickly became a central feature of the election. 74  Labour partisans used the 
damming phrase in their speeches. Richard Briginshaw, joint General Secretary of the 
*UDSKLFDQG$OOLHG7UDGHVXQLRQDUJXHGWKDWWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHPDQLIHVWRDSSHDUHGµWo be [a] 
                                         
68
 Benn, Office Without Power, p. 287 
69
 µ7KH6SHFWUHWKDWKDXQWV+HDWK¶The Times, 15 June 1970. 
70
 µ7RULHVIHDU3RZHOOPD\SODQDQHZSDUW\¶The Guardian, 11 June 1969. 
71
 R. Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration in Postwar Britain (Oxford: 2000), p.187 
72
 Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky claimed that Powell and immigration had little effect on voting attitudes General 
Election, S2QWKHSRSXODULW\RI3RZHOO¶VDQWLLPPLJUDWLRQVWDQFHLQVHH'76WXGODUµPolicy 
Voting in Britain: The Colored Immigration Issue in the 1964, 1966, and 1970 General Elections¶, The 
American Political Science Review (March 1978) 72:1, p. 54. 
73
 Benn, Office Without Power, p. 123; Butler and Pinto-Duscinsky, General Election, p. 160-162 
74
 :RRGµ/DERXUFDPSDLJQWRNQRFN7RULHV¶The Times, 12 May 1970; Butler and Pinto-Duscinsky, General 
Election, pp. 160-162. 
139 
 
UHKDVK RI WKH SROLFLHV HQXQFLDWHG E\ ³\HVWHUGD\¶V PHQ´¶ 75  The Conservatives also 
appropriated the phrase and turned the attack back on Labour. During a Commons debate on 
trade relations, Jeffrey Archer asked the Prime Minister if he had heard the UXPRXUµWKDWWKH
country wishes to return to yesterday's men, yesterday's prices, yesterday's taxes and 
yesterday's unemployment situation? Is the Prime Minister aware that yesterday's men never 
GHYDOXHGDQGQHYHUILGGOHGE\ERXQGDU\ULJJLQJ"¶76 $UFKHU¶VDWtack on Wilson using the very 
words of a Labour slogan, demonstrated the contestable and ill-conceived nature of the 
campaign, but also how <(67(5'$<¶60(1was contributing to the construction of political 
communication.   
Some were not yet ready for such much muscular political language. When the poster was 
reproduced as a newspaper advert, the Leicester Mercury UHIXVHG WR FDUU\ WKH µNQRFNLQJ
FRS\¶77 Transport House commissioned a MORI poll about the campaign and discovered 
that of the 30% familiar with it, 69% thought it an unfair attack.78 Some Labour members 
were also unhappy: Hugh Jenkins the left-ZLQJ03IRU3XWQH\FODLPHGµ3HUVRQDOLWLHVVKRXOG
EHOHIWRXWRISROLWLFV¶79 Although Bernard Donoughue had been part of the process by which 
the poster came about, HYHQ KH TXHVWLRQHG µZKHWKHU \RX VKRXOG SXEOLFL]H WKH RSSRVLWLRQ
leaders ± ZK\ JLYH IDFHV WR IDFHOHVV PHQ¶80 Such was the uproar about the image, when 
Labour withdrew it because of the impending election (see above) their actions were 
interpreted as a reaction to the criticism.81  
If <(67(5'$<¶6 0(1 attacked Heath and his Shadow Cabinet, other posters promoted 
Wilson¶V supposed qualities. Some billboards evoked the populist images of the Labour 
leader from 1964 when Wilson mingled amongst the people. PEOPLE MATTER [Figure 
4.10], for example, depicted a man relaxed in the company of those he sought to lead, an 
image the party wanted to revisit in 1970. Just as Crossman compared the Prime Minister to 
%DOGZLQ :LOVRQ¶V ELRJUDSKHU %HQ 3LPORWW FODLPHG :LOVRQ LQ  ZDV OLNH µD VWDJH
SHUVRQDOLW\ ZKR FRXOG VKDUH ROG MRNHV ZLWK KLV IDQV¶82 Labour posters played their part by 
KLJKOLJKWLQJ :LOVRQ¶V VXSSRVHGO\ SHUVRQDEOH FKDUDFWHU DQG UHOD[HG QDWXUH WHEN IT 
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COMES DOWN TO IT - $5(1¶7 /$%2856 ,'($/6 <2856 $6 :(// [Figure 4.6] 
suggested a figure whose affability resonated even with the younger generation.  
7KDWVORJDQRULJLQDWHGLQDQRWKHUVHWRISRVWHUVZKLFKDOVRXVHGWKHZRUGVµ/DERXU¶V*RWOLIH
DQGVRXO¶ >)LJXUH@7KLVJURXS IRUPHGSDUWRIEURDGHUFDPSDLJQ PHDnt to show Labour 
was compassionate; a statement aimed to suggest that the party cared where as the 
Conservatives did not.83 PDUWRI/DERXU¶VDSSHDO WR\RXWK (dealt with below) the poster also 
IHDWXUHGDSURPLQHQWSDUWRI:LOVRQ¶VµVWDJHSHUVRQDOLW\¶KLVSLSH,QLWLDOO\:LOVRQ¶VSLSHKDG
been a television prop; something he used to emphasis points, the lighting of which creating a 
natural pause during broadcasts, giving him time to think.84  It became, however, something 
much more symbolic, given that pipe sPRNLQJ KDG ORQJ EHHQ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK µVROLG
dependable, common-VHQVHPDVFXOLQLW\¶.85 For while the Labour leader espoused modernity 
the pipe linked him with the traditions of British life, suggesting the former was an 
understanding of the latter. For these UHDVRQV :LOVRQ¶V SLSH LV SUHVHQW LQ ERWK PEOPLE 
MATTER [4.10] and WHEN IT COMES DOWN TO IT [4.6]. Indeed, such was the Prime 
0LQLVWHU¶VIDPHDVDSLSHVPRNHU LQRQHSRVWHUWKHSLSH became his synonym [Figure 
4.11]. Given, however, he preferred in private the more plutocratic cigar, images of a pipe 
ZLHOGLQJ:LOVRQUHLQIRUFHGDYLVLRQRI/DERXU¶VOHDGHUFRQVWUXFWHGHQWLUHO\IRUWKHEHQHILWRI
the people.86  
If the pipe in Figure 4.6 linked Wilson with trustworthiness, the young people  ± whose class 
is not easily defined but they were respectable and best described as suburban ± DQG:LOVRQ¶V
seemingly easy manner, shows that Labour wanted the poster to attract a youthful gaze. It 
also perhaps reassured older voters that Wilson was good with the youth. The election after 
all took place in a period following the growth in youth culture during the 1960s, when many 
saw the young as rebellious. 87  :LWK XVH RI WKH SRVVHVVLYH SURQRXQ µ\RXUV¶ PHQWLRQ RI
/DERXU¶VLGHDOVDQGWKHLPDJHRI:LOVRQWKHSRVWHUDWWHmpts to draw all three together into a 
shared understanding. It was one example in a series that projected a positive message 
intended for the eyes of the young. 
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As already stated, Labour chose to ignore surveys showing the young voted in much the same 
way as everybody else. Instead, the party produced material specifically to appeal to young 
votes. Advisor Dennis Lyons emphasised WKHQHHGWRµ+DPPHUKRPHWKHIDFWWKDWWKH\RXWK
FDQVZLQJWKHHOHFWLRQ¶88 In September 1969, the party released a number of posters featuring 
the words /DERXU¶V JRW OLIH DQG VRXO [4.5]. These made the point that Labour had ideals, 
unlike the Conservatives, with Benn claiming they reflected how the party was motivated by 
µFRPSDVVLRQ¶ DQG VRXJKW WR IXOILO KXPDQ DV ZHOO DV HFRQRPLF Qeeds.89 Not all were happy 
with the slogan, and Labour Organiser UHFRJQLVHG LWZRXOG µQRW VXLW HYHU\ERG\¶90 Tribune 
HYHQVXJJHVWHGWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIVXFKDYDJXHWHUPOLNHµVRXO¶µLQWRWKHSROLWLFDOYRFDEXODU\
RI VRFLDOLVP LV ZRUWKOHVV¶91 The slogan provided satirists with ammunition to attack the 
vacuity of political communications. The *XDUGLDQ¶V*LEEDUGGHSLFWHG:LOVRQ¶VFDELQHWDVD
jazz band daubed in vaudevillian blackface, in reference to the popular light entertainment 
programme, The Black and White Minstrel Show [figure 4.12]. More pointedly, Jon of the 
Daily Mail DUJXHG LI /DERXU KDG µOLIH DQG VRXO¶ WKHQ LW QHHGHG D µWUDQVSODQW¶ >ILJXUH ]. 
Despite such criticism Labour persisted with the slogan.92 
/DERXU¶VDSSHDO WR\RXWK and projection of an avuncular Wilson, had the advantage of also 
KLJKOLJKWLQJ +HDWK¶V DORRIQHVV DQG ODFN RI IDPLO\ OLIH 'XULQJ WKH FDPSDLJQ :LOVRQ
constantly appeared with his wife Mary.93 In Their health, their education, their opportunity 
± ZKHQLWFRPHVGRZQWRLWDUHQ¶W\RXYRWLQJIRU\RXUFKLOGUHQ¶VIXWXUHDVZHOO[Figure 4.14] 
Mary Wilson became the first and perhaps only Prime Ministerial spouse to appear in a 
poster. The Prime Minister certainly believed his wife was crucial to the campaign, 
representing his faith in personalising politics.94 Although political wives had participated in 
constituency campaigning since the early twentieth century ± DPHVVDJHIURPWKHFDQGLGDWH¶V
wife was common feature of election addresses ± Mary Wilson elevated the political spouse 
to the national stage.  
Wilson the populist, at ease with all, good humoured, pipe in hand and grounded by his 
happy home life, was not the only image of the Prime Minister on show. Taking advantage of 
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being head of government, Wilson was also presented as a serious statesman. The man in 
ILJXUH  ZDV ERWK µVWURQJ¶ LQ ZRUG DQG LQ appearance. After successfully struggling to 
make the BrLWLVK HFRQRP\ µVWURQJ¶ DJDLQ LQ WKH SRVWHU :LOVRQ looked forward to the next 
VWDJHRIPDNLQJWKHFRXQWU\µJUHDWWROLYHLQ¶>)LJure 4.15].  
Here Wilson sat fore square, staring directly at the viewer. Labour research had shown 
µVWUDLJKWWRFDPHUD¶HOHFWLRQEURDGFDVWVZHUHWKHPRVWSRSXODUZLWKWKHSXEOLFDQGWKHPHWKRG
was applied to the poster.95 As with broadcasts, the technique created a direct link between 
Wilson and the public, one which contrasted sharply with Heath in <(67(5'$<¶6 0(1 
There Heath had appeared aloRI KHUH :LOVRQ¶V JD]H emphasised intimacy. Writing of 
SROLWLFLDQV¶ERG\ ODQJXDJH0D[ $WNLQVRQVWDWHVWKDWZKHQRUDtors keep the audience under 
their gaze, as opposed to looking at a script, they better hold their attention; the whites of the 
eyes being crucial to this effect.96 7KHZKLWHVRI:LOVRQ¶VH\HVLQ1RZ%ULWDLQ¶V6WURQJ[4.15] 
are particularly vibrant and emphasised further by his dark suit and tie. Just as Baldwin had 
done in 1929, Wilson stares intently at the viewer, demanding their trust.  
While the visual message of 1RZ%ULWDLQ¶V6WURQJ was straightforward, the same was not true 
RILWVVORJDQ/DERXU¶VYROuntary publicity group conceived of the wording ± µ1RZ%ULWDLQ¶V
VWURQJOHW¶VPDNHLWJUHDWWROLYHLQ¶:KHQLWFRPHVGRZQWRLWDUHQ¶W/DERXU¶VLGHDOV\RXUVDV
well? ± and justified it to the NEC with a series of upbeat statements. These included: 
µ/DERXU¶VGRQHLW¶µ7KHUH¶VPRUHWRGR¶µ:HZDQWWRPDNH%ULWDLQDZRQGHUIXOSODFHWROLYH¶
µ,W¶V MR\RXV¶ DQG µ%HQHILWV VKDUHG E\ DOO¶97 The advertising executives stated that the party 
VKRXOGQRWEHDIUDLGRIORQJVORJDQV$IWHUDOOWKH\ZHUHµDVNLQJSHRSOHWRWKLQNDERXWWKLQJV¶
7KH\ IXUWKHU VXJJHVWHG FRPELQLQJ WKH WZR SKUDVHV ZLWK DQ DGGHQGXP µ:H VXJJHVW RQH
important addition to the phrase ± an invitation to the electors to make up their own minds, 
judge us on performance, examine the facts, thus: Labour¶V7HDP6D\V ³/22. $5281'
<28 :+(1 ,7 &20(6 '2:1 72 ,7 $5(1¶7 /$%285¶6 ,'($/6 <2856 $6
:(//´¶98  ,Q WKH HQG µ/DERXU¶V 7HDP 6D\V¶ ZDV GURSSHG DIWHU WKH VHFRQG KDOI RI WKH
µ<HVWHUGD\¶V0HQ¶FDPSDLJQZDVSXOOHG%XWHYHQZLWKRXWUHIHUHQFH WR µ/DERXU¶V WHDP¶ or 
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LQGHHGWKHFOXQN\LQFLWHPHQWWRµORRNDURXQG¶WKHVORJDQUHPDLQVIDUWRRORQJ,WZHQWDJDLQVW
the grain of what was considered the most effective billboard communication.  
7KH HIIXVLYH PHVVDJH WKDW %ULWDLQ ZDV QRZ µVWURQJ¶ ZDV IRXQGHG RQ WKH 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU¶V
claim that the economy had improved. 99  It was not, however, a widely shared opinion. 
:ULWLQJIRXUGD\VEHIRUHWKHHOHFWLRQDQGFRPSDULQJ/DERXU¶VFDPSDLJQZLWKWKDWRIWKH
Conservatives in 1959, Crossman wrote that although the mood of the public was moving 
from Conservative to Labour ± there had been an upswing in the polls ± the government had 
RIIHUHG QRWKLQJ EXW µWKUHH \HDUV RI KHOO DQG KLJK WD[HV¶100 After the campaign he recorded 
WKDW /DERXU ORVW EHFDXVH µWKH YRLFH RI GRRP¶ DQG µUHPLQGHUV RI ULVLQJ SULFHV¶ DQG µEURNHQ
SURPLVHV¶KDG WDNHQWKHLU WROO101 )HZKDGEHOLHYHG WKDW WKHHFRQRP\ZDV µVWURQJ¶E\
VRPHWKLQJ &RQVHUYDWLYH SURSDJDQGD DVVLGXRXVO\ H[SORLWHG µ'RRP SULFHV DQG EURNHQ
SURPLVHV¶ZDVFHQWUDOWR+HDWKVUKHWRULF2Q-XQHth, the leader of the Opposition claimed 
/DERXU KDG µSXUVXHG D SROLF\ RI GLYHUVLRQ ZLWK D ERJXV VWRU\ RI VKDP VXQVKLQH¶ 102 . 
Reflecting the centralised nature of the Conservative campaign, its posters faithfully echoed 
that claim. 
&RQVHUYDWLYHµSRFNHWV¶ 
Most &RQVHUYDWLYH SRVWHUV UHLWHUDWHG WKH VDPH PHVVDJH YRWHUV¶ SHUVRQDO SURVSHULW\ KDG
declined under Labour. The party concentrated on personal finance because it believed that it 
strongly influenced how voters chose which party to support. In 1969 DBPT confirmed what 
PDQ\ VHQLRU SROLWLFLDQV EHOLHYHG ZKHQ WKH\ WROG &HQWUDO 2IILFH WKDW µ$ YRWHU¶V DFWXDO
prosperity is the best measure he (sic) has of judging whether a government policies work, or 
GR QRW ZRUN¶103  The agency also proposed ± in an exact mirroring of the technique of 
<(67(5'$<¶60(1± WKDWDGYHUWLVLQJVKRXOGEHFRPSDUDWLYHµ&RQVHUYDWLYHSURPLVHDJDLQVW
/DERXUIDLOXUH¶104 In contrast to the Labour approach, this message was expressed with great 
simplicity. Brendon Sewill of the Conservative Research Department argued people were 
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WXUQLQJ DZD\ IURP SROLWLFV EHFDXVH µSROLFLHV DUH WRR FRPSOLFDWHG WR XQGHUVWDQG 7KH RQO\
VROLGWKLQJWKHPDQLQWKHVWUHHWFDQMXGJHRQLVWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VUHFRUG¶105  
Personal economics, simplicity, and comparison therefore encapsulated the design of many 
&RQVHUYDWLYHSRVWHUVDQGZHUHHYLGHQWLQWKHSDUW\¶VSUH-election campaign, launched during 
the summer of 1969, the first example of which featured a family and the effect of Labour 
taxation.106 No example survives, but The Times described it as showing a family surrounding 
D FDU ZLWK WKH DFFRPSDQ\LQJ ZRUGV µ7KLV IDPLO\ SD\V WRR PXFK WD[¶ DERYH WKH VORJDQ
µ%ULWDLQZRXOGEHEHWWHURIIZLWKWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHV¶107 It evoked ± possibly deliberately ± the 
SDUW\¶V IDPRXV  /,)(¶6 %(77(5 poster, the difference being that had showed the 
positive impact of a Conservative government on family life: its 1970 equivalent illustrated 
the harm allegedly done by a Labour in office.  
Household finance took centre stage again in the µ LQ \RXU SRFNHW LV QRZ ZRUWK¶ poster 
[Figure 4.3]. This example, however, DSSURSULDWHG:LOVRQ¶VLQIDPRXVWHOHYLVLRQVWDWHPHQWRQ
19th June 1967 that the devaluation of sterling would not harm domestic standards of 
living.108 Wilson had been heavily criticised for the move, with Barbara Castle thinking it 
PDGHWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHUORRNHGWRRµFRPSODFHQW¶3LPORWWGHVFULEHG it DVDµSXEOLFUHODWLRQV
GLVDVWHU¶109 Conservatives used the discredited phrase as a stick with which to beat the Prime 
Minister.  Heath and his colleagues constantly attacked Wilson with his own words as did 
their supporters in the press.110 As late as May 1970, Sir Michael Fraser, the Deputy Party 
&KDLUPDQDUJXHGµWKHLQ\RXUSRFNHW¶VKRXOGEHRQHRIµDIHZNH\SKUDVHVIRUFRQVWDQWXVH
LQ VSHHFKHV¶111 Indeed LWZDVD VWDSOH OLQHRI+HDWK¶VFDPSDLJQRUDWRU\ WR IRUFH:LOVRQ¶V
words into the political vernacular.112 ,ISRLQWLQJWRRQHRI/DERXU¶VELJHFRQRPLFGLVDVWHUV
µ7KH LQ\RXSRFNHW¶DOVRUDLVHGTXHVWLRQVDERXW:LOVRQSHUVRQDOO\ ILUVWO\EHFDXVHKHZDV
so associated with trying to maintain the value of sterling but also because the speech 
suggested he was unwilling to tell the unvarnished truth.  
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In December 1969, Central Office produced a 48-sheet poster featuring the slogan, due to run 
from February to March 1970. 113 This was however just one part of a wider Conservative 
campaign that hammered home the message that Wilson and Labour had undermined the 
SHRSOH¶VSXUFKDVLQJSRZHU7KHGHVLJQ>@HPSOR\HGWKHWURSHRIRYHUODLGFDUGVHDFKZLWK
a lower value. When all were seen together, they revealed the falling value of sterling. The 
red figures on the top cards give them a prominence, introducing a note of danger, as well as 
visually linking them to other Conservative posters.  Red, of course, was also associated both 
with Labour and with debt. 
Other conservative posters in this suite [Figures 4.16-4.19@ KLJKOLJKWHG /DERXU¶V µEURNHQ
SURPLVHV¶ E\ FURVVLQJ WKURXJK µWKH SURPLVH¶ DQG ZULWLQJ WKH µWUXH¶ ILJXUH LQ UHG  7KH
corrections suggested a later modification, as if the poster has been graffitied following its 
display. It was a design that aimed to suggest a new authorial voice, one beyond the limits of 
DQ\ SDUW\ -XVW DV 6RQMD 1HHI KLJKOLJKWV JUDIILWL¶V SRZHU WR VSHDN EDFN DQG UHVWUXFWXUH WKH
posters faux graffiti suggested that the message came not from the Conservatives but from the 
people.114  
By showing the graffiti-VW\OHµFRUUHFWLRQV¶ LQQXPHULFDO WHUPVWKHSRVWHUVDGKHUHGWR a well-
established tradition. Numbers had been central to Victorian and Edwardian visual 
communication. The use of numbers grew during the twentieth century, if only because they 
are a useful device to close down any debate.115 ,QXVLQJILJXUHVWRLOOXVWUDWH/DERXU¶VLPSDFW
on personal finances, these posters presented a partisan argument as irrefutable fact, one that 
FRQGHPQHG /DERXU¶V FRPSHWHQFH116 But the posters went a step further, not only did they 
µSURYH¶/DERXU¶VIDLOXUHWKHLUXVHRIJUDIILWLIXUWKHUYDOLGDWHGWKHFODLP 
1RWDOOSRVWHUVWKDWDVNHGWKHSXEOLFWRµ5HPHPEHU/DERXU¶V%URNHQ3URPLVHV¶XVHGfigures. 
The slogan was a common watchword one intended to suggest that Labour could not be 
trusted, that the politics of White Heat had promised much but delivered little. The 
Conservatives most widely used poster during the campaign also featured the slogan, this 
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time above an image of waste paper basket [Figure 4.20@ RYHUIORZLQJ ZLWK /DERXU¶V IDOVH
guarantees. 
Labour reacted with a poster of its own, another example of posters being not just static 
objects but active participanWVLQDQRQJRLQJFRQYHUVDWLRQ8VLQJ$OGULGJH¶VFOD\ILJXUHVIRUD
second time, Labour released a leaflet showing Heath and his colleagues stuffed into the 
same wastepaper basket depicted in the Conservative poster [Figure 4.21]. David Lyons told 
The Times WKDW µ,W VHHPV WR XV WKH ORJLFDO HQG RI WKH FDPSDLJQ¶ +H ZHQW RQ µ7KH
<HVWHUGD\¶V0HQFDPSDLJQZDVJRLQJLQWRDSRVLWLYHSKDVHEXWWKHQWKH7RULHVVWDUWHGWKHLU
wastepaper basket campaign. This seemed the logical comment to us it just came out in 
conveUVDWLRQ¶117 The leaflet used both the iconography of the bin and the verbal suggestion 
of broken promises to counteract Conservative propositions. Each point of the leaflet began 
µ7KH\SURPLVHG¶DQGHQGHGE\ UHWXUQLQJ WRWKHWKHPHRI µ<HVWHUGD\¶V0HQ¶DUJXLng it was 
WKH\ZKRµEURNHWKHLUSURPLVHVODVWWLPH7KHVHVDPHPHQZRXOGLQRWKHUZRUGVEUHDNWKHLU
SURPLVHV JLYHQ WKH FKDQFH¶118 Notably, the sinister figures of <(67(5'$<¶6 0(1 now 
appeared emasculated and absurd.     
This spat pointed toward another important aspect of both campaigns. The parties attacked 
HDFKRWKHUOHVVRQLGHRORJLFDOJURXQGVDQGPRUHRQHDFKRWKHUV¶FRPSHWHQFHWRPDQDJHWKH
country and trustworthiness to deliver on their promises. When David Wood of The Times 
reported of Y(67(5'$<¶6 MENKHZURWHµ7KH7UDQVSRUW+RXVH&RPPLWWHHDUJXHGWKDWWKH
situation is now analogous to an ousted board of directors attempting a new takeover of a 
business and that is its therefore fair to remind shareholders of their record in 
PDQDJHPHQW¶119 Whether it ZDV/DERXU¶VµERDUGRIGLUHFWRUV¶DQGµVKDUHKROGHUV¶RU*HRIIUH\
7XFNHU¶VZLVKWRPDNH&HQWUDO2IILFHDPRUHFRPPHUFLDORUJDQLVDWLRQRUWKHH[WHQVLYHXVH
of figures in the billboard campaign the language of politics and the language of businesses 
appeared increasingly to mesh. 
In the debate about who was best to able to manage the economy, +HDWK¶VLPDJHZDV± in 
contrast to that of Wilson ± largely absent. &HUWDLQO\WKH/HDGHURIWKH2SSRVLWLRQ¶V public 
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image was less popular and less populist than the PULPH 0LQLVWHU¶V120 Many within the 
SDUW\ GHEDWHG RQ +HDWK¶V DELOLW\ WR UHODWH WR WKH YRWHUV RQH ORFDO &RQVHUYDWLYH DFWLYLVW
HFKRHGWKHYLHZVRIPDQ\MRXUQDOLVWVDQGIHOORZPHPEHUVE\GHVFULELQJKLPDVµZHDN¶DQG
LQSRVVHVVLRQRI WKHSHUVRQDOLW\RIDµEODQF-PDQJH¶121 At the start of his career as leader, 
Heath had featured on billboards.122  By 1970, it was generally agreed that Heath was less 
popular than his party. 123  He undoubtedly believed he could win the election, but the 
declining use of his image on posters would have been no hardship. He was never keen on 
the use of his image in this way and loathed the whole idea of a slick professional 
presentation. 124 The Conservatives consequently produced only one poster that featured 
their leader [Figure 4.22]. As with Wilson, Heath appeared Baldwinesque, gazing with 
serious determination above the slogan For a better tomorrow vote Conservative. There 
was, however, less intensity. In part because Heath sat with shoulders turned slightly to one 
VLGH XQOLNH :LOVRQ¶V IDce-RQ DSSURDFK *LYHQ :LOVRQ¶V SHUVRQDEOH SXEOLF SHUVRQD DQG
+HDWK¶VDORRIQDWXUHWKHWZRSRVWHUVUHSUHVHQWHGVRPHWKLQJRIDQLURQLFUHYHUVDO  
4.3 Displaying posters in 1970 
The election had notably fewer posters than previous elections. Central Office produced 
138,090 in 1966 but only 31,583 in 1970; Labour produce 27, 750 posters in 1970.125 One 
UHDVRQ ZDV WKH SDUWLHV¶ FRQFHQWUDWLRQ RQ RWKHU IRUPV RI DGYHUWLVLQJ QRWDEO\ QHZVSDSHUV
However, it was also due to a focus on marginal seats, often occupied by aIIOXHQW µIORDWLQJ
YRWHUV¶/DERXUDQGWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHV LQ WKHRU\ UDQ µQDWLRQDO¶FDPSDLJQVEXW VXFKZDV WKH
FRQFHQWUDWLRQRQµPXVWZLQ¶FRQVWLWXHQFLHVVHDWVVDIHVHDWVZHUHOHIWXQWRXFKHG 
As Barber told the 1969 Conservative party conference it was µHVsential to concentrate 
expenditure wherever possible on the critical seats ± those 60 or 70 marginal seats held by 
/DERXU RU /LEHUDOV ZKLFK ZH PXVW ZLQ EDFN LI ZH DUH WR IRUP D JRYHUQPHQW¶126 The last 
chapter showed how the Conservatives had used posters to target specific seats in 1950, now 
the practice was far more intense. The Conservatives supplied the first fifty 16-sheet posters 
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free to all constituencies, but the critical seats were allocated as many at they could use.127 
During the period of the campaign Conservative Central Office provided grants to critical 
seats so they could maintain the billboards under their own election expenses.128 
The focus on specific seats left other constituencies neglected. Beyond a small handful of 
areas posters were virtually absent once the campaign proper had begun. Frank Monkman, of 
the advertising firm Poster Bureau, raised the problem with Geoffrey Tucker. Although the 
&RQVHUYDWLYHV LQWHQGHG WKH FDPSDLJQ WR EH µQDWLRQDO¶ WKH VKHHU VSUHDG RI WKH FUXFLDO VHDWV
meant it wDV LQ UHDOLW\ VHULHV RI LVRODWHG ORFDO FDPSDLJQV $W WKH FHQWUH RI 0RQNPDQ¶V
argument was the changing way in which the electorate saw posters. Just as it had in 1950 the 
Conservatives concentrated on specific constituencies but far more people were now seeing 
SRVWHUV LQ GLIIHUHQW ZD\V 7KH µPRELOLW\ RI HOHFWRUV LV EHLQJ FRPSOHWHO\ LJQRUHG¶ ZURWH
0RQNPDQµSRVWHUVDUHDPHGLXPZKLFKUHTXLUHVWKHDXGLHQFHWRJRWRLW ± it does not go to 
WKHP¶ +H VXJJHVWHG EX\LQJ XS VLWHV LQ QHLJKERXULQJ FRQVWLWXHQFLHV µ%ULghton should be 
posted to normal commercial advertising campaign strength to improve the campaign in 
.HPSWRZQ¶DQG%ULVWRO LQXQGDWHGWRLPSURYH6:%ULVWRO7KHUHVXOWRI WKLVZRXOGEHWKH
electors of Bristol and Kemptown would have increased exposure to SRVWHUVEHFDXVHRIµWKHLU
QRUPDO DQG QDWXUDO PRELOLW\¶ DQG WKH µLQFUHDVHG FRYHUDJH ZLOO JLYH ZKROH FDPSDLJQ EHWWHU
LPSDFWDQGFRYHUDJHZLWKLQWKDWDUHD¶129  
The problem Monkman highlighted ± that people had to travel to see posters, as opposed to 
television which came to them ± underlined the changing nature of the electorate. Many now 
commuted to work, often out of the constituency where they lived. Between 1950 and 1959 
RI%ULWDLQ¶VSRSXODWLRQWUDYHOOHGWRZRUNLQWKHLURZQYHKLFOHEHWZHHQ-1979 this 
had risen to 44.5%.130 There was a danger that the parties were now producing posters for 
people who could not see them.  
2XWVLGH PDUJLQDO FRQVWLWXHQFLHV WKH QDWLRQDO SDUWLHV DWWHPSWHG WR µILOO WKH JDS¶ RI ODUJH
posters by encouraging activists elsewhere to put up smaller examples. The Conservatives 
made this point vociferously through a series of election memorandums. Here the party 
cajoled activists and supporters to make a good display of posters and window bills, 
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especially on and in houses that IDFHGµPDLQURDGVDQGEXVURXWHV¶131 The call to use private 
dwellings came after the strengthening of laws against fly posting. A change to the Country 
Planning act in 1962 had further tightened the regulations that stated persons or organisations 
that posters benefited were liable for prosecution. This diminished the ability of local parties 
in non-critical seats to show large posters or swathes of smaller ones. Transport House 
reminded agents they were responsible for any indiscretions and that in previous elections 
agents had been invoiced for fly-posted bills and even visited by the police.132  
As changes in statutory law diminished local power, so too did the prevalence of centrally 
produced posters. Constituencies did still produce their own. These were often were of a 
much simpler design than even the simplest nationally designed poster. As well as lowering 
the voting age, the 1969 legislation had for the first time added party affiliation to the poll 
card. Despite this local posters appeared to function as they often had, linking person to party. 
-XGLWK +DUW¶V VLPSOH PDVV SULQWHG EORFN OHWWHU GHVLJQ FRXOG KDUGO\ KDve used fewer words 
[Figure 4.23]; its intention to get the candidates name in the public space. Even with the 
production of local posters central party organisations attempted to control their design. 
During the 1964 /HW¶V*R:LWK/DERXU campaign, local agents could add the photo ± rather 
oddly in the form of disembodied floating head ± and name of their candidate [Figure 4.4] to 
a pre-produced and pre-approved poster. The model continued in to 1970. One of the two 
7UDQVSRUW+RXVHSRVWHUVWKDWERUH+DUROG:LOVRQ¶VLPDJHFRQWDLQHGVSDFHIRUWKHDGGLWLRQRI
WKH FDQGLGDWH¶V QDPH WR EH DSSOLHG LQ WKH FRQVWLWXHQF\133 While a poster surviving in the 
CoQVHUYDWLYHSDUW\DUFKLYH LQWHQGHG IRUSHRSOH¶VZLQGRZV, includes space at the bottom for 
the addition of the candidates name in printed or even handwritten form [Figure 4.24]. 
4.4 Conclusion 
Before <(67(5'$<¶60(1ever went on a billboard Bernice Rhodes, a Labour Party worker, 
sat on the steps of Transport House to photographed holding the poster [Figure 4.25]. It is not 
yet clear if local or national press ever used the image. The fact that an official Labour 
photographer took the picture for syndication suggests the party believed that the poster itself 
might generate press attention. This minor event spoke of the changing role the medium 
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would go through. As the next chapter shows, by the end of the century and into the next, the 
SRVWHU¶VODXQFKZRXOGEHFome as important as the object itself. 
The poster that Bernice launched remains one of the great curiosities of pictorial 
electioneering. As a piece of design it was striking, as a piece of politics it was disastrous; 
fURPWKHPRPHQW/DERXU¶VDGYHUWLVHUVFlaimed that the poster presented a positive message, 
WR WKH LQFOXVLRQ RI (QRFK 3RZHOO WR WKH SRVWHUVZLWKGUDZDO EHFDXVH RI :LOVRQ¶V IDLOXUH WR
inform his advisors on his planned election date. The contrast between a party who wanted to 
speak progress but whose own organisation was so rife with problems that it could not, was 
an instructive one.  
Moreover, the posters infamous slogan would come to haunt Wilson. Indicating the para-
SROLWLFDO UROH SRVWHUV ZHUH QRZ SOD\LQJ µ<HVWHUGD\¶V 0HQ¶ ZDV WKH VXEMHFW RI Guardian 
FDUWRRQLVW *LEEDUG¶V SHQ ,PPHGLDWHO\ DIWHU WKH HOHFWLRQ UHVXOW KDG EHHQ DQQRXQFHG KH
depicted a jubilant Heath sticking up the poster, but amended to include Wilson and 
colleagues [Figure 4.26]. More significantly, the BBC used the phrase as the title for a 
documentary shown in June 1971. While the corporation had intended to show how ministers 
adjust to opposition, some in the party interpreted the programme as an attack on Wilson.134  
The use of <(67(5'$<¶60(1¶VWKHYHUEDODQGYLVXDOV\PEROVGHPonstrated how discourse 
± in this case largely political ± was being formed intertextually. 135  Demonstrating the 
situation whereby parties, or other organisations, begin the construction of political language 
like <(67(5'$<¶60(1and how that language grows thereafter. With the mocking tone of 
the cartoonist, Labour supporters use of the slogan to attack opponents, and in turn those 
opponents use of the same words to fight back, explains how the poster entered the election 
vernacular, and more generally how these vernaculars are formed. 
The poster also provided a shot in the arm for a muscular form of politics. Potentially this 
return to attack had wider impacts. Aldridge sculpted the <(67(5'$<¶6 0(1 puppets 14 
years before Peter Fluck and Roger Law began the production of the Spitting Image, yet the 
similarities between the poster and the satirical television programme are striking. Spitting 
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Image grew from the satire boom of the 1960s and arguably, if it was as completely against 
politics as Peter Fluck claimed then so too was <(67(5'$<¶60(1.136    
The centrality of Wilson to campaign demonstrated his belief in the importance of his own 
personality to deliver elections. Posters remained a medium suitable for communicating 
directly between leader and people. Moreover, the appearance of Mary Wilson in a poster and 
during the campaign, foretold a higher visibility for the Prime Ministerial spouse in more 
recent British political culture such as Cherie Blair and Samantha Cameron.137 
There were fewer posters used in 1970 than previous election. Marginal seats saw most of the 
larger posters, a continuation from 1950. In this respect the 1970 poster campaign was a 
development of ongoing trends; smaller numbers of posters used in a small number of 
targeted seats. Learning from Conservative examples advertising expertise was now being 
more widely used by Labour, albeit in volunteer form and albeit by men prone to 
anachronistic behaviour. More significant, however, was the new visibility of the work these 
organisations and individuals did for the parties, which radically altered the posters function 
during elections. Posters no longer existed within a closed circle of party communication, but 
instead amongst a much larger more anomalous landscape.
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 )RU)OXFN¶VRSLQLRQVRISpitting Image and a discussion of the programme see (forthcoming) S. Fielding, A 
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5.0 The General Election of 1997 
 
 
Figure 5.1 NEW LABOUR NEW DANGER, 1997, Conservative Central Office, CPA, 
POSTER 1997-08. 
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The Labour party won the 1997 general election by a landslide. The new Prime Minister, 
Tony Blair, led a government supported by 418 MPs, the largest number the party had ever 
DFKLHYHG  -RKQ 0DMRU¶V &RQVHUYDWLYHV ZHUH GHFLPDWHG UHWXUQLQJ MXVW  03V, massively 
down from their 1992 total of 336. The Liberal Democrats under the leadership of Paddy 
Ashdown doubled their MPs from the 20 won in 1992 to 46.  
 Hoping his support would rally, and people would feel the benefit of an economic recovery,  
Major called the election as late as possible, and praying Labour might unravel, initiated the 
longest campaign in modern British history. After visiting the Queen on the 17th March to 
request the dissolution of Parliament, the election did not occur until 1st May.  Instead of 
helping Major, Pippa Norris concluded that this was a disastrous move as it created a 
µyawning news hole into which, like the White Rabbit, the ConVHUYDWLYHSDUW\ IHOO¶1 Norris 
referred to the stories of sleaze that rocked the Conservatives in the first week of the 
campaign, but in truth, since the election victory in 1992, problems had beset the party. 
6OHD]H DQG WKH 8QLWHG .LQJGRP¶V IRUFHG H[LW from the Exchange Rate Mechanism in 
September 1992 had undermined support. Moreover, Norman /DPRQW¶VGHFLVLRQWRLQFUHDVH
VAT in 1992 might have been born of necessity, but electorally it was a disaster.2 
In 1995 Major had faced a challenge to his leadership from the Secretary of State for Wales 
John Redwood. The Prime Minister was widely portrayed in the media as weak and 
ineffectual. Most famously the attacks came from the satirical television programme Spitting 
Image, but also by Steve Bell the Guardian cartoonist who regularly depicted Major with his 
shirt tucked into his Y-IURQWV µWKH EDGJH RI DQ HVVHQWLDOO\ FUDS VXSHUPDQ D PHWDSKRU IRU
XVHOHVVQHVV¶3 'HVSLWH%ULWDLQ¶VLPSURYLQJHFRQRP\± one reason Major had waited so long to 
call the election ± it was QRWHQRXJKWRVDYHKLPIURPEHLQJVHHQDVDIDLOHGDQGµZLPSLVK¶
leader.4 $V 3KLOLS &RZOH\ KDV VWDWHG µLW LV XQOLNHO\ WKDW any election campaign could have 
UHVFXHGWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHV¶5   
                                         
1
 P. Norris, 'The Battle for the Campaign Agenda' in A. King (ed.) New Labour Triumphs: Britain at the Polls 
(New Jersey: 1998) p. 135. 
2
 Butler and Kavanagh, General Election of 1997, pp. 2-3. 
3
 6%HOOµ,IRQO\ZHKDGNQRZEDFNWKHQ¶The Guardian, 1 Oct 2002, 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2002/oct/01/past.conservatives [accessed 25 Nov 2013] 
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 M & C Strategist Steve Hilton had called Major a wimp in a 1994 interview. It was a claim that came to haunt 
him and the Conservatives in 1997. Observer, 9 February 1997.  
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 3&RZOH\µ7KH&RQVHUYDWLYH3DUW\GHFOLQHDQGIDOO¶LQ$*eddes and J. Tonge /DERXU¶V/DQGVOLGH7KH
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As this chapter shows, these disasters dictated the nature of the Conservative poster campaign. 
Attacking Labour, the party believed, was its most efficient strategy; although, what form this 
assault should take was less easily agreed. The party could not decide whether it should 
concentrate on claiming Labour was dominated by the unions and committed to high taxes; or 
WR DUJXH WKDW /DERXU KDG QR VXEVWDQWLYH LGHDV RU WR DWWDFN /DERXU¶V OHDGHU IRU VD\LQJ RQH
thing but believing another.6 These themes had proved to be very successful in the 1979, 
1983, 1987, and 1992 campaigns, but by the mid-1990s, perceptions of Labour had changed 
considerably, meaning they did not quite have the same purchase as before.   
Tony %ODLU¶VDVVHUWLRQRIDµ1HZ¶/DERXU had suggested a radical shift from previous party 
incarnations. In truth LaboXU KDG EHHQ µPRGHUQLVLQJ¶ VLQFH LWV  GLVDVWHU 7 Indeed, the 
SDUW\KDGXVHGWKHµ1HZ¶VORJDQLQWHUQDOO\VLQFH 8 Following 1983, leading figures had 
sensed that change was required if Labour was to again govern. The process had begun under 
Neil Kinnock, continued under John Smith, and accelerated with Blair when he became 
leader in 1994. Under Blair, the party abandoned the totemic Clause IV; adopted a firmer line 
RQODZDQGRUGHUDFFHSWHGPRVWRIWKH&RQVHUYDWLYH¶VWUDGHXQLRQUHIRUPVDQGUHGXFHd the 
XQLRQV¶SRZHULn its own decision-making. All these changes were meant to attract suburban 
voters by removing those associations ZLWK WKH µKDUG OHIW¶ WKDW KDG OLQJHUHG VLQFH the early 
1980s.9 $ORQJZLWKWKHVHPDWWHUVRIVXEVWDQFHµ1HZ¶/DERXUDOVRVRught to recast its image 
through a new emphasis on communications.10 This had been tried before. In 1987 one party 
EURDGFDVWIRFXVVHGH[FOXVLYHO\RQ.LQQRFN¶VSHUVRQDOOLIHLQDXQLTXHO\µSUHVLGHQWLDO¶PDQQHU
becoming knRZQDVµ.LQQRFNWKHPRYLH¶:hile it made a positive impact, Labour still lost 
the election.11   
Amidst the apparent novelty of the 1997 campaign, posters remained one of the main means 
through which thH SDUWLHV WULHG WR LQIOXHQFH WKH HOHFWLRQ¶V outcome. Posters had never just 
been things on a wall, but the nature of political imagery was now so fluid that it crossed 
VHDPOHVVO\EHWZHHQDOWHUQDWHSODWIRUPV)LJXUHIRU LQVWDQFH WKHPRVWQRWRULRXVµSRVWHU¶
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7
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of the campaign, was not really a poster at all, but a newspaper advert, continually reported as 
being a billboard. The Conservatives did produce and display the poster in Central Office but 
it never formed a core part of the Conservative campaign.  12 A process which had started in 
the late 1960s and 1970, was now complete. The message, the method of delivery, and the 
method of construction all melded into one. When Tony Blair appeared in a Party Election 
Broadcast signing a poster that featured his own face, and complaining that was what politics 
was like now, it was clear that the posters role in election had become much more than 
simply communicating to people in the street.13   
The Conservatives had always spent significant sums on posters, and they did so again in 
1997. µ1HZ¶ /DERXU ZDV PRUH DGHSW DW IXQG UDLVLQJ WKDQ LQ WKH SDVW and much of its war 
chest was expended on securing billboard space. Unable to splash out on television 
advertising ± apart from the highly regulated party election broadcast slots ± the parties could 
spend what they wished to on posters. The chapter begins by detailing that spending and then 
shows how Labour produced its posters, arguing that this reflected the increasing 
FHQWUDOLVDWLRQ RI SRZHU LQ WKH KDQGV RI WKH OHDGHU DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK µ1HZ¶ /DERXU PRUH
generally. This control was in sharp contrast to that evident in the Conservative party. While 
it brought back Tim Bell, and employed Maurice Saatchi and his new advertising agency M 
& C Saatchi, the Conservatives could find no single combination of words and image with 
whLFK WRDWWDFN µ1HZ¶/DERXU ,QSDUW WKLVZas GXH WR µ1HZ¶/DERXU¶VRZQHOXVLYH QDWXUH, 
but the Conservatives did not help themselves with their lack of coordination between the 
various groups working on poster design.   
The making of the Liberal Democrat and Referendum Party poster campaigns are also 
assessed. The Lib Dems used their tiny budget for a campaign (based on one billboard site 
and poster trailers) focussed on separating themselves from the two larger parties. 
Referendum was not so constrained by a lack of money. In its attempt to win support for a 
referendum on BritaiQ¶VSODFH LQ WKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ WKHSDUW\ spent a large sum on press 
advertising, and used posters to legitimise the claim that it was a national party.     
7KH FKDSWHU WKHQ GHWDLOV WKH QDWXUH RI WKH WZR PDLQ SDUWLHV¶ SRVWHrs, which reflected their 
relative states. While the Conservatives struggled to create a coherent billboard message, 
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 For press reports of the advert beinJDSRVWHUVHH$&XOIµ'HPRQH\HVDGZLQVWRSDZDUG¶The Guardian, 10 
-DQIRUUHSRUWVRIWKHEHLQJGLVSOD\HGLQ&HQWUDO2IILFHLWZDVUHSRUWHGO\GLVSOD\HGLQWKH&KDLUPDQ¶V
RIILFHVHH5'RUHµ0DZKLQQH\ZLOOILJKWGLUW\¶Press Association, 30 Dec 1996. 
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/DERXU¶V ZDV a notably cohesive message although both campaigns mixed negative and 
positive messages, albeit to different degrees. If Labour had any credible claims to novelty in 
1997 it was not found in its use of negative campaigning. Negative posters had dominated 
until the post-war period, when they largely died out, only to return after 1970. Work on 
American politics at least has shown that while academics debated the effectiveness of such 
campaigning, practitioners continued to believe it could win campaigns.14 µ1HZ¶ /DERXU¶V
use of such tactics, despite its enormous poll lead over the Conservatives, betrayed an 
insecurity at the highest echelons of the party command, but also the traditional nature of 
ZKDW%ODLUSURPLVHGZRXOGEHDµQHZSROLWLFV¶XQGHUKLVOHDGHUVKLS15  
5.1 Producing posters in 1997 
During the campaign, the Conservatives spent £13.1 million in total on advertising and £10.9 
million of WKLVRQSRVWHUVµ1HZ¶/DERXU¶VSRVWHUFDPSDLJQZDVWKHFRVWOLHVWWKHSDUW\
had ever produced. Labour spent £7.3 million total on advertising and of that £5.9 million on 
posters.16 That the parties spent 83 per cent and 81 per cent of their respective advertising 
budgets on billboards highlighted that both thought poster communication important. This 
represented a shift from previous elections as the focus of spending in 1997 moved from 
press to poster advertising. The same scholar who wrote in 1990 that press advertising had 
µHFOLSVHG¶SRVWHUVZDVIRUFHGWRFRQFHGHRIWKDWWKHµDGYHUWLVLQJEDWWOHKDVPRYHGDZD\
IURPQHZVSDSHUVWRZDUGVSRVWHUVLWHV¶17 Billboard advertising, as this thesis has shown, has 
risen and fallen from campaign to campaign. Conservatives turned to the billboard due to the 
nature of their campaign financing, which came in piecemeal and built towards the ends, 
allowing much expenditure on billboards late into the campaign.18 To some extent the same 
was true for Labour, a major donation by Matthew Harding allowed for the purchase of 
billboard space. However, it was also true that Labour was using posters specifically to 
FHPHQW WKHLU µQHZ¶ LPDJH LQ WKHHOHFWRUDWHV¶H\H$V WKHSODQQLQJ IRU WKHSRVWHUFDPSDLJQV
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$0HWD-Analytic 
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15
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demonstrates, /DERXU¶V PHWKRG WRSURGXFHGHVLJQVDQGFDPSDLJQVZDVVWUXFWXUHGDQGEXLOW
within a grander plan. The Conservatives, meanwhile, was more haphazard.   
µ1HZ¶/DERXUDQGIRFXVJURXSV 
/DERXU¶V SRVWHUV IRUPHG MXVW RQH SDUWRI D EURDGHU FDPSDLJQ WR GHmonstrate that the party 
could be trusted with government. Their production relied much less on outside advertising 
expertise than had been the case in previous elections, and much more on party employees 
whose work was informed by focus group testing. Change was also evident in the location 
from where the party ran the election. In September 1995 its campaign directorate moved to a 
QHZ µPHGLD FHQWUH¶ 19  Two floors of Millbank Tower, Westminster, accommodated staff 
ZRUNLQJ LQDJLDQWRSHQSODQµZDUURRP¶ WKereby changing the dynamic through which the 
party produced all its communications. Senior staff and advertising officials worked in this 
vast space, which meant they could quickly discuss and produce posters.  
The three men ultimately responsible for LaboXU¶V FDPSDLJQ 7RQ\ %ODLU WKH 6KDGRZ
Chancellor Gordon Brown and Hartlepool MP Peter Mandelson, all worked out of Millbank. 
In theory, they all had to sign off poster designs before production, though in practice this did 
not always occur. Having started RXW DV /DERXU¶V &RPPXQLFDWLRQ 'LUHFWRU LQ  EHIRUH
entering the Commons, 0DQGHOVRQ¶VH[SHULHQFHRIZRUNLQJRQcampaigns was extensive. He 
was Head of Election Planning and /DERXU¶VFKLHIµVSLQGRFWRU¶DWHUPWKDWWKHPHGLDEHFDPH
obsessed with during the campaign. 20  Others similarly labelled (and with input into the 
SDUW\¶V SRVWHU SURGXFWLRQ LQFOXGHG $OLVWDLU &DPSEHOO %ODLU¶V 3UHVV 6HFUHWDU\ DQG IRUPHU
political editor of the Daily Mirror DQG 'DYLG +LOO WKH SDUW\¶V &KLHI 0HGLD 6SRNHVPDQ21 
Throughout its existence New Labour were criticised for their use of special advisors.22 While 
Campbell was a Blair appointment ± KHFODLPHGWRKDYHGHYLVHGWKHµ1HZ¶/DERXUVORJDQ ±, 
+LOO D IRUPHU 'LUHFWRU RI &DPSDLJQV KDG VSHQW WZHQW\ \HDUV DV 5R\ +DWWHUVOH\¶V SROLWLcal 
advisor. Philip Gould was another figure with a long association with Labour. An advertising 
executive and polling expert, Mandelson had appointed Gould in 1985 to advise the party on 
creating a new image. He had helped form the Shadow Communications Agency, a group of 
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3HWHU0DQGHOVRQWKHPLGZLIHWR1HZ/DERXU¶The Observer, 25 February 1996. 
21
 µBehind every successful politician there is a... VSLQGRFWRU/DERXU¶The Guardian (1959-2003); 18 
September 1995. 
22
 )LHOGLQJµ/DERXU¶VSDWKWRSRZHU¶S 
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advertising and marketing executives who advised Kinnock on strategy.23  It was Gould who 
HPSKDVLVHG WKH QHHG WR FKDQJH /DERXU¶V LPDJH LQ QRWKLQJ OHVV WKDQ D µSROLWLFDO
FRPPXQLFDWLRQVUHYROXWLRQ¶24  
 
There was significant mix of expertise in this group from advertising, from parliament, and 
from journalism. Gould had formed his own advertising firm in 1981, and sold it a year later 
before opening a political consultancy in 1986. Mandelson, having worked on Labour 
campaigns since 1985, was well versed in all forms of political communication; the same 
could be said for David Hill. And despite having come from a background of journalism 
$OLVWDLU&DPSEHOORQWKHVXEMHFWRIDGYHUWLVLQJµFRQVLGHUHGKLPVHOIDQH[SHUW¶25 Added to this 
pool of was the agency the party employed to manage its campaign, Boase, Massimi, Pollitt 
(BMP DDBZKLFKHQMR\HGDORQJHVWDEOLVKHGUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK/DERXU,WZDV%03¶V&KLHI
Executive, Chris Powell, who in 1972 had replaced David Kingsley as an advisor on 
advertising to Wilson. Powell had gone on to play a central part in the Shadow 
Communications Agency. Despite these ties, not everyone was happy with appointment of 
BMP DDB, WKLQNLQJ LW WRRVPDOO WRKDQGOH WKHSDUW\¶VFRQWUDFW26 Indeed, at times the party 
did turn to a larger agency, with former Tory agency Saatchi & Saatchi producing a number 
of slogans. 27  While no longer run by the Saatchi brothers, Saatchi and Saatchi was 
V\QRQ\PRXVZLWK7KDWFKHU¶VHOHFWLRQYLFWRULHV/DERXU¶VXVHRI WKH ILUPIXUWKHUV\PEROLVHG
how the party had changed under Blair.    
With Labour using the advice of another agency and the core of advertising expertise already 
extant in the party, it is perhaps unsurprising that BMP DDB was described by David Butler 
and Dennis Kavavangh as having µVXERUGLQDWH VWDWXV¶ 28   There was, however, a further 
reason why the agency was sidelined: Labour had gone through a revolution in its use of 
focus group testing. Kinnock and Smith had shown an interest in the method, but it was under 
%ODLU WKDW /DERXU¶V Xse of the technique increasingly dictated party strategy. Group testing 
also dictated SRVWHUGHVLJQ,WFHUWDLQO\VKDSHG*RXOG¶VLGHDVRQKRZ/DERXUVKRXOGVWUXFWXUH
its message, and project its image. Labour used focus group testing to shape the party 
message, using the qualitative data to hone the party message  In the three years leading up to 
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the election Gould conducted one group-test a week: during the six and half weeks of the 
campaign proper, he held them six nights a week. 29 Travelling to various front rooms in a 
QXPEHURIWRZQV*RXOGOLVWHQHGDUJXHGDQGFKDOOHQJHGWKHHOHFWRUDWHV¶RSLQLRQVXVLQJWKH
JURXSVWRµKHDUGLUHFWO\WKHYRWHUV¶YRLFHV¶  
*RXOG¶V ILQGLQJV ZHQW WR 0DQGHOVRQ &DPSEHOO DQG RWKHUV DQG XOWLPDWHO\ WR %03 DDB, 
which used it to produce poster designs that Gould then took back to the groups for comment. 
Subject to their views, the posters were then sent to Blair or Brown for final approval. Focus 
groups saw every one RI /DERXU¶V posters produced during the campaign.30 In this manner, 
poster production became a closed circle. Focus group testing also recast the role of the 
politician and the advertising executive in the production of billboard communication. Prior 
claims from both RINQRZLQJKRZEHVWWRµVSHDN¶WRWKHSHRSOH, were suddenly negated by the 
input of the people.   
As with any campaign, however, QRWHYHU\WKLQJUDQVPRRWKO\&DPSEHOO¶VILUPEHOLHI LQKLV
ability to produce effective advertising meant he became annoyed when decisions were made 
in his absence.31 There were also problems caused by the enmity between Mandelson and 
Brown. The former wrote in his memoirs of an instance in 1996 when the organisation had 
produced the designs for a poster claiming the Conservatives would put VAT on food. While 
Blair had approved the poster, Brown refused to formally respond, with Ed Miliband, 
%URZQ¶V DLGH HYHQWXDOO\ UHSRUWLQJ KLV ERVV WKRXJKW SRVWHU WRR QHJDWLYH +RZHYHU DV
Mandelson never received a formal word from Brown on the subject he felt able to launch the 
poster as it stood.32 Personal antagonisms and individual arrogance could still play a part in 
even this most closed and controlled campaign.  
5.1.2 Conservative organisation 
Appointed in 1995, Conservative Party Chairman Brian Mawhinney seemed to have made a 
strong start to WKH UROH E\ LPPHGLDWHO\DSSRLQWLQJ0	&6DDWFKL WR UXQ WKHSDUW\¶V HOHFWLRQ
FDPSDLJQ0DXULFHDQG&KDUOHV6DDWFKLKDGIRUPHG0	&IROORZLQJDVKDUHKROGHUV¶UHYROWDW
Saatchi & Saatchi, the company they founded in 1970 and which had enjoyed a close 
relationship with the Conservatives since before the 1979 election. Indeed, before the 
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&RQVHUYDWLYHVFRXOGDSSRLQW0	&WKH\KDGWREX\RXW6DDWFKL	6DDWFKL¶VFRQWUDFWZLWKWKH
party for £1 million.33 The move demonstrated the party¶V faith LQ 0DXULFH¶VDELOLW\ WR help 
them win elections. Mawhinney placed similar faith in other old hands too, bringing in Tim 
%HOO DQRWKHU ILJXUH DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK WKH SDUW\¶V VXFFHVV LQ WKH V, to advise on the 
campaign.34 
While this team may have won elections before, the Conservatives and their opposition were 
now very different beasts. Conservative posters produced between 1979-92 were premised on 
a clear binary separation between Conservative and Labour over important policy issues. For 
example, the 1983 poster FOOT PUMP. [Figure 5.2] DWWDFNHG /DERXU¶V HFRQRPLF SROLF\
ZKLOH DOVR VDWLULVLQJ LWV OHDGHU 0LFKDHO )RRW¶V RUDWRULFDO VW\OH ZKLFK XQOLNH WKH
&RQVHUYDWLYHV¶ SODFHG MRE FUHDWLRQ EHIRUH SULFH VWDELOLW\ )LVFDO µLUUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶ ZDV RQH
way of attacking Labour, that the party ZDV µZHDN¶ RQ GHIHQFH DQRWKHU 7he 1987 poster 
/$%285¶6 32/,&< 21 $506 [Figure 5.3], which mocked its commitment to unilateral 
nuclear disarmament, EHLQJDFDVHLQSRLQW/DERXU¶VVWDQFHRQWKHVHDQGPDQ\RWKHULVVXHV
had, however, changed since these posters had been produced. The Conservatives were now 
faced with an opposition in much closer accord with the majority of public opinion and their 
own position. Indeed, RQHRIWKHPDLQUDWLRQDOHV IRUµ1HZ¶/DERXUZDVWRGHPRQVWUDWHWKDW
Labour had completely changed since the 1980s.35  
By 1997, many key voters believed that Labour had been transformed under Blair, 
neutralising established avenues of Conservative attack. TKH SDUW\¶V UHVSRQVH WR µ1HZ¶
/DERXU¶VVXFFHVVZDVXQFHUWDLQDQGFRQWUDGLFWRU\PDLQO\EHFDuse its leaders could not agree 
ZKDWµ1HZ¶/DERXUDFWXDOO\ZDV0DXULFH6DDWFKLEHOLHYHGWKDWDVWKHSXEOLFKDGDFFHSWHGD
change in the party, so should the Conservatives and react accordingly. Yet the Chancellor 
Kenneth Clarke thought the party had not changed at all; while Major argued that while Blair 
PLJKWHPERG\WKHµ1HZ¶WKHUHVWRIWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQUHPDLQHGµROG¶36   
Such uncertainty revealed itself in tKH&RQVHUYDWLYHSDUW\¶VSRVWHUV7KHVORJDQµ1HZ/DERXU
1HZ'DQJHU¶ILUVWDSSHDUHGLQ-XO\and was illustrated with a set of disembodied eyes 
peering out from behind a curtain and a purse, suggesting that something dark and menacing 
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34
 A. Seldon, Major a political life (London: 1997) pp. 615-616. 
35
 S. Fielding, The Labour Party continuity and change in tKHPDNLQJRIµ1HZ¶/DERXU(Basingstoke: 2003) pp. 
96-97; Wring, The Politics of Marketing the Labour Party, pp. 124-126.  
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OD\XQGHUWKHµ1HZ¶H[WHULRU+RZHYHUZKHQLQ$XJXVW0DZKLQQH\%HOODQG&KDUOHV
Saatchi decided to reuse the eyes in a newspaper advert they moved from one interpretation 
RIµ1HZ¶/DERXUWRDQRWKHU%\JLYLQJ%ODLUGHPRQH\HVµ1HZ/DERXU1HZ'DQJHU¶ [Figure 
5.1] went from a nuanced attack on the party to a visceral personal attack on Blair. Given 
%ODLU¶VSXEOLc popularity it remained a bold decision to turn on him, the Conservatives had 
attacked /DERXU¶VVWURQJHVWUDWKHUWKDQZHDNHVWOLQNAs 'DQQ\)LQNHOVWHLQWKHSDUW\¶V+HDG
of RHVHDUFKVWDWHGWKHVORJDQµ1HZ/DERXU1HZ'DQJHU¶ZDVDSSOLHGLQFRQVLVWHQWO\37  
The decision to move from an attack on the Labour party to a direct attack on Blair was made 
at the last minute by Mawhinney, Bell and Saatchi, without reference to Major, reportedly to 
ODWWHU¶V annoyance.38 It was one example of an often testy relationship between M & C and 
leading Conservatives. While Mawhinney agreed with Saatchi on this occasion, it was widely 
reported the two did not get on.39 Like Labour, the Conservatives wanted to focus group test 
their posters but Saatchi was sceptical of their utility, claiming that the only real test was at 
the ballot box. 40  This reflected a wider belief amongst advertising professionals that 
committees did not produce effective creative copy.41 'HVSLWH6DDWFKL¶VDUJXPHQWVLQ0DUFK
1997 the party insisted that testing occur before any of its advertising was released.42    
0 	 & ZHUH RIWHQ IUXVWUDWHG E\ WKH XQZLOOLQJQHVV RI SDUW\ OHDGHUV¶ WR WDNH ULVNV 'HVLJQV
were vetoed or changed, thereby diluting their original message. Saatchi had intended the 
poster of a lion weeping a single red tear to be overtly anti-EU in tone, but Europhile Ken 
Clarke watered down the wording.43 The agency had also wanted to mount a more vigorous 
DWWDFNRQ%ODLUHYHQSURGXFLQJDSRVWHURIDJULQQLQJ7RQ\%ODLUZLWKWKHPHVVDJHµZKDWOLHV
beKLQGWKHVPLOH"¶. Major however, did not want to personalise the campaign, and vetoed it.44 
Given this context, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Conservative campaign appeared to 
lurch from one highly criticised poster to another.  
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/RQGRQ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S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 µ7HDUIXO7RULHVWRYHWQHZDGV¶Campaign, 6 March 1998. 
43
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5.1.3 Other parties  
The Liberals rented a billboard opposite Vauxhall Bridge in London upon which to display 
their posters. The party used billboard trailers to tour in marginal constituencies, something 
the Conservatives had done in the 1980s. The trailers allowed a poster to be towed behind a 
vehicle around selected constituencies (see below). Without the funds to conduct a major 
national campaign, the party spent only £100,000 on advertising. The party did employ an 
agency, Knight Leach Delaney, one with a record of helping the party, but it went bankrupt in 
September 1996.45 
  
7KH SDUW\¶V 9DX[KDOO %ULGJH VLWH FDUULHG RQO\ WZR SRVWHUV GXULQJ WKH FDPSDLJQ 7KH ILUVW
depicted Tony Blair and John Major as Punch and Judy. In an effort at integration, it was also 
a theme of the paUW\¶VHOHFWLRQEURDGFDVWDQGPDQLIHVWRODXQFK46 A Conservative poster from 
1983 used the same motif, depicting Michael Foot battling with Tony Benn [Figure 5.4]. 
While that poster highlighted the internal struggles of Labour, the Liberal Democrats used 
Punch and Judy in 1997 to suggest that they were the party to rise above the childish 
bickering of their two larger rivals. They thereby sought to position their own Party as apart 
from the Labour and Conservatives. The second Liberal Democrat poster of 1997 did the 
same, this time depicting Blair and Major as Tweedldee and Tweedledum.47 However, while 
both posters showed the Liberals to be different from their larger rivals the message of both 
was contradictory. While Major and Blair battled away in Punch and Judy battled, Tweedlee 
and Tweedledum were of course the same. 
By highlighting its difference from the two larger parties, the Liberal Democrats had turned 
to a well-used technique. ,Q %ULWDLQ¶V WKUHH SDUW\ V\VWHP often one party would show the 
similarities of the other two to demonstrate their own difference. As Chapter Two 
demonstrates, this was particularly common in 1929. The emergence of New Labour and its 
shift to the middle ground squeezed the Liberal Democrat position. It therefore made sense 
for the party to articulate its difference. However, given the Liberal Democrats and Labour 
had been in discussion since 1995 on how to defeat the Conservatives, and had decided to 
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FDPSDLJQV¶The Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/picturegalleries/uknews/7582239/Memorable-
Conservative-Labour-and-Liberal-Democrat-posters-from-previous-election-campaigns.html?image=6 
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abstain from attacking one another, the poster appeared to go against such an agreement.48 It 
was a further indication that posters as a mainly visual medium could cross lines other forms 
of communication might not.     
The Referendum party was the other party to produce posters in 1997, putting up candidates 
in 547 constituencies. Despite being a party it nonetheless had the feel of one of the 
Edwardian leagues that had played such an important role in the 1910 elections. To begin 
with, the party was relatively short lived; beginning in 1994 it ended in July 1997soon after 
the death of its founder (and funder) James Goldsmith.  Like the Leagues the Referendum 
party spent vast sums: during 1997, £6.7 million went on press advertising; just £440, 000 on 
posters.49 The disparity between press and poster advertising was a consequence of the pDUW\¶V
need to establish its presence quickly. They hoped a saturation of the print media would 
expedite this.50 The party also took the unusual step of sending out millions of videos to 
electors in marginal seats.  It was clear that the party thought spending on newspaper 
advertising was more important than on billboards, yet Sir James Goldsmith was keen to 
KLJKOLJKWWKHODUJHVVHRI WKH5HIHUHQGXP¶VSRVWHUFDPSDLJQ2QWKHth January Goldsmith 
launched, what he claimed was the largest nationwide poster campaign by a British party.51 
Quite what Goldsmith judged it against was unclear. While 1000, ninety-six sheet sites was 
impressive, Conservative and Labour would eventually dwarf the Referendum campaign (see 
below).  Emphasis on the size of the campaign was part of the SDUW\¶VDWWHPSWVWROHJLWLPLVH
its existence as a genuine electoral force. It was to some extent a symbolic measure, as to 
Goldsmith at least, national parties had national poster campaigns.  
5.2 The posters of 1997  
While the 1997 election campaign was long, the poster campaign was longer. Both the 
Conservative and Labour parties launched significant billboard efforts in 1996, building to a 
crescendo during the campaign proper. Come polling day both parties were emphasising the 
positive, but as the chapter shows throughout the campaign the lines between positive and 
negative were frequently blurred.   
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5.2.1 Conservative Posters  
The Conservatives began their poster campaign in May 1996 with a positive message, 
couched in negative language. Printed in white on a blue background the slogan YES IT 
HURT. YES IT WORKED [Figure 5.5] appeared on 1,500 billboards accompanied with 
statements LQVPDOOHUWH[WGHWDLOLQJKRZWKHJURZLQJHFRQRP\ZDVLPSURYLQJSHRSOH¶VOLYHV
The advert came at the same time Major told his cabinet that they must admit to past 
failures.52 By admitting to having made life economically difficult for people, Major hoped 
voters would move on and concentrate on the improving economy. Commentators however 
criticised the poster from the outset. 7KH2EVHUYHU¶VPeter Kellner questioned precisely what 
µLW¶ZDVLQERWKVHFWLRQVRIWKHVORJDQ$FFRUGLQJWR.HOOQHU%ODFN:HGQHVGD\KLJKHUWD[HV
and broken promises loomed large. 53  Although part satLUH .HOOQHU¶V DWWDFN KLJKOLJKWHG 
whether it was advisable for any party to remind electors about their past failures. Some 
claimed the campaign left the Tory faithful feeling guilty; others suggested the posters were 
arrogant.54 0	&6DDWFKLUHVSRQGHGE\VWDWLQJWKDWWKHLUUHVHDUFKµVKRZVWKDWSHRSOHdid not 
VD\WKH\ZRXOGYRWH7RU\WRPRUURZEXWZHGLGQRWH[SHFWWKDW¶DGGLQJµ7KHLPSRUWDQWWKLQJ
LVWKDWWKH\KDYHJRWWKHPHVVDJH7KLVLVRQO\WKHILUVWVWDJHRIDORQJKDXO¶55  
0	&6DDWFKL¶VFUHDWLYHSKLORVRSK\ZDVµEUXWDOVLPSOLFLW\RIWKRXJKW¶YES IT HURT. YES IT 
WORKED. with its two three word sentences reflected that ethos. Other Conservative posters 
used WKHWZRVHQWHQFHFRQVWUXFWLRQ7KHSDUW\¶VODVWRQHEHIRUHWKHHOHFWLRQUHOHDVHGLQ$SULO
1997 was %5,7$,1,6%220,1*'21¶7/(7/$%285%/2:,T [Figure 5.6]. Just as both 
posters used short sentences so both made prominent use of full stops. It was a definitive 
punctuation common to the posters designed by the Saatchis and Tim Bell in the Thatcher 
years. 56  Posters had of course always used punctuation to emphasise meaning. Asking a 
question required a sub-conscious response from viewers, while exclamation marks 
demonstrated strong feeling. The full stop attempted to close down an argument, suggesting 
there was nothing more to say on the matter. The full stop was perhaps appropriate to the 
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SHULRG ZKHQ 7KDWFKHU¶V SDUW\ FRPPDQGHG OHDGV RYHU /DERXU LQ NH\ SROLF\ DUHDV DQG WKHLU
posters simply reiterated that position. It was less certain it served the Conservatives well in 
1997. 
The Conservatives followed YES IT HURT. YES IT WORKED. with a series of posters 
centred on a pair of demonic eyes, referred to above. The first depicted the eyes staring out 
IURP EHKLQG D SDLU RI FXUWDLQV DFFRPSDQLHG E\ WKH VORJDQ µ1HZ /DERXU 1HZ 'DQJHU¶
[Figure 5.7] and in July 1996 went up on a thousand billboards.57 Over the next six months 
there were other iterations on the demonic eye theme, including NEW LABOUR NEW TAXES, 
[Figure 5.8] where the eyes stared out of a purse, and £700 [Figure 5.9] where a sinister hand 
was addeGJUDEELQJDIDPLO\¶VGLVSRVDEOHLQFRPH 
The eyes were those of a model, retouched and rotated 180ͼ by an M&C Sattchi artist.58 
Agency employee Steve Hilton ± ZKRZHQWRQWREHFRPH3ULPH0LQLVWHU'DYLG&DPHURQ¶V
Director of Strategy in 2010 ± had proposed tKH µ1HZ /DERXU 1HZ 'DQJHU¶ VORJDQ59 The 
vibrancy of the pupils was meant to alert and concern the viewer ± a pair of peering eyes was 
a common motif for death, or a demonic otherness in art and literature ± with red symbolising 
both danger and being the colour most associated with Labour. Perhaps not coincidentally 
New Labour-1HZ 'DQJHU DOVR HYRNHG *HRUJH 2UZHOO¶V Ninety Eighty Four ± which many 
Conservatives saw as an anti-socialist tract ± LQ ZKLFK %LJ %URWKHU¶V SRVWHUV ZHUH µVR
contrived that the eyes foOORZ\RXDERXWZKHQ\RXPRYH¶60   
While the eyes symbolised a demonic otherness, there was confusion about what they exactly 
represented in political terms. Commentators argued that by admitting Labour was indeed 
µQHZ¶, the Conservatives were allowing the opposition to dictate the terms of the campaign.61 
There was also some confusion as to whether the posters were an attack on New Labour in 
general or Blair in particular. 62  The publication of the Blair devil eye newspaper advert 
referred to above in August 1996 [Figure 5.1] suggested the emphasis had shifted from the 
former to the latter. Yet, if commentators mocked the melodramatic nature of the imagery it 
seemed that it did remind some memberV RI WKH SXEOLF RI µ2OG¶ /DERXU, with one ±
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channelling the Orwellian overtones ± VWDWLQJ WKH SRVWHU UHPLQGHG KHU RI µUHGV XQGHU WKH
EHG¶63  
Following the negativity of New Labour New Danger the Conservatives released AS 
PROMISED in November 1996 [Figure 5.10]. ,WLURQLFDOO\IHDWXUHGRQO\-RKQ0DMRU¶VH\HV
which peered out of his trademark glasses, forming part of a benign smiling face 0DMRU¶V
EHQHYROHQWIDFHFRQWUDVWHGVKDUSO\ZLWK%ODLU¶VVLQLVWHUSUHVHQFH8VLQJWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU as 
a positive figure was understandable. For while lampooned by satirists, and even with Steve 
Hilton referring to him at one point as a wimp, many voters respected Major far more than 
others in his party, and much more than his party as a whole.64 Whatever his limitations, 
Major was the Conservatives biggest asset. However, AS PROMISED remained a curious 
way to promote the leader. Phillip Bassett of the Times questioned whether the fall in 
joblessness had been significant enough to warrant an entire poster campaign. 65  Others 
PRFNHG WKH DSSHDUDQFH RI 0DMRU¶V H\HV66 Like Baldwin in 1929 and Wilson in 1970, the 
IRFXV RQ 0DMRU¶V H\HV ZDV Lntended to convey trust. Arguably, it failed in this respect 
EHFDXVH WKHNH\ WRKROGLQJ YLHZHUV¶DWWHQWLRQZDV WKHZKLWHVRI WKHH\HVZKLFKDUHEDUHO\
visible in the poster as Major is smiling. Furthermore, just aV RUDWRUV¶ RIWHQ UHPRYH WKHLU
glasses to emphasise a crucial point, doing so in order to remove a barrier between their eyes 
DQGWKHDXGLHQFH0DMRU¶VJODVVHVDOWKRXJKDNH\SDUWRIKLVLPDJHPD\ZHOOKDYHDFWHGDVD
barrier to establishing trust with viewers. 67  
Following the relatively upbeat AS PROMISED the Conservatives again produced a series of 
negative posters. The first in the series NEW LABOUR NEW FAILURE [Figure 5.11] featured 
a family of three, with the mother weeping a single red tear. Children and families, as has 
been shown in previous chapters, were a common feature in poster imagery. Here the mother 
is in distress and so therefore is the baby. Just as parties had traditionally promised to make 
Britain better for the young, the Conservatives implicitly suggested that Labour would make 
LWZRUVH,Q-DQXDU\6LQHDG2¶&RQQRUKDGIDPRXVO\VKHGDVLQJOHWHDULQWKHYLGHRIRU
the Prince penned number one hit Nothing Compares 2U.68 2¶&RQQRU¶V WHDU ZDV D YLVXDO
symbol for the pain and feeling of loss following rejection. The red tear in the Conservative 
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poster also represented loss, namely that of the next generation were voters to elect a Labour 
government. If a crude effort, survey data demonstrated that high proportions of viewers who 
saw the NEW LABOUR NEW FAILURE remembered its imagery: 74% remembered seeing 
the posters, and 54% recognised it as Conservative. The imagery of the despondent couple 
and child did not resonate with the public, however; 69% of those who saw the billboard said 
they did not like it.69  
Given such high levels of public recognition, the Conservatives continued with the red tear 
theme. In February 1997, the party released several versions of a poster featuring a lion 
weeping a red tear, one with the slogan NEW LABOUR EURO DANGER and another 
WKUHDWHQLQJµWD[ULVNXQGHU/DERXU¶70  7KH&RQVHUYDWLYH¶VZHHSLQJOLRQ± an allegory 
for British courage, and a reference to past glories ± was an attempt to make an emotional 
appeal that Britain would go into decline under an unpatriotic Labour government. 71  Its 
success at achieving this end was however negligible. Writing in Campaign, advertising 
executive Bill Mawhinney stated his son thought the poster was saying Labour was going to 
close down zoos.72 Mawhinney was being sarcastic, but Conservative MPs also complained 
their constituents failed to understand its meaning.73 Cartoonists were moreover merciless: 
Peter Brookes of The Times depicted Major-as-weeping lion, with the opinion polls 
plummeting in his glasses [Figure 5.12]. Indeed, such were its failings the poster was 
withdrawn after a month.  
When the Conservative campaign ended with %5,7$,1 ,6 %220,1* '21¶7 /(7
LABOUR RUIN IT. [Figure 5.6] the party returned to a type of poster associated with the 
success of 1959. Just as MDFPLOODQ¶VJRYHUQPHQWKDGSURPLVHGWKDWµ/,)(¶6%(77(5:,7+
7+( &216(59$7,9(6 '21¶7 /(7 /$%285 58,1 ,7¶ [Figure 4.2] so Major in 1997 
promised that the economy was in a fine shape and that Labour would do it harm. While the 
economy was recovering, the difference between Major and his predecessor was his inability 
to persuade the British public that life was indeed getting better. Ken Clarke even questioned 
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WR ZKDW H[WHQW WKH HOHFWRUDWH ZRXOG EHOLHYH %ULWDLQ ZDV µERRPLQJ¶ DQG WKRXJKW WKH YRWHU
associated the word with bust.74  
Without the belief that things were recovering, the Conservatives were lost. Speaking after 
WKHHOHFWLRQRQHSDUW\RIILFLDOVWDWHPHQWVXPPHGXSWKHFDPSDLJQµ:HZHUHWRRIDUEHKLQG
IURPEHJLQQLQJ<RXFDQQRWRYHUWXUQSHRSOH¶V LPDJHRI the last four years with a six-week 
FDPSDLJQ7KLVLVQRWDERXWZKHWKHUDORDGRISRVWHUVZRUNHGRUGLGQ¶W¶75   
/DERXU¶VSosters  
/DERXU¶V SRVWHU FDPSDLJQ EHJDQ LQ $XJXVW . An early poster TAX featured a warning 
triangle ZLWKWKHVORJDQµ6DPH2OG7RULHV6DPH2OG/LHV¶>)LJXUH@The poster was not 
a new attack, so Deputy Leader, John Prescott, and Peter Mandelson claimed, but a response 
to Conservative attacks.76  It was statement with an element of truth: the poster followed the 
µGHPRQH\HV¶ Lmages which Labour worried might be having some effect on the electorate. 
By responding to a poster with a poster, Labour demonstrated that the billboard wars of the 
early twentieth century still had a place at its end. Labour posters highlighted the 
Conservative record on tax. /DPRQW¶V LQFUHDVH LQ 9$7 HQDEOHG /DERXU WR SUHVHQW WKH
Conservatives as promise breakers. By attacking the Conservatives on tax rises, Labour could 
cogently claim to be the party of low tax. In doing so they undermined one of the key points 
that had made Conservative electioneering so strong in 1980s.   
Labour followed this attack with a group of more positive posters. In September 1996, Blair 
launched six designs HDFK RQH ZLWK D VLQJOH SRVLWLYH VORJDQ UDQJLQJ IURP µ1HZ /DERXU
New %ULWDLQ¶WRµ1HZ/DERXU1HZ6HFXULW\¶77 The posters went up on over 2,000 sites, the 
funding coming from a £1 million donation from businessman Matthew Harding.78 With such 
positive but vague SRVWHUVWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHVVWLOOUXQQLQJWKHLUµ1HZ/DERXU1HZ'DQJHU¶
campaign) suddenly appeared a reactionary organisation bent on pessimism. Blair 
emphasised the point when launching the posters in his Sedgefield constituency, claiming 
recent Conservative campaigns were µOLH DIWHU OLH YLROHQW LPDJHV GHVLJQHG WR Irighten, a 
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FDPSDLJQ LQ WKH ORQJ OLQHDJH RI XJO\ DQG FRUURGLQJ DGYHUWLVLQJ¶79In making the statement, 
Blair became one of the long-line of politicians to complain about the erroneous and 
dangerous message of rival politicians. And as with his predecessors Blair, in damming the 
message of WKH RSSRVLWLRQ FODLPHG /DERXU¶V RZQ PHVVDJH WR EH a paragon of truth. The 
campaign demonstrated the ability of the poster as a medium to change the nature of the 
political debate. Labour attempted to use the billboard to control or dominate a political 
moral high ground. In addition, the posters introduced the electorate to the idea of a pledge, 
which Labour would return to several times during the course of the campaign. 
By November %ODLU¶V FODLPV DERXW µXJO\ DQG corroding DGYHUWLVLQJ¶ KDG EHJXQ WR ULQJ 
hollow. Labour again turned to the billboards to attack the Conservatives. The new designs 
featured DWKXPESUHVVLQJGRZQRQWKHZRUGVµ\HDUVXQGHUWKH7RULHV¶ZLWKWKHVWUDS-line 
µ(QRXJK LV (QRXJK¶80 Labour took the sloJDQ IURP -RKQ +RZDUG¶V  FDPSDLJQ WR EH
Australian Prime Minister as it played well with middle-class voters; the very sort Blair 
believed held the key to Downing Street.81 That Labour had taken the slogan from a right 
wing Australian Prime Minister demonstrated the diverse sources from which it drew ideas. 
Polling evidence suggested the slogan had some traction with voters: an NOP survey 
GLVFRYHUHG WKDW  RI YRWHUV EHOLHYHG /DERXU¶V FODLP ZKHUHDV RQO\  WKRXJKW µ1HZ
/DERXU 1HZ 'DQJHU¶ KDG DQ\ WUXWK Wo it.82 In January 1997, /DERXU UHWXUQHG WR /DPRQW¶V
9$7 ULVH DQ LPDJH DSSHDUHG RI D KDQG EUHDNLQJ DQ HJJ DJDLQ FODLPLQJ µ(QRXJK LV
(QRXJK¶83 The egg was meant to signify that that the Conservatives intended to place VAT 
on food, something angrily denied by Kenneth Clarke, while Major called the poster a 
µGLVJUDFHIXOVPHDU¶84   
Despite the obvious scare tactics Labour deployed in some of its posters, many in the 
electorate did not see them like that. Following the election NOP discovered that 47 per cent 
of voters believed the Conservatives had the most negative advertisements compared to just 
15 per cent for Labour.85 This is because Labour tapped into generally held and very hostile 
views about the character of the Conservative government, reversing the process that 
underpinned the Saatchi posters of the period 1979-92 which had so vigorously attacked 
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Labour. By 1997 the boot was on the other foot: Conservative attacks seemed unduly harsh, 
HYHQ ZURQJ ZKLOH /DERXU DWWDFNV FKLPHG ZLWK PDQ\ YRWHUV¶ QHZO\ DFTXired political 
SUHMXGLFHV7KHUHZDVDJUHDWHUZLOOLQJQHVVWRDFFHSW/DERXU¶VDWWDFNVDVWUXWK7KLVZDVERUQ
out in the polling. One NOP poll questioned voters beliefs in two negative slogans, 
TXHVWLRQLQJ µZKLFK VHHPV PRUH WUXH WR \RX"¶ 2I WKRVH YRWHUV Vwitching to Labour 83% 
WKRXJKWµ(QRXJKLV(QRXJK¶ZDVPRUHWUXHZKLOHRQO\WKRXJKWWKHVDPHRIµ1HZ/DERXU
1HZ 'DQJHU¶86 Negativity was in the eye of the beholder, it was a suggestion that posters 
reflected and reinforced views rather than created them. 
At the end of February 1997 Labour released their most controversial poster to date, which 
featured a two-headed John Major. Reworking established themes, it featured the by-now 
IDPLOLDUµHQRXJKLVHQRXJK¶DQGWKHUHIUDLQRIWKHWD[ULVHVVLQFHWo make the point 
that Major said one thing but did another [Figure 5.14]. If this suggested a new low in the 
personalisation of the campaign, Blair had a vetoed a set of posters which depicted Major as a 
0U0DQFKDUDFWHUFDOOHGµ0U6SLQHOHVV¶87 While Blair was happy to attack the Conservative 
leader, he did not want to focus on his character, although claiming Major was a liar meant 
this was a nice distinction. Reports suggest the poster had a strong impact on wavering 
voters.88  
During the final weeks of the campaign, Labour turned their posters towards the positive. 
/DERXU¶V SOHGJHV ZKLFK KDG RULJLQDOO\ DSSHDUHG RQ D FDUG, now appeared as posters. The 
idea was an innovative one, originating from a Californian referendum campaign.89 Notably, 
a Labour campaign supposedly defined by novelty still utilised posters to help communicate 
its message.  The posters simplified the message. Whereas the card stated that the party 
LQWHQGHGWRµFXWFODVVVL]HVWRRUXQGHUIRUDQG\HDU-olds by using money from the 
DVVLVWHGSODFHVVFKHPH¶tKHSRVWHUDVVHUWHGµ&ODVVVL]HVZLOOEHVPDOOHU¶>)LJXUH@This 
was a demonstration of the poster fully working into an integrated campaign. The pledge was 
D FHQWUDO SDUW RI /DERXU¶V FDPSDLJQ ZKLFK WKH SDUW\ GHOLYHUHG DFURVs multiple types of 
communication but adapted to suit each one. The pledge cards aimed to persuade those who 
had bothered to read and engage with the text by providing a rationale for how Labour would 
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achieve the outcome. The posters simply spoke simply and briefly to the passer by. By 
producing the posters in this manner, Labour demonstrated a belief (inherent in all parties 
throughout the 20th century) that the poster worked best produced in a simple manner to 
communicate with those who did not what want or have time to be communicated with.   
3HUKDSV WKH PRVWQRWHZRUWK\DVSHFWRI/DERXU¶VSRVWHUFDPSDLJQ ± which reflected the 
character of its overall appeal to the British public ± was the role played by Blair. The 
Labour party archive contains three posters bearing the LabRXU OHDGHU¶V LPDJH 2QH
featured the future Prime Minister in a relaxed pose [Figure 5.16], with loosened tie. The 
UROOHGXSVOHHYHVUHIOHFWKLVDELOLW\WRµJHWWKHMREGRQH¶ZKLOHWKHWKURZQEDFNKHDGDQG
broad smile show someone approachable and easy going. The poster also promoted 
%ODLU¶VµLQIRUPDO¶DSSURDFKWRSROLWLFVZLWKWKHRSHQ-necked shirt. This was the image of 
a man from a new generation of politicians brought up ± as he stated to the Brighton 
conference in 1995 ± µRQ FRORXU WHOHYLVLRQ &RURQDWLRQ 6WUHHW DQG 7KH %HDWOHV¶90 This 
was not an image for the billboard, however, instead it was circulated by Labour 
headquarters to put up in regional campaign rooms and sold to party members.91 Such 
casualness was far removed from the grey faced, grey suited and buttoned up image of 
John Major popularised by the likes of Spitting Image and 7KH*XDUGLDQ¶VSteve Bell.92  
%ODLU¶VRVWHQVLEO\ \RXWKIXO FDVXDO DSSHDUDQFH KHOSHGGHILQH/DERXU¶V campaign; a key 
point of separation between the two party leaders.93 The other two surviving Blair posters 
contained similar characteristics. Figures 5.17 is the window card of a billboard version 
of that was almost the same. The difference being that the billboard image carried the 
VORJDQ ¶9RWH EHFDXVH %ULWDLQ GHVHUYHV EHWWHU¶ >)LJXUH @94 The images were graver 
than that of Figure 5.16, and similar to the portrait on the front cover of the Labour party 
manifesto, which in itself was a personal message from Blair. During the launch of the 
manifesto journalists commented on how serious Blair had been, the solemnity an 
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apparent reaction to focus group results, which revealed young women thought him 
µVPDUP\¶95  
%ODLU¶V ODFN RI VPLOH KDG KLVWRULFDO SUHFHGHQW 3DUWLHV KDYH FRQWLQXDOO\ XVHG SRVWHUV WR
construct a personal relationship between leader and people. The Blair posters were no 
different from those of Baldwin in 1929 or Wilson in 1970, or even Major in 1997 which 
implored the voter to trust that particular leader. Like those earlier examples there was 
little reference to the party Blair led: the viewer is invited to vote for Blair. It was an 
unsurprising that Labour adopted such a strategy: as with Baldwin and Wilson, the party 
sought to concentrate on the man to help deliver electoral victory.96 The Blair images add 
to the existing evidence that scholars have used to suggest that the Labour Prime Minister 
UHLQIRUFHG LI QRW DGYDQFHG WKH µSHUVRQDOLVDWLRQ¶ RU µ$PHULFDQLVDWLRQ¶ RU HYHQ
µSUHVLGHQWLDOLVWLRQ¶RI%ULWLVKSROLWLFV97 However, when considered as a whole with those 
posters cited earlier in this thesis that positively portrayed party leaders, the Blair images 
from 1997 were not innovations but a continuum of a already established language.  
 
 
5.3 Displaying posters in 1997 
 
The Independent claimed thaW µPosters KDYH PDGHWKHELJJHVWPDUNHWLQJ LPSDFW¶GXULQJ WKH
 FDPSDLJQ¶ DQG LQ LWV ILQDO ZHHN WKH &RQVHUYDWLYHV GLVSOD\HG   VKHHW SRVWHUV
while Labour displayed 2,600 of the same. 98 A MORI poll conducted at this time suggested 
that 70 per cent of voters had seen at least one party poster with 55 per cent having seen a 
Labour example and 53 per cent viewed a Conservative product. 99   Given that Labour 
produced many fewer posters than the Conservatives this was a remarkable result, suggesting 
its designs were more memorable or better situated, or both. 
Poster displays concentrated on key seats, as they had increasingly done since the 1950s. But 
there were attempts to extend beyond marginal constituencies. Labour, held a number of 
poster launches in holiday resorts. In August 1996 John Prescott announced that the party 
intended to start a leaflet and poster campaign in places favoured by British holiday makers, 
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WDNLQJKLVZDURQWKHµ7RU\OLHPDFKLQH¶RYHUVHDV100 Labour rented 10 billboard sites on the 
&RVWD%ODQFDDQGSURMHFWHGWKHVORJDQVµQRZRQGHU\RXQHHGDEUHDN¶DQGµVDPHROG7RULHV
VDPHROG OLHV¶ WR VRPHRIWKH IRXUPLOOLRQ%ULWRQVZKRKROLGD\HG WKHUHDQQXDOO\ The party 
ZDVDOVRNHHQWRDWWUDFWWKHYRWHVRI6SDLQ¶VVL]HDEOHH[SDWULDWHFRPPXQLW\.101  
It is questionable if this innovation achieved much. The MP and former actor Glenda Jackson 
launched the Spanish campaign, dressed in formal wear more suitable to the Commons 
Chamber rather than the beach. It was a move, which generated much derision. 102  The 
Conservatives had had similar plans, to at least display posters in airports, but abandoned 
them fearing they would alienate Britons trying to escape party politics.103 7HOOLQJO\/DERXU¶V 
experiment was not repeated.  
Lack of resources meant the Liberal Democrats also innovated to ensure their posters were 
seen by more than those who passed their single Vauxhall Bridge billboard, employing a 
mobile billboard that visited fifty key seats.104 The mobile poster had long history in British 
electoral politics. James Thompson highlights the use of vans in Edwardian Britain, while in 
the 1930s Conservative film vans would carry posters too.105 During the 1980s and into the 
1990s both the Conservatives and Labour used the vans. The low cost was offset by other 
problems. As the Liberal Democrats only sent the vans to places likely to vote for the party 
the poster campaign had a very local feel, which potentially, the advertising executive 
Brendan Llewellyn argued, reinforced notions of being a minority party.106 
While LDERXUKDGµODXQFKHG¶LWV<(67(5'$<¶60(1SRVWHULQin an attempt to gather 
press support, by 1997 parties routinely held set piece events in order to unveil their latest 
creation to journalists. This was a cost effective device. Media reaction to and reporting of 
posters meant that they could reach viewers who might never see the real thing.107 However, 
launches in 1997 often had a greater purpose. Rigorously stage managed, the launch itself 
became the message. Notably Labour unveiled its final series of posters at a country house in 
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Kent, with Blair and Prescott symbolically surrounded by hundreds of eager children, who 
each wore a t-shirt wearing the Britain deserves better slogan. Writing in his diary Campbell 
stated that he wanted to launch the posterVLQDµILHOGRGUHDPV¶+HZHQWRQWRVWDWHWKDWµ,
WULHGWRLPDJLQHZDWFKLQJWKLVDWKRPH<RX¶GKDYH0DMRUGHDOLQJZLWK+DPLOWRQ± or not ± 
and TB up saying he wanted a positive vision of the future, surrounded by these big bright 
posters doing just thaW,ORYHGLW¶108 The event was a novel act of political communication but 
one whose ostensible heart was the venerable poster.109  
5. 4 Conclusion 
The general election of 1997 did not represent a renaissance or resurrection in the poster as a 
form of electioneering. Rather it demonstrated that while the nature of British electioneering 
might change, the poster continued to develop alongside. Both Labour and the Conservative 
party placed money and faith in the role of the poster as symbolically important to election 
campaigning. But while thousands of posters went up in constituencies around the country, 
the posters other roles in the campaign demonstrated a new role.  
/DERXU¶V HQWKXVLDVWLF XVH RI IRFXV JURXSV WR LQIRUP LWV SRVWHUV UDLVHG TXHVWLRQV DERXW WKH
paUW\¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHHOHFWRUDWH6FKRODUVKDYHKLJKOLJKWHGWKDWWKHXVHRIIRFXVJURXSV
changed the relationship between party and people; claiming it as the point when policies 
become products and voters became consumers. 110  Blair did little to dispel such myths. 
'HFODULQJLQGHIHQFHRI/DERXU¶VIRFXVJURXSWHVWLQJµ6XSSRVLQJ\RXDUHUXQQLQJ0DUNVDQG
Spencer or Sainsbury or whatever it is, you will be constantly trying to work out whether 
your consumers are satisfied with the product that they are gHWWLQJ¶111 $FFXVDWLRQVRIµVHOOLQJ
SROLWLFV OLNH VRDS¶ ZHUH RI FRXUVH QRWKLQJ QHZ Focus group testing in 1997 did, however, 
diminish the power of advertisers in favour of the party. Testing reduced advertisers claims 
that only they had the expertise to translate the party message into a communication the 
public would easily understand. Focus group testing, especially the testing of posters, put this 
knowledge firmly back in the hands of the party. 
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A strong negative streak ran though the campaigns of both parties. As early as September 
1996 7KH*XDUGLDQ¶V0LFKDHO:KLWHKDGFODLPHGWKDWERWKSDUWLHVZHUHµVFUDSLQJWKHEDUUHO¶
with their various claims about each others future tax policy. 112  And yet, in a strong 
affirmation that posters affirm rather than change views, only the Conservative campaign was 
GHHPHG QHJDWLYH 'XULQJ /DERXU¶V ILQDO SXVK RQH RI WKH ILQDO set of posters contained the 
slogan that underlined the end of the cDPSDLJQµ%ULWDLQGHVHUYHVEHWWHU¶ [Figure 5.19]. During 
the launch, press attention fRFXVVHGRQWKHSRVLWLYHTXRWLQJ%ODLU¶VRSWLPLVWLF PHVVDJH WKDW
KHZDQWHGWRµULVHDERYHVOHD]H¶DQGµQRWUXQGRZQWKHRSSRVLWLRQ¶113 The affirmative nature 
of the campaign was only LQFUHDVHGE\%ODLU¶VRUGHUWRUHPRYHRIDOORI WKHWZR-faced John 
Major posters.114 Yet the message remained negative and very few commented. It was left to 
Daily Express cartoonist Hector Breeze to highlight the duplicity in the message [Figure 5.20]    
Posters played a central part in the campaign. While they had never been a static form of 
communication, as parties confidently and with great control transposed symbols and slogans 
across communication, posters were now part of a general fluidity of image that stretched 
intertextualy across the campaign. Notably the most notorious µSRVWHU¶RI WKH  JHQHUDO
election, WKH LPDJH RI %ODLU¶V GHPRQ H\HV [Figure 5.1] was actually a newspaper advert.115 
%ODLU¶V LPDJH WKH VLPSOH WH[W DQG GHPRQ H\HV PRWLI ZRXOG KDYH ZRUNHG HTXDOO\ ZHOO DV
DGYHUWRUSRVWHU7KHVDPHZDVWUXHRI/DERXU¶VPDnifesto cover, which could have appeared 
on a billboard. There was a transmutability of imagery, which in turn was a reflection of the 
changing patterns of political campaigning. Where as Edwardian poster artists constructed 
party posters from existing known symbols, in 1997 the symbol was often the message. 
%ODLU¶V µSOHGJHV¶ ZHUH QRW MXVW D V\PERO WR KHOS FRQVWUXFW /DERXU¶V FRPPXQLFDWLRQ the 
µSOHGJH¶ was the communication.  
Such conclusions mean a dramatic change in our understanding of the posters role in 
campaigns. The general election of 1997 demonstrated that it was becoming increasingly 
difficult to talk about posters as singular identities. This thesis has throughout located posters 
within a broader election campaign. And during those previous campaigns, it was always 
possible to identify a singular series of objects distinct from, but increasingly integrated into a 
wider campaign. Such was the way parties now communicated, unpicking the poster 
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campaign of any party as a distinct entity had by 1997 becoming an increasingly arbitrary 
process. The era of the intergraded campaign had truly arrived.   
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6.0 Conclusion: The Death of the Poster?  
 
 
Figure 6.1 BUILDING A FOUNDATION. WEARING IT. 2010, Labour Party 
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Faced with a flood of Conservative billboards in marginal seats, and no money to spend on 
KLVRZQFDPSDLJQ/DERXU¶VJHQHUDOHOHFWLRQRUJDQLVHU'RXJODV$OH[DQGHU03DUJXHG
µ$WWKHHQGRIWKHGD\LW¶VSHRSOHZKRZLQHOHFWLRQVQRWSRVWHUV± LWDOZD\VKDVEHHQ¶1 2010 
makes a fitting conclusion to this thesis. Not only did it mark a century since the apogee of 
poster use in Britain, the election of 1910, it was also the campaign when Alastair Campbell, 
FLWLQJWKHRQVHWRIµLQGLYLGXDOLVHG¶FDPSDLJQLQJDQGUHIOHFWLQJRQ%DUDFN2EDPD¶VYLFWRU\RI
µVRFLDOQHWZRUNLQJ¶LQWKHUDFHIRUWKH:KLWH+RXVHGHFODUHGWKDWWKHSRVWHUKDGILQDOO\
had its day. 2  
This thesis has charted the development of posters from the delirium of 1910 to the present. 
At its simplest level, it has attempted to understand and locate the role of posters, not within 
the long narratives of art or design history, but within the context of the election for which 
parties intended them. It has suggested that only by locating communication in the period and 
culture it was produced, by attempting to understand why and how such communication came 
in to being, can we properly grasp the nature of political communication. Only then is it 
possible to truly comprehend how such communication functioned and indeed what that 
might mean for our understanding of politics. In that respect, it is not just a study of posters, 
but an attempt to create a model for future studies of communication.   
In attempting this feat, what has emerged is a long thin analysis of a small part of political 
communication in Britain. Some of the wider conclusions from the thesis are drawn out 
below. But more generally what the thesis has shown, is that there is no grand narrative of the 
poster. There has been no lineal development where we can point to a far off point where a 
poster was one thing and which developed (if indeed this is the right word) to what we see 
now. If anything, writing communication history in this manner suggests that the grand 
sweeping terms often used by scholars of communication and associated with recent 
developments are too generalised and lacking the necessary nuance. There have been posters 
                                         
1
 The majority of the information about the 2010 general election comes from C. BurgHVV³7KHHOHFWLRQZLOOEH
ZRQE\SHRSOHQRWSRVWHUV¶«$GYHUWLVLQJDQG*HQHUDO(OHFWLRQ¶LQPolitical Communication in Britain, D. 
Wring, R. Mortimore, S. Atkinson (Eds.), (Hampshire: 2011), pp. 181-197.;  Alexander gave the statement 
during an interview to Alex Smith from the website Labour List on 23 March 2010, 
http://labourlist.org/2010/03/this-election-will-be-won-by-people-not-posters-the-douglas-alexander-interview/ 
[accessed 9 January 2014]  
2
 $&DPSEHOOµHas the political poster virtually haGLWVGD\"¶The Times, 22 February 2010. 
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produced seventy years ago where WHUPVVXFKDVµSHUVRQDOLVDWLRQ¶RUµSURIIHVLRQDOLVDWLRQ¶DUH
as applicable to those produced today.  
Of course picking out individual posters and using them to debunk accepted wisdom is 
ahistorical, and this has not been the attention. As just one type of communication, and 
produced in far fewer numbers than other forms, posters cannot speak for all. However, by 
studying communication in such depth, and by locating it within the landscapes for its 
intended viewers, the result has been a reassessment of wider conclusions about the change in 
communication. Because as the thesis has shown, for this communication at least, that the 
move from one point to another was not crescendo like. Instead, it was staccato and sporadic 
and in the long term at least unplanned.   
6.1 Mad Men 
Conservative, Labour, and Liberal Democrat parties all produced poster campaigns for the 
2010 general election. In order to produce these campaigns each party worked with an 
advertising agency. Labour worked with Saatchi & Saatchi. The Conservatives contracted the 
advertising firm Euro RSCG, but during the campaign turned to its old friends at M&C 
Saatchi to assist. The agency Iris produced a highly innovative group of posters for the 
Liberal Democrats. By 2010, the standard model for parties wanting to produce a poster 
campaign was to commission an advertising agency, or sometimes two. Such a system was 
according to Martin Harrop, a legacy of the Conservative association with Saatchi & Saatchi. 
:ULWLQJLQ+DUURSVWDWHGµ:KHQWKH&RQVHUYDWLYH3DUW\KLUHG6DDWFKL¶V LQ LWZDV
headline news. By the end of the 1980s it would have been just as big news if a party had 
FKRVHQQRWWRXVHSURIHVVLRQDOPDUNHWLQJH[SHULHQFHLQDQHOHFWLRQ¶3  
+DUURS¶VYLHZ EHWUD\HGDSUHVHQW-centredness this thesis has done its best to revise. As the 
preceding chapters have shown, as regards the production of posters, parties have habitually 
turned to professional marketing expertise, in whatever form it might come. During the 
elections of 1910 both the Liberal and Conservative parties turned to highly regarded 
professionals to produce billboard artwork. By employing John Hassall for instance, the 
&RQVHUYDWLYHV XVHG RQH RI WKH FRXQWU\¶V PRVW SUHVWLJLRXV FRPPHUFLDO DUWLVWV 8QGRXEWHGO\
the relationship between the Conservatives and Saatchi & Saatchi in 1979 was not the same 
as that with Hassall in 1910. However, the thesis has shown that as the advertising industry 
                                         
3
 0+DUURSµ3ROLWLFDO0DUNHWLQJ¶, Parliamentary Affairs, (1990) 43 (3), p. 277 
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developed from the individuals and small organisations of Edwardian Britain to the large 
agencies extant today, so throughout that period the Conservatives hired the most technically 
DFFRPSOLVKHGµDGYHUWLVHU¶ WKH\FRXOG ILQG6XFK ILQGLQJVGLVSXWHWKHZLGHVSUHDGQRWLRQWKDW
WKH &RQVHUYDWLYHV RU DQ\ RWKHU SDUW\ VXGGHQO\ µZRNH XS¶ WR DGYHUWLVLQJ DQG PDUNHWLQJ LQ
1978. 
/DERXU¶VGULIWWRZDUGVWKHXVHRIDµSURIHVVLRQDO¶DJHQF\ZDVPRUHFRPSOH[WKDQWKDWof the 
Conservatives. For much of the first half of the century Labour was a party of amateurs when 
it came to posters, with commissions generated through adverts in labour movement 
newspapers and personal acquaintances. Things had moved on by the 1960s, though there 
remained a strong resonance with this earlier way of doing things even into the 1980s. Just as 
WKURXJKRXW WKH WZHQWLHWK FHQWXU\ WKH &RQVHUYDWLYHV ZDQWHG µWKH EHVW¶ ZKHQ LW FDPH WR
advertisers, so Labour wanted people sympathetic to its own aims. For just as Gerald Spencer 
Pryse contributed work free of charge in the 1900s, so too did the professionals who 
constituted the Shadow Communications in the 1980s.4 If the party believed effective posters 
helped its campaigns, many in the party were uneasy about taking the commercial route. This 
was on grounds of cost but also because of what they perceived to be the advertising 
LQGXVWU\¶VDQWL-socialist ethos. Thus, when Labour appointed BMP DDB in 1997 it appeared 
as a more of a break with the past than it actually was: the chief executive of BMP DDB was 
Chris Powell who had worked with the party since 1972.  
7KHSDUW\¶VFKDQJLQJUROH 
Over the time period covered in this PhD advertising industry and its product has gone 
through a dramatic process of expansion and development. This change has quite naturally 
had an effect on the way posters are produced. Parties no longer work with one man, but with 
entire organisations who take responsibilities from designing the shape of the message, to 
planning how and when it will be disseminated to the public. Given this narrative, there has 
been a tendency to see parties as monolithic bodies who have latched on to a developing 
advertising industry that has helped deliver their message. This, of course is not the case. This 
thesis has shown that the way in which parties produce and approve posters has altered. For 
the Liberal and Conservatives especially, the process for approval has moved from bodies 
                                         
4
 The SCA worked anonymously for the party so as not to upset the Conservative supporting businesses that 
made up the day to day work of their career. Wring, The Politics of Marketing the Labour Party, (Hampshire: 
2005), 91-92 
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within the party structures to the very head of that structure. In contemporary politics, it 
UHPDLQV XQOLNHO\ D SDUW\ ZRXOG UHOHDVH D SRVWHUZLWKRXW WKH OHDGHU¶V SHUPLVVLRQ ,QGHHG LW
was not just David Cameron but allegedly also his wife who helped choose the image for 
Figure i.6.5  
Edwardian Conservative and Liberal leaders played no part in the production of posters. 
Central Office and the Liberal Publication Department assumed overall control of their 
communication and even then, both effectively contracted out the work to artists or 
advertising companies. Labour at this time remained an anomaly. Reflecting a lack of 
professional personnel, a sub-FRPPLWWHH RI /DERXU¶V 1(& ZKLFK LQFOXGHG WKH OHDGHU
discussed and selected poster designs. This situation did not much change in the inter-war 
period. SAFETY FIRST! carried an image of Baldwin but he played no role in its production.6 
As late as 1970, while the Conservative Director of Publicity, Geoffrey Tucker worked 
closely with Edward Heath, the latter showed no interest in communications.  It was only 
with Margaret Thatcher and her close relationship with Tim Bell that Conservative party 
leaders were beginning to monitor matters much more closely.  
The vetting of Labour posters remained the responsibility of one or other of its N.E.C 
FRPPLWWHHV XQWLO WKH µSUHVLGHQWLDO¶ +DUROG :LOVRQ VSOLW IURP KLV SDUW\ PDFKLQH LQ WKH ODWH
1960s. Wilson was undoubtedly more aloof than later Labour leaders would be, but he did 
nonetheless meet with the controversial artist Alan Aldrige before the production of the 
controversial YESTE5'$<¶60(1in 1970.  
7ZRUHDVRQVUHYHDO WKHPVHOYHVDVWRZK\WKHSRVWHUKDVDVVXPHGPRUHRI WKH OHDGHU¶V WLPH
latterly than at the start of the twentieth century. Certainly, the general centralisation of power 
in the parties explains part of the shift. 7 Decision- making is increasingly becoming the 
prerogative of the leader, and this includes the production of posters. Furthermore, posters are 
increasingly seen as more importance to campaigning, in regards the fact they are now more 
visible. Of all the many designs produced for the two elections of 1910, journalists 
commentated on the effectiveness of a small handful, notably Figures 1.7, 1.8 and 1.9.8 As 
                                         
5
 µ0HHW'DYHWKH
DLUEUXVKHG
SRVWHUER\7RULHVODXQFKSUH-HOHFWLRQFDPSDLJQ¶Daily Mail online, 5 
Jan 2010, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1240734/As-pre-election-campaign-steps-gear-meet-Dave-
airbrushed-poster-boy.html. [accessed 1 Nov 2014]. 
6
 Williamson, Stanley Baldwin: Conservative Leadership and National Values, (Cambridge: 1999), p. 37 
7
 5+HIIHUQDQµExploring (and Explaining) the British Prime Minister;, BIPIR, (2005) 7, pp. 608 and 609. 
8
 The Times, 1December 1910; Blewett, N., The Peers, the Parties and the People, The General Election of 
1910 (London, 1972). p. 313. 
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the century progressed, parties produced fewer designs, each becoming increasingly 
physically larger.  From the packed hoardings of Edwardian Britain to the large single 
message of the modern billboard, the poster is in a sense becoming more visible. This 
prominence only increased with poster launches, leading to their more habitual reproduction 
in the press and ± in the twentieth-first century ± circulation on the internet. Within this 
HOHFWRUDOFOLPDWHSRVWHUVKDYHFRPHWRGHILQHQRWMXVWDSDUW\¶VFDPSDLJQEXWWKHSDUW\LWVHOI
SAFETY FIRST was the first example of this process, but increasingly with single posters 
released and grabbing the media spotlight ± even if for only for short periods ± they can 
dominate the campaign. Given this status, it seems little wonder that leaders are increasingly 
moved to control exactly how posters communicate. 
6.2 The changing visual nature of the political poster 
Posters are entirely of the moment. They speak to an electorate, not as it is, but as political 
campaigners perceive it to be. And these perceptions have changed from election to election. 
This thesis has demonstrated that visual politics was not static. This section focuses on the 
broad development of the poster over the course of the study and then highlights how the 
thesis has informed our understanding of key visual themes. 
6.2.1 Development in design 
Compared to the posters of the 2010 election, those of 1910 are much more visually complex. 
In early posters colour, words, and symbols abound, adopted as they are from a great swathe 
of sources. Early posters provided far more information. A comparison between Tariff 
Reform Leagues WANTED A CHANGE >)LJXUH @ DQG /DERXU¶V BUILDING A 
FOUNDATION. WEARING IT. [Figure 6.1] shows that the former is overflowing with verbal 
and visual imagery. The artist A.B. White clearly believed the viewer would be able to 
translate the complexities of this message, including the dress of the two men, the oratorical 
stance of the working class man, the idea of Tariff Reform being a mass movement (a point 
made through the demonstration in the background), and the impact of Free Trade on 
industrial production. The 2010 poster is less visually rich, although this is not to say that it is 
simplistic. However, while viewers would have to known about the fuss generated by Figure 
i.6 (for which some commentators had ridiculed David Cameron as he allegedly wore 
makeup) to appreciate the pun, apart from knowing what Gordon Brown and Cameron looked 
like not much else was expected of the viewer.  
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Throughout the latter half of the century critics complained of DµGXPELQJGRZQ¶RISROLWLFV, 
of party communication becoming D TXHVWLRQ RI µselling¶ RI YRWHUV EHLQJ WUHDWHG OLNH
µconsumers¶. This began with the rise of television politics; the critic Milton Shulman 
claiming the 1970 contest was a question of choosing between the political detergents of 
µ2PR¶ :LOVRQ DQG µ'D]¶ +HDWK¶9 Posters had in fact started to become less visually rich 
during the inter-war period. Simplification was in part the result of party elites believing that 
the new mass electorate that followed 1918 and 1929 was incapable of understanding the 
FRPSOH[LWLHVRISROLWLFDODUJXPHQWµA vast number of the electorate have little inclination to 
reason out political questions for themselves¶ wrote Labour agent for East Leyton, A.E. 
Burgess, in 1921, µ7KH\DUHVZD\HGE\LPSXOVHVSUHMXGLFHVDQGFDWFKZRUGV¶10  
 
Change also reflected developments in commercial practice. Political posters reflected 
changes occurring in wider visual landscapeV7KHSDUWLHV¶DGRSWLRQRI photography killed the 
LQWULFDFLHVRIWKHGUDXJKWVPDQ¶VDUW7RDQH[WHnt, this simply reflected a greater awareness by 
parties of developments in communication. Despite the Conservatives adoption of 
commercial advertisers, as regards design, Labour often proved the most innovative. As 
historians have identified this was true RI *HUDOG 6SHQFHU 3U\VH¶V ZRUN EHIRUH DQG DIWHU
1910. 11  We saw further LQQRYDWLRQ ZLWK WKH SDUW\¶V XVH RI SKRWRJUDSK\ LQ  $ODQ
$OGULGJH¶V <(67(5'$<¶6 0(1 poster of 1970 might have been counterproductive, but it 
was novel. Into the 1980s, the party continued to look to art for inspiration. The 1987 The 
FRXQWU\¶VFU\LQJRXWIRUFKDQJH9RWH/DERXU[Figure 6.2] with its black and white evocation 
of the /$%285,61¶7:25.,1*GROHTXHXHDQGWKHILJXUHKROGLQJXSWKHSDUW\¶VUHGURVH
symbol, demonstrated a wish to deliver a message simply and evocatively.  
Innovation for the Conservatives came in a different form. Namely with the realisation that 
their posters had to be recognisably Conservative, and that billboard campaigns needed to be 
integrated within an overall communications strategy. Insights undoubtedly learnt from 
advertising agency expertise. In 1950, the imagery of Conservative billboards and the 
imagery of Conservative newspaper adverts combined. When the Conservatives worked with 
Aims of Industry in 1970, we can to some extent see the continued acceptance that 
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 M. Shulman, The Least Worst Television in the World, (London: 1973), p. 157 
10
 µ3LFWRULDO3URSDJDQGD¶/DERXU2UJDQLVHU0DUFKS 
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 -7KRPSVRQµ³3LFWRULDOOLHV´"SRVWHUVDnd politics in Britain, 1880-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2007) 197, p.185; L. Beers, Your Britain: Media and Making of the Labour Party (Harvard: 2010), p. 30 
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communication should cross campaigns. When in 1979 /$%285,61¶7:25.,1*appeared 
in a party election broadcast, it was clear that the message was something that crossed 
between media with ease.12 This is not to suggest that the campaigns of 1950 were the same 
as 1997, evidently they were not. The thesis does demonstrate, however, that the attempts at 
cohesive campaigning have long roots.   
 
6.2.2 Represent and represented 
This study has demonstrated that the people who occupied the political billboards of the 
twentieth century can be broken down into two distinct groups: the party leader and the 
people. Taking their cue from popular cartoons of the Edwardian era, political parties saw the 
poster as a method by which to undermine their rivals. These attacks often combined the 
political with the personal. David Lloyd George-as-child, for example, puzzled by the 
simplest of economic conundrums [Figure 1.23] expressed his negative capacities as a 
Chancellor through a suggestion of his limitable intelligence. After the Great War, this 
µYXOJDU¶ SHUVRQDOLW\ SROLWLFV UHPDLQHG 13  Any Labour posters, which promoted Ramsay 
MacDonald as a man made for leadership [Figures 2.31 and 2.32], were undermined by a 
Conservatives response that attacked MacDonald for being a crook and a charlatan. Such 
language was a demonstration of how posters would go beyond the acceptable extremes of 
other forms of communication. Images of a drunken Asquith [1.24] and lecherous Lloyd 
George [Figure 2.15] reflected reality, but also demonstrated just how far character 
DVVDVVLQDWLRQ ZHQW ,W DOVR GHPRQVWUDWHG WKDW WHUPV OLNH µSHUVRQDOLVDWLRQ¶ FRPPRQ WR WKH
literature relating to more recent studies of political communication can be easily applied to a 
more historic context.14 The posters demonstrate that the individual ± albeit in negative terms 
and in this instance on posters ± played as equally strong in at the beginning of the twentieth 
century as they did at the end.  
3DUWLHV¶ XVH RI personalised attack posters ended with the high turnouts and unprecedented 
levels of party identity of the mid-century. A time when it was thought best to avoid mention 
of rivals for fear of giving them free publicity. Even when the personal attack returned in 
1970 with <(67(5'$<¶60(1, Bernard Donoghue questioned whether it was worthwhile 
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 Conservative Party Election Broadcast, First broadcast 19 April 1979. 
13
 Lawrence, ElectiQJ2XU0DVWHUV¶(Oxford: 2009), p. 113 
14
 Lauri Karvonen was clear that this personalisation was a recent phenomenon. See the introduction to L. 
Karvonen (Ed.) The Personalisation of Politics, (ECPR Press: 2010), pp.1-6  
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JLYLQJ µIDFHV WR IDFHOHVV PHQ¶ 15  That poster did, however, begin the resurgence in the 
negative campaign and by the late twentieth century, attack advertising had reasserted itself. 
A fact demonstrated by the appearance of demonic Blair [Figure 5.1] and two-faced Major 
[Figure 5.12] in 1997. The election of 2010 demonstrated that personal attack remained 
central to political campaigning in Britain in the twenty-first century. When the 
Conservatives produced a billboard depicting a smiling Gordon Brown quoting some of his 
failed promises [Figure 6.3] it was clear that the type of personalised attack common in the 
first third of the last century continued as a valid method of campaigning.  
Parties turned to attack during periods of fluid voter support. The onset of a mass electorate 
provided a host of new voters for parties to attract. Posters were just one part of this aim, but 
just as parties promoted their own positive elements they sought to undermine their rivals 
claims. Posters were used to turn voters of the other side and such attack advertising is likely 
to continue. A belief exists within the advertising industry that the politics of denunciation 
provides the most effective way of speaking to the unaligned electorate. One advertising 
H[HFXWLYHZKRZRUNHGRQ/DERXU¶VFDPSDLJQVDLG WKDW LWZDV LQFUHDVLQJO\GLIILFXOW WR
µRZQ¶WKHSRVLWLYH16   
Posters did not just depict leaders so as to attack them. What this study has made clear is that 
posters personalise politics, attempting to create a bond between leader and led. Since the 
1920s each party has consistently used their own posters to praise the qualities of their 
leaders. Indeed, it has been a rare election where any party has not produced at least one 
positive depiction of its leader.17 This became increasingly more common as the century 
moved on, undoubtedly a reflection on wider changes to campaigning, with its greater 
emphasis on the personality of whoever happens to be party leader.18 This has not entirely 
been a late twentieth century development. As Chapter Two demonstrated, from the 1920s 
leader posters began to appear. Such an early start is not surprising. Leaders, and their 
trustfulness, are a concrete entity upon which the voter can latch, unlike the somewhat 
amorphous nature of party. They are all presidential in the sense that they incite votes based 
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 µ$ODQ$OGULGJH¶VLQIOXHQWLDOQH[WGRRUQHLJKERXU¶The Times, 14th May, 1970  
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 Mentioned in conversation with the author 
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 See for example Aside from the examples cited in the thesis see also Harold MacMillan in 1959 CPA: 
POSTER 1959-08 VOTE CONSERVATIVE, 1959, Conservative and Unionist Central Office; Alec Douglas 
Home. PHM: Vote CONSERVATIVE, 1964, Conservative and Unionist Central Office.  
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on the man and not the party, and to this extent have remained somewhat consistent over the 
century.  
If leaders have been depicted in similar ways across the century, the same cannot be said of 
the British people. Posters show that there has been a transition in male identity, which 
reflects changes in society and parties attitudes to it. Edwardian pictorial imagery defined 
masculinity through the pub. Into the inter-war period the appeal to men reflected parties 
perceptions of them. Labour and the Liberals concentrated on employment. The 
Conservatives and their fear of societal break-up, led the party to picturing men of all classes 
amongst a cohesive group, all of whom would enjoy the benefits of society. After 1945 new 
visions of masculinity emerged as parties adopted catchall election strategies and adapted to 
the age of affluence. As Chapter Three demonstrated, the father, a rare sight before the 
Second World War, became a far more regular site on British posters. Though this proved to 
be an aberration rather than a definite shift. Throughout the century poster designers 
continued to a return to a definition of masculinity through some form of paid employment. 
The father may have appeared and even on one instance so did the male consumer, but such 
depictions remained in the minority. In the majority of posters, male identity in the twentieth 
century was defined by employment or lack thereof. 
If posters failed to move beyond narrow confines of male identity it is also true that the 
appeal to women has been equally one-dimensional. Since entering the franchise, those 
women pictured on billboards have been confined to the domestic sphere, appearing as 
mothers and keepers of the household budget. Aside from 1929, when some women were 
shown as dominant political actors, poster portrayals of femininity have remained a 
remarkably stable presence. Posters of the 2010 election reinforced this conclusion. Of the six 
SRVWHUV SURGXFHG IRU WKH &RQVHUYDWLYH FDPSDLJQ µ,¶YH QHYHU YRWHG EHIRUH EXW¶ RQH RI WKH
men was depicted in paid employment [Figure 6.4] while the other man was seen holding his 
child and praising the Tories for sorting out the NHS. Of the four women featured in the 
campaign two declared an interest in families and children, while the other two thought the 
&RQVHUYDWLYHVZRXOGVROYH%ULWDLQ¶VµEURNHQ¶VRFLHW\DQG03¶VH[SHQVHV19  Rosie Campbell 
and Sarah Childs highlighted that during in 2010 there was across the manifestos a 
concentration on families with a particular focus on improving family life especially the work 
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 )RUWKHZKROHFDPSDLJQVHH(85256&*¶VZHEVLWHhttp://conservatives.eurorscg.com/never-voted-tory-
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life balance. This however, was not evident in the posters. As Campbell and Childs highlight 
mRVWSHRSOHGRQRWUHDGPDQLIHVWRVDQGµthose watching the news or reading the newspapers 
would instead have seen a presidential electoral campaign with policies for women and 
women SROLWLFLDQV SXVKHG WR WKH VLGHOLQHV¶ 20  It was clear that the Conservative poster 
campaign did little to disprove such a conclusion. 
 
While we can point towards a relatively stable depiction of gender across the century, class 
has proved a much more fluid signifier. Until the 1950s, the class of those protagonists who 
populated posters was readily identifiable. The working-class man or woman was easily 
distinguishable by dress, by occupation and by interest. As the century has worn on, this task 
has become much harder. In later posters it has becomes much more difficult to determine 
where those individuals ± when they appear in posters ± might fit into the stratas of British 
society. The apparent absence of class is not that surprising. Class dealignment over the 
course of the twentieth century has naturally led all parties towards an image of the voter 
defined by their ambiguity as opposed to anything else. Politicians continued to catagorise the 
public, yet more recent posters often no clues to quite what these new definitions look like. 
While the posters of 1910, 1929 and even 1950 help us better understand Conservative, 
Labour and Liberal visions of the people, the posters of 1997 over no real clues to the 
appearance of what Blair called at the 1996 party conference Essex Man. While the absence 
(or more accurately desertion) of class is unsurprising, what, however, has not emerged is any 
new distinct vision of the electorate. 
6.3 The changing face of poster display 
Changes in the way voters experience the billboard, is the one factor that has defined the 
posters shifting nature and continued relevance. Edwardian and inter-war voters saw political 
posters packed together on the billboard. By the end of the century posters occupied huge 
billboards on their own, and without the contest for the eye faced by their earlier cousins. 
This change was a forced one, changes to legislation quelling the egress of the manic illegal 
and legal fly-posting that dominated the earlier decades of the century. In this respect early 
political poster pioneers, such as the Liberal Charles Geake, have had thHLUDUJXPHQWV¶ WKDW
the most effective use of posters was to visually smash the viewers sight with as many 
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 5&DPSEHOODQG5&KLOGVµµ:DJV¶µ:LYHV¶DQGµ0RWKHUV¶%XWZKDWDERXW 
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different examples as possible destroyed by a common sense view that bigger and simpler 
was better.  
Such change has altered the characteristics of the poster. While John Hassall worked on 
Conservative posters based on the assumption that his designs must stand out from other 
examples, Saatchi & Saatchi working for the same party almost 80 years later had no such 
consideration. They knew what space the poster would occupy, the concern was to make it 
stand out from the commotion of life itself. This development reflects the changing landscape 
which poster have occupied. They have always been an urban form of communication. But 
where as at the first-half of the century they would have been mostly viewed on the street and 
on foot, the development of the posters both in scale and simplicity has reflected the need for 
communication adapted to the mass transit of public transport and increasingly the car. 
Indeed, a singular aspect of the poster is that even as the medium has moved from the 
visually complex styles of the first half of the twentieth century to the simpler ones of its 
latter half the need to catch attention and deliver the message quickly has always been 
paramount. As Peter Harle the Labour Party designer put it as early as 1948, when designing 
DSRVWHUµ5HPHPEHUDOZD\VWKDWWKHEDVLFLGHDLVWRSUHVHQWDPHVVDJHLQVXFKDZD\WKDWµKH
ZKRUXQVPD\UHDG¶¶21 It was as true then as it is now. 
With posters becoming in themselves less visually rich, and the way in which they were 
displayed matching this trend, the move towards simplicity would seem complete. However, 
the history of the display of the political poster does not end with the billboard. During more 
recent elections posters launches have become a central way of attracting press attention. 
Designed exclusively for the benefit of the press, the rise of these launches has meant that in 
contemporary Britain posters are as likely to be seen in newspapers or on television as they 
are on billboards. It is telling fact that Labour put up no posters in 2010 the party only 
launched them.  
Most recently innovation in display has come online. In 2010, there were a number of images 
GHVFULEHGDV µSRVWHUV¶ which only appeared via computer screens. Indeed, the Conservative 
UHVSRQVHWR/DERXU¶V&DPHURQ-as-Hunt poster was only ever depicted online.22 The speed at 
which the Conservatives produced their response suggested a continued dynamic role for the 
poster. The thesis has shown that throughout the century the poster rebuttal and parody have 
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 3+DUOHµ'HVLJQLQJDSRVWHU¶Labour Organiser, (Oct, 1949) 28: 331, pp. 12 ± 13. 
22
 D. Kavanagh and P. Cowley, The British General Election of 2010, (Hampshire: 2010) p. 144 
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long been a feature of campaigns. The reproduction of posters by cartoonists and the reuse of 
symbols by rival parties was part of the cut-and-thrust of elections. Posters have never been a 
static form of communication, and the development of digital billboard technology looks set 
to increase their dynamic character. In future parties will be able to display posters which 
respond to events that have occurred just hours before.23  
These changes in display, from billboard to launch, from launch to internet, demonstrate that 
as electioneering in general has innovated, so the poster has fitted in with such innovation. 
Although the poster by 2010 was in election terms an ancient form of campaigning, it had not 
been a static form. This rather contested relationship between the, to some eyes, old-
fashioned form of communication but one highly adaptable to current forms of campaigning 
ZDV GHPRQVWUDWHG ZLWK WKH /LEHUDO 'HPRFUDW µ/DEVHUYDWLYH¶ FDPSDLJQ 7KLV ODXQFK RI D
spoof new party involved a series of images designed by the Iris agency and communicated 
via social networking sites. The campaign, which was not branded as Liberal Democrat, 
attempted to generate a national dialogue about the mutual failings of the other two main 
protagonists. The spoof party had its own logo and cynical tag line, For more of the same and 
OHDGHU µ*RUYLG&DPHURZQ¶ $VDSDURG\ WKH/DEVHUYDWLYHVGHSOR\HG WKH WURSHVDVVRFLDWHG
with a genuine campaign such as a Party Election Broadcast and posters. It was a three 
cornered demonstration that posters were associated with the old, as they were linked to these 
apparently staid parties: that even in this more contemporary of campaigns posters had a role 
and finally and perhaps most importantly the symbolic importance of the poster to 
electioneering. In order to appear real, this fake campaign required posters. 
If this thesis has any validity, then reports of the death of the poster have been greatly 
exaggerated. Parties have constantly changed the way they have communicated with those 
whose votes they want. Yet, despite the coming of cinema, radio, television and the internet, 
the poster remains a central feature of all party campaigning. But is that which appears on 
FRPSXWHUVVFUHHQVVWLOOWHFKQLFDOO\DµSRVWHU¶RUKDVLWEHHQWUDQVPXWHGLQWRDQRWKHUIRUP,I
ZHUHWXUQWR&DUOR$UWXUR4XLQWDYDOOH¶VGHILQLWLRQKLJKOLJKWHGDWWKHYHU\VWDUWRIWKLVWKHVLV
ZHJHWWRWKHKHDUWRIWKHSRVWHU¶VORQJHYLW\,WLVWKHµUDSSRUWEHWZHHQLPDJHDQGZRUG¶WKDW
GHILQHV WKHP DQG LW LV EHFDXVH RI WKH FHQWUDOLW\ RI WKLV µUDSSRUW¶ WR %ULWLVK HOHFWLRQ
                                         
23
 The original Labour Gene-as-Hunt poster appeared as a digital billboard and launched by the Miliband 
brothers. See photograph in µ(G0LOLEDQGPXVWWUDGHLQDJUDQGSODQIRUDFDUHIXOZDWFKLQJEULHI¶Telegraph 
Online, 25 Oct 2010,  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/maryriddell/8086012/Ed-Miliband-
must-trade-in-a-grand-plan-for-a-careful-watching-brief.html [accessed 11 Jan 2014] 
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FRPPXQLFDWLRQ WKDW WKRVH RQOLQH µSRVWHUV¶ DUH GHILQHG DV VXFK *LYHQ WKDW SROLWLFLDQV ZLOO
still use the poster in one form or another for generations to come.  
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